AutoZone, Inc. v. Leonard

• Decision Date: 27 April 2001
• Citation: 812 So.2d 1179
• Parties: AutoZONE, INC. v. Michael LEONARD. Michael Leonard v. AutoZone, Inc.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

812 So.2d 1179

AutoZONE, INC. v. Michael LEONARD.

Michael Leonard v. AutoZone, Inc.

1901.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

April 27, 2001.

Rehearing Applications Denied July 13, 2001.

Jonathan S. Harbuck of Kullman Firm, P.C., Birmingham, for appellant/cross appellee AutoZone, Inc.

Nat Bryan, Dennis E. Goldasich, Jr., and Thomas M. Powell of Marsh, Rickard

& Bryan, P.C., Birmingham, for appellee/cross appellant Michael Leonard.

PER CURIAM.

The defendant AutoZone, Inc., appeals from a judgment awarding compensatory and punitive damages in a wrongful-termination case. The plaintiff Michael Leonard cross-appeals from the trial court's order requiring a remittitur of the jury's damages awards. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Facts and Procedural History

Michael Leonard was employed as a parts salesman for a store in Leeds operated by AutoZone, Inc. On September 18, 1997, Ron Blankenship, the manager of the Leeds store, asked Leonard to drive from the Leeds store to the AutoZone store in Pell City to pick up an automobile part for a customer. Although the usual route for travel from Leeds to Pell City would have been Interstate Highway 20, at that time I-20 was undergoing construction work. Blankenship testified that because Leonard had lived in Leeds for several years and was familiar with the area, he instructed Leonard to "go the back way" to avoid the construction. Leonard, however, denied that he was ever instructed not to travel on I-20; rather, he testified that his understanding of the conversation was that he was to use those roads that would have allowed him to avoid the construction work on I-20.

When Leonard left the Leeds store, he intended to travel along I-20 for a distance and then to take a couple of back roads to reach Pell City. While traveling along I-20 Leonard encountered a traffic backup that required him to come to a complete stop. As he was stopped on I-20, Leonard's vehicle was hit from behind. Leonard sustained injuries to his right knee as a result of the accident. Leonard stayed at the accident scene for approximately two and one-half hours. When Leonard arrived at the Pell City store, he picked up the automobile part and telephoned Blankenship to notify him of the accident and to tell him that he was going to a hospital to have his knee examined.

Leonard was examined by a doctor, who told him that he could not return to work until September 22, 1997, and gave Leonard a medical excuse. Leonard's wife took the excuse, as well as the automobile part, to the Leeds store the following day. Leonard's wife said that when she delivered the items to the Leeds store Blankenship told her that Leonard would not be allowed to return to work without a medical release, a copy of the accident report, and copies of Leonard's X-rays.

Because Leonard's accident occurred while he was working for AutoZone, AutoZone notified its workers' compensation insurance carrier, Employers Insurance of Wausau ("Wausau"), of the accident. Wausau opened a file, and its investigator interviewed Leonard by telephone. Blankenship informed Wausau's investigator that he had instructed Leonard to "go the back way" to reach the Pell City store. Based on this information, Wausau denied Leonard's workers' compensation claim based on his "deviation from course." When his compensation claim was denied, Leonard retained an attorney; the attorney notified Wausau that Leonard was appealing the denial, and he instructed Wausau to have no further contact with his client Leonard.

Because of his injuries, Leonard was unable to return to work until November 10, 1997. When he returned, AutoZone's file did not contain medical excuses for Leonard's absences for the period September 19-23, 1997, and November 6, 1997. Noting these unexcused absences, Melody Jones, an "AutoZoner Relations specialist"¹ who oversaw AutoZone's personnel matters, contacted Lawrence Swindall, of AutoZone's Loss Prevention Department, to determine whether Leonard had turned in medical excuses for the dates in question and to obtain a detailed account of Leonard's whereabouts on the date he was injured.

Swindall went to the Leeds store on November 20, 1997, to speak with Leonard. When Swindall told Leonard that he would like to get a statement regarding the events surrounding the accident, Leonard told him that he had retained counsel and that he would not give a statement without having his attorney present. Swindall then took a statement from Blankenship and left the Leeds store.

