Tidik v. Ritsema

Decision Date12 July 1996
Docket NumberCivil No. 96-40094.
Citation938 F. Supp. 416
PartiesBrad A. TIDIK, Plaintiff, v. Gerhard RITSEMA, Director, Wayne County Friend of the Court, Richard C. Kaufman, Lynn Watson, Court Clerk, 3rd Circuit Court, John Lemire, Referee, Friend of the Court, David March, Staff Attorney, Friend of the Court, David Manville, Social Worker, Friend of the Court, Paul A. Longton, Lisa Tidik, Theadora Smith, George Smith, Amy Smith, Carol Watson, Grosse Ile Township, Maurice Stevens, Chief of Police, Grosse Ile Police Department, Charles Coman, John Does # 1-12, Grosse Ile Township Police Officers, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

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Robert G. Squiers, Jr., Matthew A. Seward, Garan, Lucow, Miller, Seward, Cooper & Becker, Detroit, MI, for Charles Coman.

Amy Smith, Grosse Ile, MI, for Amy Smith.

Lisa A. Tidik, Grosse Ile, MI, for Lisa A. Tidik.

Paul A. Longton, Wyandotte, MI, for Paul A. Longton.

Michelle M. Rick, Michigan Department of Attorney General, Tort Defense Division, Lansing, MI, for David Manville.

Jennifer M. Granholm, Nancy M. Rade, Wayne County Corporation Counsel, Detroit, MI, for Lynn Watson.

Barbara H. Goldman, Brian D. Einhorn, Collins, Einhorn, Farrell & Ulanoff, P.C., Southfield, MI, for Richard C. Kaufman.

Brad A. Tidik, Grosse Ile, MI, for Brad A. Tidik.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF'S SECTION 1983 COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(B)(6)

GADOLA, District Judge.

On January 25, 1996, the plaintiff, Brad Tidik, filed this complaint against the defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the United States Constitution. The plaintiff previously filed a similar complaint on November 16, 1995, which was dismissed by this court on December 22, 1995. In response to this second complaint, defendants Richard Kaufman, Gerhard Ritsema, Lynn Watson, John Lemire, David March and David Manville have filed a motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), or alternatively, for dismissal, pursuant to 12(b)(6). Defendant Kaufman has also filed a motion seeking an order enjoining the plaintiff from filing any further actions relating to the disposition or enforcement of his 1995 divorce action. Upon review of the submissions, this court has determined that oral argument is not necessary to the determination of the issues presented. Local Rule 7.1(e)(2) (E.D.Mich., Jan. 1992). For the reasons stated below, this court will grant the defendants' motion for dismissal.

I. Factual Background

The facts underlying the plaintiff's complaint are fairly straightforward. The plaintiff was the plaintiff in a divorce action in Wayne County Circuit Court, case number 95-502349-DM. The plaintiff filed that action against defendant Lisa Tidik, who was represented by defendant Paul A. Longton. Defendant Judge Kaufman presided at that trial and issued a final Judgment of Divorce on September 28, 1995.

As part of the divorce decree, Judge Kaufman included a provision requiring that the plaintiff post a bond with each motion filed with the court as security against costs or sanctions potentially awardable under Michigan Court Rule 2.114(E). This was due to plaintiff's filing of numerous motions during the course of his divorce proceedings.

The plaintiff alleges that he has a constitutional right to visit his children, and that that right has been consistently violated by all the defendants. These violations allegedly began on July 3, 1995, when defendant Lisa Tidik, his wife, did not allow the plaintiff to see the children during an alleged planned association. The plaintiff claims that similar incidents occurred on July 16, 18, 28, 30, and on August 13, 20 and 24 of 1995. The plaintiff alleges that during several of these incidents, he was told to leave defendant Lisa Tidik's residence under threat of arrest by Gross Ile Township police officers. The plaintiff argues that the police officers refused to arrest defendants Lisa Tidik, George and Theadora Smith, or recognize his right to visit, and did not willingly release information to the plaintiff. Defendants George, Theadora and Amy Smith, were allegedly involved in hiding the children from the plaintiff and interfering with his right to visitation.

