Aultman v. Meyers
| Decision Date | 02 August 1948 |
| Docket Number | 47258. |
| Parties | AULTMAN et al. v. MEYERS et al. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Floyd E. Page, of Denison, for appellant.
L W. Powers and L. V. Gilchrist, both of Denison, for appellees.
There is no material disagreement over the facts. The matter for determination is whether they sustain the court's decree. On December 2, 1930, Sada A. Ford executed her will, by which she made bequests of $1000 each to the plaintiffs and to another niece and nephews. After making other dispositions she directed that her 239-acre farm be sold and two charitable bequests of $1000 and $1500 be paid from the sale proceeds, and the remainder be divided equally between the Christian Home at Council Bluffs, the Eastern Star Masonic Home at Boone, and the Eastern Star Orphanage Relief Fund. The plaintiffs were made equal residuary legatees, and the defendant, Mearl O. Meyers, was nominated as executor.
On July 16 1931, Sada A. Ford, as donor, and the defendant bank, as trustee, executed the trust agreement involved herein. The instrument states: '* * * I * * * hereby give, devise and set over to the Crawford County Trust and Savings Bank' her farm and personal property described in Exhibit 'A', attached to the trust agreement The instrument further provides that the trust property shall be invested under order of the district court and the entire net income and any part of the corpus of the trust fund needed shall be paid to the donor as long as she may live; that the real estate, with the grain, livestock and other personal property thereon, may be sold and the proceeds invested in approved securities as the court may direct 'but said real estate shall not be sold without the written consent of the donor.' The donor reserved the right to revoke the trust at any time by giving written notice thereof to the trustee. The cause of this litigation arose from the diverse constructions which the parties placed upon the instrument as a whole, and particularly the following provision thereof: 'Upon the death of the Donor the property of this trust estate remaining shall be divided and distributed as directed by the will of Donor herein now made and executed.' The will referred to is the one noted above. The personal property listed in Exhibit 'A', referred to in the trust agreement, consisted of county, and road, bonds and United States Liberty bonds of an aggregate face value of $30,800. The court records show the administration of the trust from its inception into April 1947. These records were received in evidence subject to the objection of the executor.
On May 24, 1932, a general guardian was appointed for the person and property of Sada A. Ford. Thereafter a succeeding guardian informed the trustee in writing of his appointment, and therein notified the trustee of his revocation of the trust, and demanded possession of the trust property. The trustee having failed to comply with the demand, the guardian on August 22, 1933 filed his petition in court alleging that the trust relation was revoked by the substitution of the guardianship relation, and by the letter of revocation, and prayed for a decree requiring the trustee to fully account for, and to surrender, the trust property to the guardian. In dismissing the petition of the guardian, the district court said:
Sada A. Ford died February 26, 1947 leaving the will noted herein as her last testament. The executor offered the will for probate, and two nephews and a niece of the testatrix, each of whom was a legatee for $1000 under the will, filed objections to the probate on the ground that the testatrix was of unsound mind when the will was executed. The three charitable institutions, which received the bulk of the sale proceeds of the farm, and the personal property, appeared against the contestants. On July 11, 1947 a stipulation was agreed upon by the contestants and the resisters providing that the objections to the probate of the will were withdrawn and that the farm should be sold, by the person appointed by the court to administer the estate, to the objectors to the will for $24,000, and that the provisions of the will be carried out. The stipulation was filed on July 14, 1947, and on that date the will was admitted to probate, and Mearl O. Meyers was appointed executor, and received Letters Testamentary on July 15, 1947 on filing a bond of $50,000.
On July 14, 1947 the plaintiffs filed their petition in the proceeding before us, alleging some of the factual matters stated herein, and that as residuary legatees they had an interest in the amount of costs and fees which will be taken from the trust estate if it is turned over to the executor, and that if the trustee be not restrained it may surrender the trust estate to the executor. They pray that the trustee be restrained from so doing and that it be directed to make distribution of the estate among those who are beneficiaries thereunder. The trustee, apparently with no thought of surrendering the property to the executor, filed answer joining in the relief asked by plaintiffs.
The executor filed motion for dismissal of the petition and, subject to the ruling thereon, answered and alleged that the probate court had taken jurisdiction of the estate prior to the commencement of the action, that administration was proceeding, and claims against the estate in excess of $9000 had been filed, and that a court of equity, under the circumstances, could not rightfully interfere therewith. Dismissal of the plaintiff's petition was asked in each pleading.
By findings, conclusions, and order filed, the court found that the trust agreement had been duly executed by competent parties conveying real estate and transferring personal property to the trustee, thereby making permanent provision for the care and disposal of her property, subject to her consent to the sale of real estate, and, to her right to revoke the agreement, which revocation had never been exercised during the donor's life, nor effected by her death; that administration and distribution of the estate would be by the district court and it was of no importance whether it be in probate by the executor, or in the forum of equity by the trustee. The court concluded as a matter of law that the earlier decree of the court in the proceeding brought by the guardian to terminate the trust was res judicata against the executor as to the issue herein. Decree was entered in favor of plaintiffs and the trustee, and against the executor.
It is the contention of the appellant that Sada A. Ford intended the trust agreement to be in force and effect only during her life, and that, upon her death, all of her property, including that covered by the trust agreement, should pass by and be disposed of by her will, and be distributed by the executor of her estate.
It is our conclusion from the trust agreement and the will and the record as a whole that the intention of the deceased was as contended for by the appellant. This conclusion is quite unavoidable if the testimony of the attorney who drew the trust agreement, which was rejected by the court, be considered.
I. Appellant urges a number of propositions for a reversal. We will discuss two of them. The trial court relied largely upon the judgment of the district court in 1934, hereinbefore mentioned, which was adverse to the guardian of Sada A. Ford. It was the conclusion of the trial court that said judgment was res judicata against the the executor of the main issue in the case then before the court. In this, the court, in our judgment, erred.
The principles of res judicata are well settled and have often been announced by this court. Before the doctrine is applicable in any case there must be certain recognized identities in the adjudicated case and in the case on trial. It is particularly essential that there be identity in the cause of action, issue, or matter for decision. As said in Wheatley v. City of Fairfield, 221 Iowa 66, 75, 264 N.W. 906 911: 'It is a well-established rule, of almost universal application, that a judgment, if rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, on the merits, constitutes a complete bar and estoppel to a subsequent action between the same identical parties based upon the same claim or demand or cause of action.' (Italics supplied.) For other authorities and decisions relating to res judicata or to estoppel to relitigate matters before litigated, see 30 Am.Jur. (Judgments), 908, sect. 161 et...
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