Aultman Engine & Thresher Co. v. Greenlee

• Decision Date: 17 May 1907
• Parties: THE AULTMAN ENGINE & THRESHER COMPANY, Appellant, v. W. F. GREENLEE and MRS.W. F. GREENLEE, Appellees
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

111 N.W. 1007

134 Iowa 368

THE AULTMAN ENGINE & THRESHER COMPANY, Appellant, v. W. F. GREENLEE and MRS.W. F. GREENLEE, Appellees

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

May 17, 1907

Appeal from Benton District Court.--HON. OBED CASWELL, Judge.

ACTION in equity in the nature of a creditors' bill. Petition dismissed, and plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

C Nichols and C. W. E. Snyder, for appellant.

Montgomery & Chambers and Whipple & Brown, for appellees.

OPINION

WEAVER, C. J.

In the year 1902 one Allen Greenlee, being seised of certain lands in Benton county, Iowa died intestate, and by the terms of his will one-twelfth part of said lands was devised to his son, W. F. Greenlee, subject to a charge or lien of $ 350. Thereafter, on November 28, 1903, W. F. Greenlee conveyed all his right, title and interest in said lands by warranty deed to his wife, Ella M. Greenlee, in whom the title still stands. About March 1, 1905, the plaintiff recovered a judgment against the said W. F. Greenlee in the district court of Benton county for several hundred dollars upon a claim antedating the conveyance aforesaid. An execution upon said judgment being returned unsatisfied, this action was begun alleging that the conveyance by Greenlee to his wife was in fraud of his creditors, and asking to subject said lands to the payment of the judgment. To this claim the defendants answering separately deny the alleged fraud, and aver that said conveyance was made in payment of a bona fide indebtedness and pursuant to an agreement entered into in good faith long before the date of its execution and delivery, and before the origin of the debt to the plaintiff. A question of homestead rights is also raised by the answer. The wife also, by cross-petition, asks to have the title of the land quieted in her. The trial court found the equities to be with the defendants and dismissed the bill.

The principal issue is one of fact, and possesses no such unusual features as to call for an extended discussion of the evidence. It appears that at the date of their marriage neither the husband nor wife had property or money to any considerable amount. The wife is shown, however, to have been a music teacher of experience, who was capable of earning and did, in fact, earn a considerable income, while the husband seems not to have been very prosperous. It is the claim of the defendants, and the evidence tends to show, that in 1897 and before the debt to plaintiff was contracted, the husband and wife entered into an agreement by which she undertook to lend him sums of money from time to time and to invest other of her earnings in payment of bills contracted for the support of the family in consideration of his promise to turn over or convey to her whatever share or interest he might thereafter receive from the estate of his father on the latter's decease. According to her testimony, she thereafter loaned to her husband and expended for him under said agreement money to the aggregate amount of $ 971, in consideration of which he made to her the deed in question in accordance with his promise. The testimony of the husband and wife is quite direct and consistent with the truth of this claim, and it finds some support and corroboration in other circumstances, which we do not stop here to relate. The points made for a reversal of the decree below are as follows:

I. That the terms of the alleged agreement between the defendants are too indefinite to be upheld as a contract. It may be that, if this were an action by the wife to enforce a specific performance of the agreement, this objection would be available, but we do not think it can be here sustained. While in its original statement the agreement was somewhat vague, as oral contracts are quite apt to be, it was still reasonably definite. Moreover, it has been fully performed. The fact that a contract may not be susceptible of specific enforcement does not necessarily imply its invalidity, and, if the parties thereto interpret its terms and carry it into effect by the transfer of property, the creditors of neither can demand the invalidating of such transfer on the mere ground of vagueness of the preliminary agreement.

II. It is next said that, while an agreement by a person to sell or assign his prospective inheritance will under some circumstances be enforced, yet to be so treated the agreement must be fair and free from fraud in its terms and must be made with the consent of the ancestor. Here again we may say that assuming the rule of law to be as stated, and that its application would be sufficient to defeat the claim of the wife for a specific enforcement of her agreement with her husband, it does not follow that it affords any ground to invalidate the transaction when it has once been performed. True, in this as in all other transfers of property, if the transaction was planned or carried out with intent to defraud creditors or was a purely voluntary one on the part of the debtor, the court will...