The complaint alleges that all defendants are involved in a complex conspiracy to violate his rights to visit his children. However, the plaintiff's lengthy complaint fails to reveal any specific examples supporting the conspiracy allegation, or that any constitutional rights were violated. The plaintiff accuses defendants Judge Kaufman and Court Clerk Lynn Watson of refusing to docket or hear his motions, and of holding hearings without the plaintiff's presence. Defendant Paul Longton allegedly violated the plaintiff's rights by drafting the motion provision for defendant Kaufman's signature. Finally, regarding Wayne County Friend of the Court officials, defendants Gerhard Ritsema, David March, David Manville and John Lemire, the plaintiff alleges these individuals, as non-judicial authorities, conducted proceedings and drafted orders violating his constitutional right to visit his children. The plaintiff claims these constitutional violations continue to this very day.

The record indicates that the plaintiff filed a claim of appeal with the Michigan Court of Appeals on October 25, 1995, and that appeal was docketed as number 189891. The record further indicates that the plaintiff has filed several motions with the Michigan Court of Appeals, including a motion seeking disqualification of Judge Kaufman which was denied.

II. Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes the district courts to dismiss any complaint which fails "to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." This rule allows a defendant to test whether, as a matter of law, the plaintiff is entitled to legal relief even if every allegation in the complaint is true. Under this standard, a complaint should be dismissed only where it appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 638 (6th Cir.1993). To apply this standard, the court must presume all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Id. The court need not, however, accord the presumption of truthfulness to any legal conclusions, opinions or deductions, even if they are couched as factual allegations. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 629 (9th Cir.1980); Mitchell v. Archibald & Kendall, Inc., 573 F.2d 429, 432 (7th Cir.1978); Sexton v. Barry, 233 F.2d 220, 223 (6th Cir.1956). Accordingly, to determine whether a complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), this court must examine the applicable substantive law and the facts alleged in the plaintiff's complaint.

III. Discussion

Review of the submissions and the relevant authorities demonstrates that dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint is warranted under Rule 12(b)(6) because it fails to state a claim under section 1983 against any of the defendants.1 This court will address the various claims seriatim.

A. Absolute Immunity

On December 22, 1995, this court dismissed plaintiff's first action against defendant Judge Kaufman based on the doctrine of absolute immunity. (Tidik v. Kaufman, 95-CV-40414, E.D.Mich., 1995). For the very same reason, plaintiff's second action is also dismissed. The doctrine of absolute immunity of judges for acts committed within the judicial jurisdiction is a firmly established principle of common law and section 1983 litigation. Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L.Ed 646 (1872); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967).

This immunity serves to preserve the autonomy and independence of the judiciary "without which no judiciary can either be respectable or useful." Bradley at 346, 20 L.Ed 646. The only instance where a judge may be stripped of this protection is for an act taken in "the clear absence of all jurisdiction." Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 1105 (1978). Otherwise, a judge, enjoys absolute immunity, "even where the exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors." Id. at 359, 98 S.Ct. at 1106. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227, 108 S.Ct. 538, 544, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988) (concluding that a judicial act "does not become less judicial by virtue of an allegation of malice or corruption of motive.") This immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2815, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985).

What constitutes a judicial act for the purposes of immunity is determined by "whether it is a function normally performed by a judge" and whether the parties understood that they were dealing with the judge "in his judicial capacity." Stump, 435 U.S. at 357, 362, 98 S.Ct. at 1105, 1107-08. The record here clearly indicates that Judge Kaufman was acting in his judicial capacity at all times during the plaintiff's divorce proceedings, including the Motion Practice provision in the divorce judgment. Therefore, Judge Kaufman is absolutely immune from any suit for damages under section 1983 and the plaintiff's complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976) (holding that dismissal is required if the allegations of the complaint demonstrate that the defendant official had absolute immunity from the claim); Brinkmann v. Johnston, 793 F.2d 111, 112 (5th Cir.1986) (declaring frivolous a husband's 1983 action against a state judge because at all times that judge was acting within the scope of his judicial duties in a divorce action, and thus, was...

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