Auto Cash, Inc. v. Hunt, s. A94A2048
| Decision Date | 07 February 1995 |
| Docket Number | Nos. A94A2048,A94A2049,s. A94A2048 |
| Citation | 454 S.E.2d 162,216 Ga.App. 239 |
| Parties | AUTO CASH, INC. v. HUNT. HUNT v. AUTO CASH, INC. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Davis, Zipperman, Kirschenbaum & Lotito, Steven A. Suna, Atlanta, for appellant.
Sims, Fleming & Swan, Carlton A. Fleming, Jr., Kunes & Kunes, G.G. Kunes, Jr., Tifton, for appellee.
On May 4, 1992, Auto Cash, Inc. ("Auto Cash") filed a complaint against defendant Michael Hunt d/b/a Auto Cash ("Hunt") for damages and injunctive relief. On February 12, 1993, Auto Cash moved the court for preliminary injunctive relief and for partial summary judgment. Auto Cash argued that irreparable harm would result from Hunt's continued use of its trademark and that, as a matter of law, it was entitled to damages. Hunt filed a response to Auto Cash's motion and also filed a motion for summary judgment.
The superior court denied Auto Cash's motion for a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction and partial summary judgment. The court also denied Hunt's motion for summary judgment. Auto Cash filed a timely notice of appeal to the Supreme Court and Hunt filed a notice of cross-appeal. Subsequently, the Supreme Court transferred the cases to this court.
These cases were filed in the Supreme Court, presumably because OCGA § 5-6-34(a) provides that direct appeals may be taken from "(4) [a]ll judgments or orders granting or refusing applications ... for interlocutory or final injunctions." The Supreme Court summarily transferred the cases to this court, which does not have jurisdiction of equity cases, thus indicating that the appeals should have been filed in this court in the first place because equitable relief was merely ancillary. See Beauchamp v. Knight, 261 Ga. 608, 609(2), 409 S.E.2d 208 (1991). The Georgia Constitution states that, unless otherwise provided by law, the Supreme Court "shall have appellate jurisdiction of ... [a]ll equity cases." Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. III. Since this court does not have jurisdiction over the question of whether equitable relief in the form of injunction should have been granted or denied, 1 but only over the efficacy of the summary judgment rulings, the appeals should have been brought in this court pursuant to the interlocutory appeal procedure because the crux of the matter is whether summary judgment was properly denied. OCGA §§ 5-6-34, 9-11-56(h).
The mere request for interlocutory injunction does not make a ruling thereon subject to direct appeal under OCGA § 5-6-34(a)(4); if it is ancillary to an underlying legal question which prompts a ruling on summary judgment, the method for appealing such a...
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Saxton v. Coastal Dialysis and Medical Clinic, Inc.
...Although Dr. Saxton's direct appeal was considered on the merits, the Court of Appeals held that, pursuant to Auto Cash, Inc. v. Hunt, 216 Ga.App. 239, 454 S.E.2d 162 (1995), all such future cases must comply with the interlocutory appeal procedure. We granted certiorari to consider this qu......
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Saxton v. Coastal Dialysis & Medical Clinic, Inc.
...cannot close our eyes to the reality that they are in fact the same appeal. However, in the future we will follow Auto Cash v. Hunt, 216 Ga.App. 239, 454 S.E.2d 162 (1995), which held that since this Court only had jurisdiction over the efficacy of the summary judgment denials and not over ......