Aviation v. Butler County Bd. Of Comm'rs
| Decision Date | 04 December 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. C-090616.,C-090616. |
| Citation | 924 N.E.2d 862,2009 Ohio 6331,185 Ohio App.3d 477 |
| Parties | EMPOWER AVIATION, L.L.C., Appellant,v.BUTLER COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Keating Meuthing & Klekamp P.L.L., Joseph L. Trauth Jr., and Charles M. Miller, Cincinnati, for appellant.
Frost Brown Todd L.L.C., Scott D. Phillipps, Douglas R. Dennis, and Ali Razzaghi, Cincinnati, for appellees Butler County Board of Commissioners, Donald Dixon, Gregory Jolivette, Charles Furmon, and Ronald Davis.
Santen & Hughes and Charles E. Reynolds, Cincinnati, for appellee Meridian Partners, L.L.C.
{¶ 1} This is an expedited appeal from the trial court's denial of a preliminary injunction sought by an unsuccessful proposer for a 2009 contract as the Fixed Based Operator (“FBO”) at the Butler County Regional Airport. The FBO provides services at the airport such as aircraft marshaling and fuel and oil sales. The appellant is Empower Aviation, L.L.C., the FBO operator since 2007 under a contract that expired on August 31, 2009. The defendant-appellees are the Butler County Board of Commissioners; the individual members of the board in their official capacity only; Ronald W. Davis, the administrator of the airport in his official capacity only (collectively referred to as “the county”), and the successful proposer, Meridian Partners, L.L.C., doing business as Reynolds Jet Center (“Meridian”).
{¶ 2} The county, as owner and operator of the airport, entered into an FBO service agreement with Pro-Aero, Inc., in June 2004. The 2004 FBO agreement had a five-year term with an option to enter into negotiations for successive five-year terms. Empower acquired Pro-Aero in 2007, and the county, with reservations, allowed Empower to assume Pro-Aero's rights and obligations under the 2004 FBO contract. Empower invested in new equipment and technology for its FBO operations and expanded its non-FBO operations at the airport, including purchasing and managing several charter jets and turboprop aircraft. But the county became increasingly dissatisfied with Empower's FBO services due to safety issues and a perceived lack of management. Consequently, in January 2009, the county opted not to renew the 2004 FBO agreement with Empower. Instead, the county issued a request for proposals (“RFP”).
{¶ 3} The RFP states that Butler County will enter into negotiations for a new five-to-15-year FBO service agreement with the proposer that the county deems to be the “best and most qualified,” but the RFP also provides that the county may reject all proposals. The RFP further sets out the requirements for applications and the evaluation criteria.
{¶ 4} Four companies, including Empower, responded to the RFP. The county reviewed and evaluated each proposal and assigned each a numerical score. Meridian achieved the highest overall score with a 91.69 (out of a possible 100). Empower finished third, with an overall score of 66.69. The county selected Meridian as the successful proposer. Empower then filed this lawsuit.
{¶ 5} In its amended complaint, Empower alleged that the county had violated Ohio's statute governing sealed proposals 1 and had breached the terms of the RFP by selecting Meridian, not Empower, as the superior proposer. Additionally, Empower claimed that Meridian had “tortiously interfered with [Empower's] business operations.” As remedies, Empower sought a declaration that it was the superior proposer, an award of money damages against the county and Meridian, an injunction permanently enjoining the county from entering into negotiations, and a contract with Meridian.
{¶ 6} Empower moved the trial court for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and a preliminary injunction, pending the resolution of its claims. In July 2009, by consent order, the court enjoined the county from contracting with Meridian until the resolution of the preliminary-injunction motion, mooting the TRO request.
{¶ 7} After a hearing, the trial court denied Empower's motion for a preliminary injunction. The county then entered into a five-year FBO contract with Meridian to begin on September 1, 2009. On August 31, 2009, Empower appealed the trial court's order denying the preliminary injunction, and on that same date, this court issued a temporary injunction ordering that Empower remain the FBO under the prior contract pending the resolution of this appeal. The county then moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of a final, appealable order. We deferred a ruling on that motion and allowed the parties to brief the merits of the appeal.
