Austin v. Wilkinson

Decision Date10 June 2004
Docket NumberNo. 02-3816.,No. 02-3429.,02-3429.,02-3816.
Citation372 F.3d 346
PartiesCharles E. AUSTIN et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Reginald WILKINSON et al., Defendants-Appellants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Jules Lobel, Center for Constitutional Rights (argued and briefed), Pittsburgh, PA, Raymond Vasvari (briefed), American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio Foundation, Cleveland, OH, Alice Lynd (briefed), Nile, OH, for Appellees.

Todd R. Marti (argued and briefed), Office of the Attorney General, Corrections Litigation Section, Columbus, OH, for Appellants.

Before MOORE and ROGERS, Circuit Judges; FORESTER, Chief District Judge.*

MOORE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which FORESTER, D.J., joined. ROGERS, J. (pp. 360-365), delivered a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

OPINION

MOORE, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs-Appellees Charles E. Austin et al.,1 ("Inmates") all inmates at the Ohio State Penitentiary ("OSP") in Youngstown, Ohio, filed this § 1983 suit as a class action against Defendants-Appellants Reginald Wilkinson et al.,2 Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction officials ("ODRC Officials"), alleging Eighth Amendment violations as well as procedural due process claims relating to their placement at the OSP facility, which is a supermaximum, or supermax, facility. A class was certified pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), and the Eighth Amendment claims, related primarily to medical care and the provision of outdoor recreation, were settled. The due process claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were then tried to the district court, which rendered a judgment for the Inmates and entered the injunctive orders at issue.

On appeal, the ODRC Officials raise two claims of error: that the district court applied the wrong legal standards in finding a constitutional violation, and that even if a violation was correctly found, the remedial orders entered violate 18 U.S.C. § 3626, requiring particularized fact-finding by federal district courts interfering with state prison practices. Because we conclude that the district court did not err in determining that a liberty interest existed in the prison placement at issue and in modifying the procedures that govern that placement, we AFFIRM that portion of the district court's judgments; because the district court erred, however, in modifying substantive Ohio prison regulations, we REVERSE AND REMAND that portion of the judgments.

I. BACKGROUND

In May 1998, the OSP, Ohio's supermax prison facility, opened for business. Supermax facilities, in operation in most of the states and in the federal prison system, represent an attempt to concentrate the "worst of the worst" in one facility, thereby making the rest of the general prison population more safe and easier to control. Ohio's supermax, which is designated a high- maximum-security prison, was built in response to an April 1993 riot at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility ("SOCF"). Prior to the construction of the 504-bed OSP, Ohio's most secure prison was the SOCF, a maximum-security prison. Within the SOCF is an even more secure cellblock, the J-1 cellblock, which houses twenty cells. Before the OSP opened, Ohio did not fill the J-1 cells; instead, it did not have enough maximum-security cells to house inmates at that security designation. From these facts, the district court concluded that the surplus of high-maximum-security cells led to a "because we have built it, they will come" mentality, with the surplus of maximum-security inmates leading to placement of inmates at OSP who did not meet the high-maximum-security requirements, contrary to both corrections policy and constitutional norms. See Austin v. Wilkinson (Austin I), 189 F.Supp.2d 719, 724 (N.D.Ohio 2002).

When the OSP first received inmates in May 1998, it did so in a concededly problematic and confused manner. Appellants' Br. at 11. On August 31, 1998, the department "attempted to establish some predictability to placement at the OSP by issuing Department of Rehabilitation and Correction Policy 111-07"; the version of this policy in effect when the Inmates filed their complaint ("old 111-07") became effective January 28, 1999. Austin I, 189 F.Supp.2d at 727. Placement at the OSP was synonymous with inmate classification at a high-maximum-security level. Old 111-07 provided for a classification committee (made up of a deputy warden and a mental health professional from the inmate's current institution, and a third official designated by the warden), which would receive a written statement from the prisoner as well as information provided by staff, and make a recommendation to the warden. The warden then approved or disapproved the recommendation, and sent the information along to the Bureau of Classification ("Bureau"). Even if both the classification committee and the warden agreed that high-maximum-security classification was inappropriate for an inmate, the Chief of the Bureau could still assign the inmate to OSP. Placement at OSP renders an inmate ineligible for parole during his time there. Austin I, 189 F.Supp.2d at 728.

