Augustine v. State
| Decision Date | 10 February 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2019-CT-01467-SCT |
| Parties | Kobe AUGUSTINE a/k/a Kobe Jaquan Augustine a/k/a Kobe J. Augustine v. STATE of Mississippi |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER BY: GEORGE T. HOLMES, Jackson, MOLLIE MARIE McMILLIN
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: BARBARA WAKELAND BYRD, Jackson
EN BANC.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
¶1. Kobe Augustine was convicted of second-degree murder for the killing of Nigel Poole in Harrison County Circuit Court. A divided Court of Appeals1 reversed and remanded Augustine's conviction, opining that the circuit court erred by admitting hearsay testimony and that the error was not harmless. Augustine v. State , No. 2020-KA-01467-COA, ––– So.3d ––––, ––––, 2020 WL 7350676, at *18 (Miss. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2020). However, consistent with Mississippi law, the circuit court did not err by allowing an officer to testify to the content of a witness's prior statement for the purpose of impeachment. But even assuming that doing so was erroneous, the evidence against Augustine overwhelmingly supported his conviction.
¶2. Kobe Augustine, fifteen years old, shot and killed sixteen-year-old Nigel Poole. Augustine became a suspect during the police investigation of Poole's killing and was arrested after he was found hiding under his bed. When questioned by the police, Augustine initially stated that he "wasn't even there" when Poole was shot. He then said that someone shot at him and Poole from a car. Augustine later confessed that he and Poole had a confrontation, and Poole hit him on the left side of his face. Detective Werner did not find any indication of a struggle between the two.
¶3. During the trial, Nilah Hands testified that she was with Augustine and Poole the day of the shooting and that she had seen Augustine with a .38-caliber revolver earlier that day. Hands also testified that she heard "two gunshots go off" and saw Augustine "running down the street by himself." Hands also testified that she heard Augustine tell Clarence Clay, "I shot him."
¶4. The State called Irby Jules as a witness. On direct examination, Jules denied ever giving a prior statement to the police. The State desired to impeach Jules. Outside of the jury's presence, the State called Officer Keyhoe to establish Jules's prior statement. During a proffer, Keyhoe testified that Jules stated that he had previously talked to Augustine and that Augustine said he wanted to "catch a body," meaning that he wanted to kill someone. Jules told the officer that Augustine had offered to sell him a .38 caliber revolver for $150 one week before the shooting of Poole. Jules also told police that he believed that Augustine and Poole were having relations with the same girl.
¶5. The circuit court allowed Keyhoe to testify to the specifics of Jules's statement. Augustine objected, arguing that the testimony offered through Keyhoe contained hearsay and was prejudicial. The circuit court issued a limiting instruction to the jury.
¶6. Augustine testified that he had the gun and that Poole asked to shoot it. Augustine said that when he pulled the gun, Poole hit him, and the two wrestled over the gun. Augustine said that he grabbed the gun and "fired a warning." Augustine said Poole was still coming toward him after the first shot, so he shot again. Augustine then admitted that he had previously told detectives that Poole fell after the first shot. Augustine also admitted to lying to his friends, his brother, and detectives about what happened because he was scared and "did not want to go to jail."
¶7. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed Augustine's conviction and remanded the case for a new trial, opining the "admission of Officer Keyhoe's hearsay testimony constitutes error." Augustine , ––– So.3d at ––––, 2020 WL 7350676, at *1. The Court of Appeals held that Keyhoe's testimony regarding a prior statement was admissible for impeachment purposes but that other testimony regarding the content of Jules's statement was hearsay and prejudicial toward Augustine. Id. at ––––, 2020 WL 7350676 at *5. The Court of Appeals opined that the content of Jules's statement to the police only provided evidence of motive for the shooting. Id. at ––––, 2020 WL 7350676 at *6. The Court of Appeals further found that the prejudice caused by the officer's testimony was not cured by the circuit court's instruction. Id.
