Austin v. Clark Equipment Co.
| Decision Date | 06 March 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 93-1701,K-D,93-1701 |
| Citation | 48 F.3d 833 |
| Parties | Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,165 Brenda H. AUSTIN; Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CLARK EQUIPMENT COMPANY; Hyster Company, Defendants-Appellees, andManitou, Incorporated; Hyster-Yale Material, Incorporated; Nacco Industries, Incorporated, Defendants. Product Liability Advisory Council, Incorporated, Amicus Curiae. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
ARGUED: S.D. Roberts Moore, Gentry, Locke, Rakes & Moore, Roanoke, VA, for appellants. Henry M. Sackett, III, Edmunds & Williams, Lynchburg, VA, Michael Thomas Wharton, Wharton, Levin, Ehrmantraut, Klein & Nash, Annapolis, MD, for appellees. ON BRIEF: Melissa Warner Scoggins, Gentry, Locke, Rakes & Moore, P. Brent Brown, Carter, Brown & Osborne, P.C., Roanoke, VA, for appellants. Kenneth J. Ries, Johnson, Ayers & Matthews, Roanoke, VA, for appellee Clark Equipment; David B. Hart, Gary B. Tegencamp, Wooten & Hart, P.C., Roanoke, VA, for appellee K-D Manitou. Kenneth S. Abraham, University of Virginia School of Law, Charlottesville, VA; Stephen J. Goodman, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Washington, DC, for amicus curiae.
Before POWELL, Associate Justice (Retired), United States Supreme Court, sitting by designation, NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, and OSTEEN, United States District Judge for the Middle District of North Carolina, sitting by designation.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge OSTEEN wrote the opinion, in which Justice POWELL and Judge NIEMEYER joined.
Brenda H. Austin was impaled by the mast of a carpet lift truck while working at Lee's Carpet, Inc., a division of Burlington Industries, Inc. ("Burlington"). In the ensuing products liability action, Austin alleged, inter alia, that Hyster Company ("Hyster"), the manufacturer of Austin's lift truck, Clark Equipment Company ("Clark"), the manufacturer of the second lift truck involved in the accident, and K-D Manitou, Inc. ("Manitou"), the manufacturer of the mast on the second lift truck, were negligent and breached the implied warranty of merchantability (Hyster, Clark, and Manitou are collectively referred to as "Appellees"). The district court granted summary judgment holding that the products were not unreasonably dangerous because the alleged defects were open and obvious. Agreeing with the district court's decision to grant Appellees' motion for summary judgment, we affirm.
The catastrophic accident forming the basis of this litigation occurred on September 21, 1988, at a Lee's Carpet warehouse in Glasgow, Virginia. Austin and James McDaniel were both operating forklift-type trucks with long poles or masts used to move rolls of carpet. Austin, driving the Hyster lift truck, entered the warehouse to retrieve a roll of carpet. After loading a roll of carpet on the mast, Austin proceeded to leave the warehouse, driving in reverse, the correct direction. Approaching an intersection, Austin slowed down, but did not stop. She does not remember whether she sounded her horn at the crossing. As Austin turned, she looked forward to make sure her load cleared the storage racks. When she turned around, looking backwards, she saw the other forklift and was pierced by the mast on McDaniel's truck.
Prior to the accident, McDaniel, operating a Clark lift truck with a Manitou mast, 1 was loading carpet onto a wagon. After loading a third roll of carpet on the wagon, McDaniel backed up to move his mast around the wagon. He then began moving forward with the mast some distance off the floor and in a straight forward position to retrieve a fourth roll of carpet. As McDaniel was moving forward, Austin rounded the intersection, and the collision occurred. McDaniel did not sound his horn before impact. Both the Clark and Hyster lift trucks had operational flashing lights at the time of the accident. Neither lift truck was equipped with rear motion alarms or rear view mirrors.
On September 19, 1990, Austin filed a complaint against five defendants alleging claims based on negligence, strict liability, and breach of express and implied warranties. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company ("Liberty Mutual"), as Austin's employer's workers' compensation carrier, was added as a party plaintiff (both Austin and Liberty Mutual are referred to as "Austin" herein). Two defendants were dismissed because they were not proper parties to the action. Virginia does not recognize a cause of action based on strict liability in tort; and, the strict liability claim was dismissed. The claims based on express warranties and the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose were withdrawn in response to Appellees' motion for summary judgment. The remaining claims against Hyster, Clark, and Manitou were allegations of design defect and failure to warn based on negligence and breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.
Appellees moved for summary judgment on the following grounds: (1) that any defects in the lift trucks or mast were open and obvious; (2) that Burlington was a sophisticated user of the products; (3) that the actions of McDaniel and Burlington were superseding and intervening causes of Austin's injuries; 2 and (4) that, as a matter of law, Austin was contributorily negligent. Manitou also argued that Austin assumed the risk of injury as to the mast assembly. The district court granted summary judgment, holding that risks created by the absence of rear view mirrors, audible motion alarms, adequate flashing lights, and a mast that did not obstruct vision were open and obvious, barring Austin's claims, 821 F.Supp. 1130. Austin is now before the court on appeal.
The granting of a motion for summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Higgins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 863 F.2d 1162, 1167 (4th Cir.1988). Summary judgment is appropriate in those cases where it is established through pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and other discovery documents that there exists no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Thus, it is the burden of the moving party to show the court that no material factual issues exist for trial. Of course, the court must draw any permissible inference from the underlying facts as established in the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Pulliam Inv. Co. v. Cameo Prop., 810 F.2d 1282, 1286 (4th Cir.1987).
When the moving party has carried its burden, the nonmoving party must come forward with evidence which shows more than some "metaphysical doubt" that genuine and material factual issues exist. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. at 1356. A mere scintilla of evidence presented by the nonmoving party is insufficient to circumvent summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512. Rather, the nonmoving party must convince the court that upon the record taken as a whole a rational trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party. Id. at 248-49, 106 S.Ct. at 2510.
The district court had diversity jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1332. The parties agree that Virginia law controls this action. Virginia law provides that:
The standard of safety of goods imposed on the seller or manufacturer of a product is essentially the same whether the theory of liability is labeled warranty or negligence.... Under either the warranty theory or the negligence theory the plaintiff must show, (1) that the goods were unreasonably dangerous either for the use to which they would ordinarily be put or for some other reasonably foreseeable purpose, and (2) that the unreasonably dangerous condition existed when the goods left the defendant's hands.
Logan v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 216 Va. 425, 428, 219 S.E.2d 685, 687 (1975). A product is unreasonably dangerous if it is "defective" in assembly, manufacture or design, or if not labeled with an adequate warning. Bly v. Otis Elevator Co., 713 F.2d 1040, 1043 (4th Cir.1983).
Case law has established that a manufacturer is not liable for failing to warn of an "open and obvious" defect. See Spangler v. Kranco, Inc., 481 F.2d 373, 375 (4th Cir.1973); Marshall v. H.K. Ferguson Co., 623 F.2d 882, 886 (4th Cir.1980). A risk is open and obvious if the person using the product is or should be aware of the risk. Spangler, 481 F.2d at 375. A warning is therefore superfluous because the user is or should be aware of the obvious danger. Restatement (Second) of Torts, Sec. 388, reflects this principle, stating that:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel...
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