Automobile Club of Michigan v. Stacey

• Decision Date: 08 November 1990
• Docket Number: No. 90-CV-71427-DT.,90-CV-71427-DT.
• Citation: 750 F. Supp. 259
• Parties: AUTOMOBILE CLUB OF MICHIGAN, a/k/a AAA, and Automobile Club Insurance Association, Plaintiffs, v. Honorable Judge Michael STACEY, acting in his official capacity as Wayne County Circuit Judge for the State of Michigan, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

750 F. Supp. 259

AUTOMOBILE CLUB OF MICHIGAN, a/k/a AAA, and Automobile Club Insurance Association, Plaintiffs, v. Honorable Judge Michael STACEY, acting in his official capacity as Wayne County Circuit Judge for the State of Michigan, Defendant.

No. 90-CV-71427-DT.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, S.D.

November 8, 1990.

John C. O'Meara, Detroit, Mich., for plaintiffs.

Morton H. Collins, Southfield, Mich., for defendant.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

HACKETT, District Judge.

Plaintiffs brought this claim for declaratory and injunctive relief premised on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, contending that defendant Judge Stacey, acting in his official capacity and under color of the laws of the state of Michigan, acted to deprive them of their federally protected rights under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The federally protected right which plaintiffs assert is the "right to resort to economic weapons in the collective bargaining process" and "to be free from state interference in all matters relating to the use of economic weapons in labor disputes subject to federal law."

BACKGROUND

William Bullock had instituted an action in the Wayne County Circuit Court against plaintiffs in this case, Bullock v. AAA, Wayne County Civil Docket No. 82-226-217-CK. In that action, Bullock pursued state law claims for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, unjust enrichment, conversion and age discrimination in violation of state law. AAA brought a motion to dismiss before defendant Judge Stacey, asserting that Bullock's claims were preempted by federal labor law and that the state court had no jurisdiction over the matter. Defendant Judge Stacey denied the motion and AAA appealed. The Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court upheld Judge Stacey finding that Bullock's claims were not preempted by federal labor law. Bullock v. Automobile Club of Michigan, 432 Mich. 472, 444 N.W.2d 114 (1989). AAA then applied for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. Certiorari was denied, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 1118, 107 L.Ed.2d 1024 (1990), rehearing denied, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 1840, 108 L.Ed.2d 968 (1990).

Plaintiffs filed suit seeking to have this court declare that Judge Stacey's failure to dismiss this case deprived them of their federal rights under the NLRA, thus implicating § 1983; declare that Bullock's claims are preempted by federal labor law; direct Judge Stacey to dismiss the case based on the state court's lack of jurisdiction; grant plaintiffs a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining Judge Stacey from violating plaintiffs' federal labor law rights; and award plaintiffs costs and attorney's fees. In their brief in opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss, plaintiffs have voluntarily withdrawn their "boilerplate request" for costs and attorney's fees.

Defendant points out that there are 33 cases similar to Bullock's currently pending in the state court system. Plaintiffs have also filed a Motion for Superintending Control with the Michigan Court of Appeals, seeking a stay in all 33 cases pending the resolution of a new group of five wrongful discharge cases by the Michigan Supreme Court. Defendant notes that plaintiffs seek to adversely affect Bullock and the 32 other plaintiffs without joining any one of them in the litigation in this court.

DISCUSSION

Defendant has filed a motion to dismiss raising several grounds in support of dismissal. The first of these grounds is that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the case on the basis of the Rooker/Feldman doctrine, which provides that federal district courts have no authority to review the final judgments of a state court. In support of this contention, defendant cites the two United States Supreme Court decisions from which the doctrine takes its name and cases from other circuits applying the doctrine.

Plaintiffs argue that this court does have jurisdiction over the case, pointing out that neither of the Supreme Court cases involves a § 1983 claim. Plaintiffs also assert that they are not seeking to have this court exercise appellate jurisdiction over the Michigan Supreme Court, but are pursuing an independent § 1983 action in order to redress violations of federal law by the Michigan Courts.