{¶ 8} Empower contends in its only assignment of error that the trial court's order denying the preliminary injunction is contrary to law and that the court failed to apply the correct legal standard and abused its discretion in evaluating the evidence.
{¶ 9} We first address whether this court has jurisdiction over Empower's appeal. The scope of our appellate jurisdiction is limited. 2 An appellate court lacks jurisdiction over an order that is not final.3 The order from which Empower appeals does not involve a judgment on the merits of Empower's claims; rather, the order denies only a provisional remedy-a preliminary injunction.4 And an order denying a provisional remedy such as a preliminary injunction does not automatically qualify as a final, appealable order under Ohio law.5
{¶ 10} R.C. 2505.02(B)(4) governs the issue of whether an order granting or denying a provisional remedy is a final and appealable order. The order is not immediately appealable unless the following apply: “(a) [t]he order in effect determines the action with respect to the provisional remedy and prevents a judgment in the action in favor of the appealing party with respect to the provisional remedy, [and] (b) [t]he appealing party would not be afforded a meaningful or effective remedy by an appeal following final judgment as to all proceedings, issues, claims, and parties in the action.” 6 Both requirements must be met before an order denying a preliminary injunction will qualify as a final order under R.C. 2505.02(B)(4).
{¶ 11} The county concedes that the order denying the preliminary injunction prevented a judgment in Empower's favor with respect to the provisional remedy-the preliminary injunction. The county argues, however, that the trial court's denial of the preliminary injunction failed to satisfy the second requirement of R.C. 2505.02(B)(4) because Empower will be afforded a “meaningful or effective remedy” by an appeal following final judgment on all the issues in the action.
{¶ 12} We must determine, then, whether Empower will be afforded a meaningful or effective remedy by an appeal following final judgment. But first, to aid our analysis, we clarify the scope of the provisional remedy requested, the procedural posture of the case, and the character of the alleged injury.
{¶ 13} Empower sought a preliminary injunction to prevent Meridian and the county from negotiating or entering into an FBO contract until the conclusion of the case on the merits. That particular remedy can never be obtained because the county and Meridian have actually entered into a contract. But in our view, the scope of the requested provisional remedy must be construed to encompass a preliminary injunction preventing Meridian from performing under the contract until the resolution of the claims on the merits.
{¶ 14} The trial court denied the preliminary injunction but did not rule on the merits of Empower's claims. Civ.R. 65(B)(2) allows the trial court to consolidate a preliminary-injunction hearing with a trial on the merits of a permanent injunction, essentially expediting the trial for the permanent relief.7 But the parties did not request a consolidation in this case, and the trial court did not issue a consolidation order sua sponte. Thus, the court decided only the preliminary matter, and it did not determine the merits of Empower's claims.
{¶ 15} The trial court included a Civ.R. 54(B) certification in its order. But this certification does not make the order denying the provisional remedy immediately appealable. 8 Therefore, the trial court's use of the Civ.R. 54(B) certification on its order denying the preliminary injunction did not make the order final under R.C. 2505.02(A)(4).
{¶ 16} We also clarify that Empower did not include in the complaint a federal claim based on the deprivation of a constitutional right. Thus, we conclude that Empower did not allege any injury of a constitutional magnitude.
{¶ 17} In light of these clarifications, we now determine whether Empower will be denied a meaningful or effective remedy if an immediate appeal is not allowed from the denial of the preliminary injunction.
{¶ 18} By statute, an order affording a provisional remedy is not a final order unless the party appealing “would not be afforded a meaningful or effective remedy” on appeal from a final judgment on the merits.9 This statutory language, added by amendment, recognizes that “in spite of courts' interest in avoiding piecemeal litigation, occasions may arise in which a party seeking to appeal from an interlocutory order would have no adequate remedy from the effects of that order on appeal from final judgment.” 10 Courts have recognized this “occasion” in cases where “the proverbial bell cannot be unrung,”11 such as those involving an order compelling the production of documents containing trade secrets, an order compelling the production of privileged communications, or an order denying a request to enforce a covenant not to compete.12
{¶ 19} Likewise, the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Muncie 13...
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