Auto Club Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Estate of Lewis, Case No. 5D18-3439
Decision Date | 13 December 2019 |
Docket Number | Case No. 5D18-3439 |
Citation | 285 So.3d 383 |
Parties | AUTO CLUB INSURANCE COMPANY OF FLORIDA, Appellant, v. The ESTATE OF Norman LEWIS and Billie Jarrard, Appellees. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Wendy F. Lumish and Daniel A. Rock, of Bowman and Brooke LLP, Miami, for Appellant.
Jessica C. Conner, of Dean, Ringers, Morgan & Lawton, P.A., Orlando, for Appellee, The Estate of Norman Lewis.
No Appearance for Appellee Billie Jarrard.
Frank A. Shepherd and Lesley-Anne Marks, of Gray Robinson, P.A., Miami, Amicus Curiae for American Property Casualty Insurance Association.
Auto Club Insurance Company of Florida ("AAA") appeals the final summary judgment entered against it in a declaratory judgment action that it filed against the Estate of Norman Lewis ("the estate"). The declaratory judgment action was brought to determine the extent of AAA's liability pursuant to the automobile insurance policy held by its insured, Billy Jarrard. In a separate action, it was alleged that Jarrard struck and killed Lewis while operating his vehicle. That action included loss of consortium claims on behalf of Lewis' parents. The limits of liability under the policy were $100,000 per person and $300,000 per occurrence. AAA contends that, under the terms of the policy, Lewis' parents' loss of consortium claims are subject to a single per person liability limit. The estate successfully argued to the trial court that Lewis' parents' loss of consortium claims are separate "bodily injury" claims such that their claims are not subject to a single per person limit. We reverse.
The relevant portions of the policy read as follows:
The parties each filed motions for summary judgment on the issue of whether Lewis' parents' loss of consortium claims were subject to a single $100,000 per person limit. AAA argued that because the policy defines "bodily injury" as "bodily harm, sickness or disease, including death therefrom" and given that Lewis was the only person who sustained "bodily injury" in the accident, as defined by the policy, the bodily injury coverage limit of $100,000 per person was all that was available to the estate. In response, the estate argued that based on the language set forth in the "Limits of Liability" provision, bodily injury included damages for loss of consortium and, accordingly, each survivor suffered a separate "bodily injury" and was, therefore, entitled to his or her own "per person" liability limits.
In ruling for the estate, the trial court concluded that the policy was ambiguous as to the definition and scope of the term "bodily injury." Specifically, the trial court stated:
We disagree with the trial court's analysis. "[W]hen analyzing an insurance contract, it is necessary to examine the contract in its context and as a whole, and to avoid simply concentrating on certain limited provisions to the exclusion of the totality of others." Swire Pac. Holdings, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co. , 845 So. 2d 161, 165 (Fla. 2003). If the language used within the policy is plain and unambiguous, the policy must be interpreted in accordance with its plain meaning. Travelers Indem. Co. v. PCR Inc. , 889 So. 2d 779, 785 (Fla. 2004).
In contrast, if a policy's language is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, one providing coverage and the other limiting coverage, the policy language is considered ambiguous. Id. "When language in an insurance policy is ambiguous, a court will resolve the ambiguity in favor of the insured by adopting the reasonable interpretation of the policy's language that provides coverage as opposed to the reasonable interpretation that would limit coverage." Id. at 779. However, it is important to recognize that the mere fact that an insurance policy provision can be drafted in a clearer manner does not necessarily render the provision ambiguous. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Pridgen , 498 So. 2d 1245, 1248 (Fla. 1986).
Here, the term "bodily injury" is plainly and unambiguously defined in the Definitions section of the policy to mean "bodily harm, sickness or disease, including death therefrom." That definition can be readily inserted into the Limits of Liability provision. By doing so, that provision is properly read to mean that the bodily injury limit stated on the declarations page ($100,000) is the most that AAA will pay where there is a bodily injury (bodily harm, sickness or disease, including death therefrom) to one person and that the damages subject to that limit include damages for the care of the injured person and loss of consortium or loss of services sustained as the result of the same injuries by any other person (here, Lewis' parents).
The interpretation advocated by the estate—that the Limits of Liability provision "expands" the definition of bodily injury to include loss of consortium—is flawed in at least three major respects. First, it unnecessarily creates a conflict between the policy's Definitions provision and its Limits of Liability provision, thereby producing two different definitions for the term "bodily injury." Second, the proposed interpretation negates the "in any one accident" limit set forth in the first sentence of the Limits of Liability provision given that the parents were not injured in the accident. Third, the...
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...negates the nonrenewal provision. This unreasonable interpretation creates no ambiguity. See Auto Club Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Estate of Lewis, 285 So. 3d 383, 386 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019) ("Because the estate's interpretation is unreasonable, it does not create an ambiguity in the policy."). The tr......