Austin v. State
Decision Date | 14 February 1964 |
Docket Number | No. 4161,4161 |
Citation | 160 So.2d 730 |
Parties | Rudolph Jerome AUSTIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Carl M. Collier, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
James W. Kynes, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, Leonard R. Mellon, Asst. Atty. Gen., Miami, for appellee.
Rudolph Jerome Austin was indicted for the offense of rape, was by a jury found guilty with recommendation of mercy, and on June 4, 1962, was sentenced by the court to the state prison for the balance of his natural life. This defendant was represented throughout the trial proceedings by a conpetent attorney of his own choosing and employment, experienced in the field of criminal law; no appeal from the judgment of conviction and sentence was ever taken. After having served nearly a year of his sentence, Austin prepared and filed pro se a motion to vacate or set aside the sentence pursuant to Criminal Procedure Rule 1, F.S.A. ch. 924 Appendix. From an order of the trial court denying this motion, he also composed and filed his own notice of appeal but is now represented here by court-appointed counsel. The motion, basically, is directed to insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction and sentence. Other questions are raised with regard to alleged false swearing of testimony and to a claimed illegal search of Austin's car without a search warrant.
Our study of appellant's motion has revealed to us no basis upon which the trial judge should have granted it; his action in declining to do so was therefore proper.
As the Supreme Court of Florida pointed out in Roy v. Wainwright, 1963, 151 So.2d 825, at page 828, Criminal Procedure Rule 1 , 28 U.S.C.A., a federal statute which has been in effect since June 25, 1948. The rule provides for post-conviction remedy under certain situations. These situations are where the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United States or of the State of Florida, where the court was without jurisdiction to impose it, where the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or where the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack. These conditions are identical to those contained within the federal statute.
The federal courts have interpreted Section 2255 as to the nature and purpose of the remedy which it provides. In Birtch v. United States, 4 Cir. 1949, 173 F.2d 316, at page 317, cert. denied, 1949, 337 U.S. 944, 69 S.Ct. 1500, 93 L.Ed. 1747, the court stated:
See also Johnston v. United States, 8 Cir. 1958, 254 F.2d 239; Johnson v. United States, 5 Cir. 1954, 213 F.2d 492; Hurst v. United States, 10 Cir. 1949, 177 F.2d 894. See further 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255, note 111, page 588. It is therefore clear that Section 2255 is not intended to broaden the class of attacks which may be made upon a judgment of conviction or sentence; rather, the attack through motion to vacate must be made under the conditions specified.
It has been repeatedly held as to Section 2255 that questions directed to sufficiency of the evidence must be raised by appeal from the judgment of conviction or sentence and not by motion to vacate. Thus, to challenge sufficiency of the evidence, a motion to vacate is not available to a defendant as a substitute for an appeal. See Enzor v. United States, 5 Cir. 1961, 296 F.2d 62, cert. denied, 1962, 369 U.S. 854, 82 S.Ct. 940, 8 L.Ed.2d 12; United States v. Shields, 6 Cir. 1961, 291 F.2d 798, cert. denied, 1961, 368 U.S. 933, 82 S.Ct. 371, 7 L.Ed.2d 196, rehearing denied, 1962, 368 U.S. 962, 82 S.Ct. 401, 7 L.Ed.2d 393; United States v. Washington, 7 Cir. 1961, 287 F.2d 819, cert. denied, 1961, 366 U.S. 969, 81 S.Ct. 1933, 6 L.Ed.2d 1259. A collateral proceeding for vacation of a judgment or correction of a sentence cannot be utilized in lieu of an appeal to give to a defendant adjudged guilty of a crime the right to a retrial on sufficiency of the evidence or on asserted errors of law. See Pearson v. United States, 7 Cir. 1962, 305 F.2d 34; Banks v. United States, 7 Cir. 1961, 287 F.2d 374, cert. denied, 1961, 366 U.S. 939, 81 S.Ct. 1668, 6 L.Ed.2d 850, cert. denied, 1962, 369 U.S. 804, 82 S.Ct. 645, 7 L.Ed.2d 551, rehearing denied, 1962, 369 U.S. 832, 82 S.Ct. 847, 7 L.Ed.2d 797. See also 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (Supp. 1963), note 10, pages 98-99.
As to appellant's contention of false swearing or use of perjured testimony, a reading of this portion of the motion shows it to constitute an attempt to argue the credibility of testimony given by certain state witnesses and claimed conflicts in that testimony. Additionally, in order to have a sentence set aside on the ground that perjured testimony was used, it is necessary for the motion to show that the testimony was perjured and that the prosecuting officials, at the time of its use, knew it was perjured. See Black v. United States, 9 Cir. 1959, 269 F.2d 38, cert. denied, 1960, 361 U.S. 938, 80 S.Ct. 379, 4 L.Ed.2d 357; Enzor v. United States, 5 Cir. 1961, 296 F.2d 62, cert. denied, 1962, 369 U.S. 854, 82 S.Ct. 940, 8 L.Ed.2d 12; United States v. Daniels, D.C.E.D.Pa.1961, 191 F.Supp. 129; also see 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (Supp.1963), note 282, pages 136-138. Appellant's motion to vacate fails to meet this test.
Turning now to appellant's complaint of illegal search, we quote that paragraph of the motion in its...
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