Austin v. Caterpillar, Inc.
| Decision Date | 20 December 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 1:21-cv-1113 |
| Parties | BRADLEY AUSTIN, Plaintiff, v. CATERPILLAR INC., et al, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois |
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (ECF No 16); Defendant Black and Decker's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 7); and Defendant Caterpillar Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 9). For the reasons stated below Plaintiff's Motion to Remand is DENIED and Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (7) and (9) are both GRANTED.
Plaintiff Bradley Austin is a former employee of Defendant Caterpillar. (ECF No. 1-2 at 5). On or around April 20, 2018, Plaintiff injured his wrist while using an electric wrench that Defendant Caterpillar provided to him. Id. at 4-5. Defendant Black and Decker is the manufacturer of the wrench. Id. at 4. Plaintiff asserts that the clutch on the wrench did not engage, resulting in the wrench spinning around and twisting Plaintiff's right wrist. Id. Plaintiff claims that this caused severe and permanent injuries. Id. at 6. He claims that he is hindered from attending to his usual daily activities, that he has suffered and that he will continue to suffer great physical pain, and that he has spent and will continue to spend money for medical care. Id. Plaintiff further claims that the product was in an unreasonably dangerous condition while it was in possession of Defendant Caterpillar. Id at 5.
Plaintiff initially filed his case in Livingston County bringing sixteen counts related to products liability and warranty claims ECF No. 1-2. Defendant Black and Decker timely removed, citing diversity jurisdiction and claiming that Plaintiff fraudulently joined Defendant Caterpillar for the purpose of destroying diversity. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff and Defendant Black and Decker are diverse parties, but Defendant Caterpillar and Plaintiff are citizens of the same state. Defendant argues that the Illinois Worker's Compensation Act (“IWCA”) provides Plaintiff's exclusive remedy against his employer in this situation and that the claim is otherwise barred because Plaintiff signed a broad relief in settling his worker's compensation claim. Plaintiff argues that Defendant Caterpillar is a necessary party and that the case should at least proceed to discovery. The Court will first address Plaintiff's Motion to Remand to confirm that it has jurisdiction over these claims before turning to Defendants' two Motions to Dismiss.
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Section 1332(a)(1) confers jurisdiction to district courts to hear state law claims when complete diversity of citizenship exists between the parties: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75, 000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). If a plaintiff files a case in state court even though the federal courts also have jurisdiction, the defendant may remove the case to federal court. Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 89 (2005). Section 1441(a) provides:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.
28 U.S.C. § 1441.
Jurisdiction of the court generally depends upon the state of things at the time the action is brought. Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 570 (2004). An exception to this rule is applied when a party is “fraudulently joined.” Fraudulent joinder may be found where a litigant makes “false allegations of jurisdictional fact, ” but is more commonly found where a plaintiff makes “a claim against an in-state defendant that simply has no chance of success, whatever the plaintiff's motives.” Poulos v. Naas Foods, Inc., 959 F.2d 69, 73 (7th Cir. 1992). The party attempting to demonstrate fraudulent joinder “bears a heavy burden to show that, after resolving all issues of fact and law in favor of the non-moving party, the non-moving party cannot establish a cause of action.” Thornton v. M7 Aerospace, LP, 796 F.3d 757, 765 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Poulos, 959 F.2d at 73).
Defendant Black and Decker filed a Response to Plaintiff's Motion to remand and argues that the Illinois Worker's Compensation Act bars Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Caterpillar and that in any event, Plaintiff already signed a settlement agreement releasing Defendant Caterpillar from any claims involving Plaintiff's injury with the electric wrench at work.[1] Without citing any relevant case law, Plaintiff responds that he needs discovery first and that the only effect the settlement could have on the present litigation would be to offset any judgment Plaintiff may obtain from this lawsuit. ECF No. 12 at 5. Finally Plaintiff argues that to find that the settlement agreement had any effect on the current litigation, the Court must determine that Plaintiff intended the settlement to resolve all disputes, again suggesting that discovery is needed before the Court can decipher the Parties' intentions.
Generally, the Workers' Compensation Act provides the exclusive means by which an employee can recover against an employer for a work-related injury. Folta v. Marine Servs. Co., 43 N.E. 3d 108, 113 (Ill. 2015) (citing Meerbrey v. Marshall Field and Co., Inc., 564 N.E.2d 1222 (Ill. 1990)). However, an employee can escape the exclusivity provisions of the Act if the employee establishes that the injury (1) was not accidental; (2) did not arise from his employment; (3) was not received during the course of employment; or (4) was not compensable under the Act. Id.; see also Collier v. Wagner Castings Co., 408 N.E.2d 198 (1980). As Defendant Black and Decker points out, Plaintiff filed a worker's compensation case against Caterpillar for this same incident and thus, acknowledged that this was an accidental injury arising from his employment and covered by IWCA. See ECF No. 10-3 at 4. Plaintiff's Complaint similarly reflects that his employer assigned him to work using the wrench and that while using the wrench to tighten screws, the clutch on the wrench failed to engage. ECF No. 1-2. The Court agrees that Plaintiff does not include factual allegations that would support a finding that the injury was anything other than accidental and occurred during the course of Plaintiff's employment.
Plaintiff also vaguely argues that his employer is a distributor of the wrench and thus, a required party. ECF No. 16 at 3. In his Response to Defendant Caterpillar's Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff states that discovery is necessary to discover “what additional role Caterpillar may have played in causing Plaintiff's injuries.” ECF No. 12 at 4. Defendant Black and Decker helpfully explains that in some limited circumstances a dual capacity exception applies, where plaintiffs show that their employer acted in two distinct capacities and they were injured as a result of conduct their employer engaged while acting in the capacity other than that of employer. ECF No. 19 at 7 (citing Murcia v. Textron, Inc., 795 N.E.2d 773 (Ill.App.Ct. 2003)). Defendant further explains that Illinois Courts have held that supplying tools is a natural incident of the employer-employee relationship and does not give rise to dual capacity. ECF No. 19 at 7 (). In Rosales, the plaintiff was injured using a punch press that the employer had modified by removing a safety control. The majority refused to find that the employer had become a quasi-manufacturer and held that providing tools does not constitute a second capacity of the employer. Rosales, 354 N.E.2d 553. In Murcia, the court held that the mere fact that the employer had modified the press that injured the plaintiff did not impose obligations unrelated to those flowing from its status as an employer and plaintiff was unable to take advantage of the dual capacity doctrine. Murcia, 795 N.E.2d at 779. Accordingly, the Court held that the IWCA barred the plaintiff's claims.
Plaintiff cites a case from the Northern District of Illinois to support his position that the IWCA exclusivity provisions “do not apply in cases where a manager or supervisor of a defendant was acting as an alter ego of the defendant.” ECF No. 12 at 4 (citing Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, Inc., 2016 WL 826403, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 2016)). Plaintiff overlooks a critical piece of this exception that requires that the employer or its “alter ego” intentionally inflect harm upon an employee. Jones, 2016 WL at *2 (citing Meerbrey v. Marshall Field & Co., Inc., 564 N.E.2d 1222 (Ill. 1990)). In Jones the court further clarified that the Supreme Court of Illinois has held that torts committed by coworkers are generally treated as accidental for the purpose of IWCA. Id. (citing Meerbery, 564 N.E.2d at 1227). The facts of the case are also readily distinguishable from the present case. The plaintiff in Jon...
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