The Rooker/Feldman doctrine takes its name from two United States Supreme Court cases: District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983); and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923). The doctrine provides that review of final determinations in state judicial proceedings can be obtained only in the United States Supreme Court and that federal district courts do not have the authority to review final judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings. In Feldman, supra, the Court held that, to the extent that appellee's sought appeal of the District of Columbia court's decision in the federal district court, the federal district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case. 460 U.S. at 482, 103 S.Ct. at 1315. The Court stated that federal district courts "do not have jurisdiction ... over challenges to state-court decisions in particular cases arising out judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege that the state court's action was unconstitutional. Review of those decisions may be had only in this Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1257." 460 U.S. at 486, 103 S.Ct. at 1317. The Court further stated that "if the constitutional claims presented to a United States district court are inextricably intertwined with the state-court's denial in a judicial proceeding of a particular plaintiff's application ... then the district court is in essence being called upon to review the state court decision. This the district court may not do." 460 U.S. at 483, n. 16, 103 S.Ct. at 1315, n. 16.

Plaintiffs contend that they are not seeking an appellate review of the Michigan Supreme Court's decision, but rather, are pursuing an independent § 1983 action based on ongoing violations of federal law by the Michigan courts. Plaintiffs' assertions are not, however, consistent with the relief sought by their complaint. In the complaint, plaintiffs seek to have this court declare that Judge Stacey's failure to dismiss the Bullock case violated plaintiffs' rights secured by federal law and that Bullock's claims are preempted by federal law. This requested relief would take this court squarely into appellate review, not only of Judge Stacey's initial decision, but also the Michigan Supreme Court's decision affirming Judge Stacey. Plaintiffs further seek this court to direct Judge Stacey to dismiss Bullock's case and to enjoin Judge Stacey from violating plaintiffs' federal labor law rights.

Plaintiffs are not seeking to collaterally attack the state court judgment for lack of jurisdiction. It is uncontested that the state courts possess jurisdiction to determine whether state law claims are preempted by federal labor law.¹ Plaintiffs are seeking to enjoin the enforcement of a state court decision based on their contention that the state court reached an incorrect decision on a question of federal law.² Plaintiffs' request relates specifically to the underlying Bullock case, and is, therefore, "inextricably intertwined" with the state court's judicial proceeding. This is the essence of appellate review. This type of appellate review is reserved exclusively to the United States Supreme Court.

Plaintiffs further argue that because of the statutory amendments eliminating appeal of right to the United States Supreme Court, section 1983 actions brought in the lower federal courts are the only means of protecting federal rights from state interference. Plaintiffs argue that federal courts must be available to hear these cases. Plaintiffs appear to be implying that because Rooker/Feldman has its roots in 28 U.S.C. § 1257, the amendment of the statute eliminating the appeal of right also eliminates Rooker/Feldman.

The statute governing appeal of state court decisions, 28 U.S.C. § 1257, currently provides:

(a) Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in question or where the validity of a statute of any State is drawn into question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, or where any title, right, privilege, or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution or the treaties or statutes of, or any commission held or authority exercised under, the United States.

Prior to this amendment, which became effective in September, 1988, the statute provided for appeal of right in cases where state courts rejected claims that the application of state law was barred on federal grounds.

Plaintiffs assert that because they no longer possess an appeal of right to the Supreme Court, federal district courts must review cases such as theirs in order that federal courts have the "last say" on interpretation of federal law. This position is not supported by the plain language of the amended statute, which provides only that all appeals from state court decisions will be by certiorari. Further, the legislative history of the amendment does not support plaintiffs' argument and, in fact, militates against it.

The legislative history shows that one of the congressional concerns prompting amendment was the effect of an increased workload on the finite resources of the Supreme Court. This was not, however, the only congressional consideration behind the amendment. Congress noted that the old statute was based, in part, on doubts that the state courts could properly interpret the United States Constitution and laws. In amending this statute, Congress specifically found that this distrust was misplaced...