Auldridge v. State

• Decision Date: 03 March 1976
• Docket Number: No. 51472,51472
• Citation: 533 S.W.2d 821
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
• Parties: Dennis Ervin AULDRIDGE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

Page 821

533 S.W.2d 821

Dennis Ervin AULDRIDGE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 51472.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

March 3, 1976.

Frank W. Sullivan, III, Fort Worth, for appellant.

Tim Curry, Dist. Atty. and Marvin Collins, Asst. Dist. Atty., Fort Worth, Jim D. Vollers, State's Atty., and David S. McAngus, Asst. State's Atty., Austin, for the State.

OPINION

DALLY, Commissioner.

This is an appeal from a conviction for the offense of aggravated robbery. The appellant waived a jury trial and entered a plea of guilty before the court. The court assessed punishment of imprisonment for 7 years.

The only ground of error presented by counsel is that: 'The trial judge erred in not impaneling a jury to determine appellant's competency to stand trial in accordance with Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. Art. 46.02(2)(g)(1.)' ¹ There is no contention on appeal that the appellant was insane at the time he committed the offense.

'It is well settled that the conviction of an accused person, while he is legally incompetent to stand trial, violates due process. Bishop v. United States, 350 U.S. 961, 76 S.Ct. 440, 100 L.Ed. 835 (1956); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966); Perryman v. State, 494 S.W.2d 542 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). Due process requires a separate hearing to determine competency to stand trial. Pate v. Robinson, supra. While Pate would not require a jury trial on such issue, Texas law does. Townsend v. State, 427 S.W.2d 55 (Tex.Cr.App.1968); Cavender v. State, 515 S.W.2d 277 (Tex.Cr.App.1974).

'In Noble v. State, 505 S.W.2d 543 (Tex.Cr.App.1974), this court said:

"Recently, in Ainsworth v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 493 S.W.2d 517 (1973), we discussed what is necessary to bring into play the due process requirement of a separate hearing:

"'An accused is not required to prove actual insanity or incompetency before the trial judge is required to conduct a separate hearing on the matter. If this were the rule, the separate hearing procedure would become meaningless. However, it is necessary that evidence come before the court, from some source, of sufficient force to create in the court's mind reasonable ground for the judge to doubt the competency of the accused to stand trial. Once this occurs, the court should conduct a hearing out of the presence of the jury to determine whether or not there is in fact an issue as to the competence of the accused to stand trial.'

"Once the separate inquiry is made out of the jury's presence, the due process requirement is met. If the trial court determines that no such issue exists, his decision will not be disturbed in the absence of abuse of discretion. However, if the issue is found to exist, then Texas law requires the court to halt the proceedings and empanel a separate jury to determine the issue uncluttered by the evidence relevant only to the question of guilt or innocence. Ainsworth v. State, supra; Vardas v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 488 S.W.2d 467; Hefley v. State, Tex.Civ.App., 480 S.W.2d 810; Townsend (sic) v. State, supra; Article 46.02, V.A.C.C.P. . . ." Bonner v. State, 520 S.W.2d 901 (Tex.Cr.App.1975).

The victim of the robbery, which occurred in a liquor store, testified that he had known the forty-year old appellant for longer than ten years prior to the robbery. Another eye witness who had known the appellant for a number of years also testified about the robbery. The appellant used a shotgun to obtain $200 in the robbery.

After being fully admonished the appellant entered his plea of guilty on June 9, 1975. He had filed a motion requesting that he be granted probation. He testified in support of that motion, and also testified at length concerning his prior work record and medical history. He testified that he had received treatment for mental illness on several occasions; he had been in military service; he had attended a trade school; he had worked at a number of different jobs for a large aircraft manufacturer for over ten years. One of his jobs was as a technical writer for this firm.

The appellant said that he did not remember committing the offense but he was sure it happened if the witnesses whom he had known for many years said that he had committed the robbery, but in answer to a question put to him by the court the appellant testified that he was not making the contention that he was 'insane' at the time of trial. A well drawn handwritten motion demanding a speedy trial was admitted in evidence; the appellant acknowledged that he had authored the motion while he was in jail.

On March 13, 1975, the appellant's court-appointed attorney, prior to trial, filed a motion stating that the appellant appeared to be insane and incapable of effectively assisting his attorney in the defense of the pending charge and requested that a psychiatrist be appointed to examine the appellant. On the same day the motion was filed the trial court...