Under this policy, though, problems continued. Some of the more troubling instances of this haphazard system occurred when the Bureau would, without stating its reasons, overrule the recommendation of both the classification committee and the warden and either place or maintain the placement of an inmate at OSP; when inmates who would otherwise be recommended for parole were ineligible because of a suspect OSP placement; when multiple jumps in security levels happened as a result of a single incident; when decisions were made with little factual support; and when decisions were based solely on the use or smuggling in of small amounts of drugs. Id. at 734-36.

The goal of the OSP, to separate the most dangerous prisoners from the rest of the prison population, is achieved primarily through solitary confinement, of a type noticeably different than segregation at other Ohio prisons. Inmates at OSP spend twenty-three hours a day in their single cells, measuring approximately 89.7 square feet. Id. at 724. These cells are further isolated from the outside world by the installation of metal strips on the bottom and sides of the cell doors that prevent inmates from communicating with one another. Id. During the one hour per day that inmates can leave their cells, they have access to two indoor recreation rooms; most inmates have recreation alone, although a limited number may have recreation with one other prisoner. Id. Inmates having visitors are required to be strip-searched when they leave and reenter the cellblock, even though they are isolated from their visitors by solid windows. Id. at 725. Additional factual findings by the district court differentiate life at OSP from segregation conditions at other Ohio prisons, including extra limitations on personal property rights, access to telephones and counsel, outside recreation, and communication with other persons. Id.

On January 1, 2001, the Inmates filed their complaint, stating both procedural due process claims regarding placement at OSP, the claims at issue on appeal, and Eighth Amendment claims regarding inadequate medical and psychiatric care, inadequate outdoor recreation facilities, and harsh restraints used at OSP. The Eighth Amendment claims were settled below. See Austin v. Wilkinson, No. 4:01-CV-71 (N.D.Ohio Apr. 5, 2002) (order approving settlement agreement). A Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2) class was certified, and the case was scheduled for trial in January 2002. On the eve of trial, the ODRC released a new version of 111-07 ("new 111-07"), and it is the district court's ordered modifications to new 111-07, made after a bench trial, that are at issue on this appeal. In old 111-07, prisoners were classified as high-maximum-security and maximum-security; in new 111-07, the security levels are instead level five and level four. When the district court issued its decision, only level five prisoners were housed at OSP, but the appellees urge this court to take judicial notice of the decision by Defendant Wilkinson to house inmates classified at both levels four and five at OSP. Appellees' Br. at 5 n. 1. New 111-07 details both the substantive reasons for reclassification and the procedures followed to reclassify, as well as the conditions imposed on inmates in those classification levels.3 Various prison officials are empowered to initiate placement into classification level five,4 using the "Security Designation Long Form," which provides a score sheet for inmates based on their age, the severity of the offense triggering the initiation of reclassification hearings, prior prison experience, prior violent behavior, pre-prison gang activity, and escape attempts; the prison official is also empowered to override the numerical score for any of the reasons identified by 111-07 as grounds for level five classification. These include assaultive and/or predatory behavior; the nature of the inmate's conviction; leadership roles in riots or disturbances; the possession of contraband; the identification of the inmate as a leader of a "security threat group" (prison gang); escape attempts; "an ability to compromise the integrity of [prison] staff"; knowing exposure of others to HIV or hepatitis; or a chronic inability to adjust to a lower security level. On initiation of the reclassification, the warden establishes a classification committee to review the inmate's behavior and determine whether in fact the inmate meets one of the level five criteria. That committee is to hold a hearing to review the form and any other relevant information; 111-07 entitles inmates to forty-eight hours' prior notice of that hearing and the opportunity to appear and make both oral and written presentations. The classification committee is to "document information"...

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