¶8. In his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge Greenlee wrote that the admission of Keyhoe's testimony did not constitute reversible error and that Augustine's conviction and sentence should be affirmed. Id. at ––––, 2020 WL 7350676 at *7 (Greenlee, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He wrote that because Keyhoe's " testimony was offered for impeachment purposes and the jury was instructed that it could not consider it as substantive evidence, the trial court's decision to admit the evidence was not an abuse of discretion and was consistent with Mississippi law." Id. at ––––, 2020 WL 7350676 at *8. Judge Greenlee further offered that an error, if any, in admitting the testimony was harmless and that the State met its burden with respect to the second-degree-murder charge. Id.
¶9. When reviewing a hearsay challenge, this Court applies the abuse-of-discretion standard. White v. State , 48 So. 3d 454, 456 (Miss. 2010). An erroneous admission of hearsay can be deemed harmless if "the same result would have been reached had the errors not existed." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Tate v. State , 912 So. 2d 919, 926 (Miss. 2005) ).
¶10. Augustine first argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by allowing Officer Keyhoe to testify at all. Augustine argues that Keyhoe could not testify since Jules did not give an inconsistent statement. Rather, he denied giving a statement at all. Despite Augustine's arguments, the circuit court properly relied on the Mississippi Rules of Evidence to determine that Keyhoe's testimony was permissible for the limited purpose of impeachment.
¶11. Rule 607 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence provides that "[a]ny party, including the party that called the witness, may attack the witness's credibility." MRE 607. This Court has held that not only inconsistent statements but also "a flat denial by a witness constitutes an inconsistency subject to impeachment." Harrison v. State , 534 So. 2d 175, 179 (Miss. 1988).
¶12. "Impeachment can be accomplished through the introduction of extrinsic evidence." Id. at 179 (citing MRE 613(b) ; Hubbard v. State , 437 So. 2d 430, 434-35 (Miss. 1983) ). Rule 613(b), which specifically addresses extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement, reads in pertinent part:
Extrinsic evidence of a witness's prior inconsistent statement is admissible only if the witness is given an opportunity to explain or deny the statement and an adverse party is given an opportunity to examine the witness about it, or if justice so requires.
¶13. In Harrison , the Court held that a proper predicate for impeachment had been established and that impeachment through extrinsic evidence was proper. Harrison , 534 So. 2d at 179. The witness was given an opportunity to explain and/or deny his statements, and the witness was available for examination by opposing counsel. Id.
The prior statements of Ray Lee Patty to Officer Coleman were inconsistent with his testimony at trial. On direct and re-direct, Patty denied telling Officer Coleman that he "heard Annie Ruth hollering," or that the defendant kept saying he "had messed them up." It was proper, therefore, to elicit from Officer Coleman that Patty had previously made these statements. It is clear without reference to authority that a flat denial by a witness constitutes an inconsistency subject to impeachment.
Id. Our precedent, which governs the Court of Appeals' review, establishes that the trial judge has the discretion to admit prior inconsistent statements for impeachment purposes. Carothers v. State , 152 So. 3d 277, 282 (Miss. 2014). Only when the trial court finds that the purported purpose of impeachment for offering the statements is in bad faith or is subterfuge to mask the true purpose of the statement(s) to prove truth of the matter asserted is impeachment by prior inconsistent statement not allowed. Id. These requirements were not established in the record. Thus, no basis to override the trial court's ruling exists, and the ruling should not be disturbed.
Id. at 1212-13. The trial court allowed officers to testify on rebuttal regarding a witness's prior statement. Id. at 1213. A witness had testified that she had not seen the defendant since late 2002. Id. Over the defense's objection, the officers testified in rebuttal that the witness made a statement that she had seen the defendant in March 2003. Id. at 1211-12. The witness was called in surrebuttal and testified that she did not make such a statement to the...
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Green v. State
...of the charge for which he is presently on trial." [6] Augustine v. State, 2020 WL 7350676 (Miss. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2020), rev'd, 337 So.3d 646 (Miss. 2022), was reversed by the Supreme Court's decision discussed later. See infra at ¶¶35-40. [7] We use the Court of Appeals' now-reversed opi......
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Green v. State
...of the charge for which he is presently on trial." [6] Augustine v. State, 2020 WL 7350676 (Miss. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2020), rev'd, 337 So.3d 646 (Miss. 2022), was reversed by the Supreme Court's decision discussed later. See infra at ¶¶35-40. [7] We use the Court of Appeals' now-reversed opi......