Leonard was terminated on November 24, 1997, four days after Swindall had attempted to take his statement. The decision to terminate Leonard was made by AutoZoner Relations specialist Melody Jones, AutoZone area advisor Gwinn Jones, and regional vice president Grant McGee. The reasons given for termination were excessive unauthorized absenteeism and failure to cooperate with a loss-prevention investigation.

On December 12, 1997, Leonard sued AutoZone and Blankenship, claiming he had been fired in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim, in violation of § 25-5-11.1, Ala.Code 1975. Leonard also alleged that AutoZone and Blankenship had intentionally caused him to suffer emotional distress by terminating his employment. Finally, Leonard alleged that Blankenship had intentionally misrepresented to Wausau the facts concerning his instructions to Leonard on the date of the accident and that Blankenship's misrepresentation had ultimately led to Wausau's denying his claim for workers' compensation benefits.

The trial court entered summary judgments in favor of AutoZone and Blankenship on Leonard's claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress (the tort of outrage). After the court had entered those summary judgments, Leonard voluntarily dismissed Blankenship from the action, on June 17, 1999. The case was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of Leonard and awarded him $200,000 in compensatory damages and $750,000 in punitive damages on the wrongful-termination claim. The court denied AutoZone's motion for a judgment as a matter of law. However, the trial court granted AutoZone's motion for a remittitur. The court denied AutoZone's motion for a new trial, conditioned on Leonard's accepting a remittitur of the compensatory-damages award to $75,000 and a remittitur of the punitive-damages award to $275,000. Leonard accepted those remittiturs, and the court entered a judgment awarding Leonard $75,000 in compensatory damages and $275,000 in punitive damages.

AutoZone argues that, even as remitted, the award of compensatory damages was excessive, and it argues that Leonard failed to present "clear and convincing" evidence entitling him to an award of punitive damages, specifically, it says, because he failed to establish a pattern and practice of retaliation or coercive harassment. On his cross-appeal, Leonard argues that the trial court erred in ordering a remittitur of the jury's awards.

Analysis

I. Compensatory Damages

AutoZone argues that the compensatory-damages award, even after the remittitur, was excessive. Conversely, Leonard insists that the evidence supports the jury's $200,000 compensatory-damages award. In its order requiring a remittitur of the jury's compensatory-damages award to $75,000, the trial court stated:

"In this trial Plaintiff claimed that he suffered severe mental anguish as a direct result of AutoZone's actions and that his marriage was caused to be terminated in divorce as a direct result of AutoZone's actions.

". . . .

"Although the Court finds that there was substantial evidence from which a jury could award compensatory damages to Mr. Leonard for the actions complained of, the Court finds that the amount of the compensatory award, $200,000.00, was excessive under the circumstances. The evidence in this case established that Mr. Leonard was covered by health insurance on the date of the accident in question, and therefore, his actual out of pocket damages were his lost wages, $3000.00. The evidence further establishes that the financial burden caused by AutoZone's wrongful denial of Plaintiff's [Workers'] Compensation claim and his subsequent termination was only one of many reasons which brought about the dissolution of his marriage. Although it is difficult for the Court to supplant its assessment for that of the jury in determining a reasonable award of compensatory damages for mental anguish and emotional distress associated with the acts complained of in this case, including those acts that were claimed to have contributed to the breakup of a family, it is this Court's opinion that compensatory damages in the sum of $75,000.00 will fairly and adequately compensate Michael Leonard for AutoZone's wrongful conduct."

Alabama law has consistently held that "`jury verdicts carry ... a presumption of correctness, and that ... presumption is strengthened when the trial court denies a motion for new trial.'" Northeast Alabama Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Owens, 584 So.2d 1360, 1366 (Ala.1991) (citation omitted).

"The appellate courts of this state do not favor setting aside a verdict for damages if doing so can be avoided. The invocation of our statutory authority to determine the proper amount of recovery is dependent upon a clear showing that the jury verdict is the product of bias, passion, prejudice, corruption, or other improper motive."

Id. (citations omitted). A court's review of a jury's compensatory-damages award, on the ground of alleged excessiveness, must focus on the plaintiff and must ask what award the evidence supports, in terms of the damage or harm the plaintiff suffered. Daniels v. East Alabama Paving, Inc., 740 So.2d 1033, 1044 (Ala.1999). In the absence of a flawed verdict, a court has no statutory authority to invade the province of the jury in awarding compensatory damages. Id.

This Court has long held that "`[t]here is no fixed standard for ascertainment of compensatory damages recoverable...