Avila v. Astrue, CV 11-07670-VBK
| Decision Date | 25 July 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. CV 11-07670-VBK,CV 11-07670-VBK |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
| Parties | VIOLET FAYE AVILA, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
(Social Security Case)
This matter is before the Court for review of the decision by the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff's application for disability benefits. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(c), the parties have consented that the case may be handled by the Magistrate Judge. The action arises under 42 U.S.C. §405(g), which authorizes the Court to enter judgment upon the pleadings and transcript of the record before the Commissioner. The parties have filed the Joint Stipulation ("JS"), and the Commissioner has filed the certified Administrative Record ("AR"). After reviewing the matter, the Court concludes that the decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed.
Plaintiff Violet Faye Avila (hereinafter "Plaintiff"), represented by counsel, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §405(g), seeking review of the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying her application for Title II and Title XVI disability benefits.
Plaintiff filed her Complaint on September 22, 2011. The Commissioner filed his Answer and the Certified Administrative Record ("AR") on March 23, 2012. On June, 25, 2012, the parties filed a Joint Stipulation.
The matter is now pending before the Court and ready for decision. This Memorandum Opinion and Order shall constitute the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law.
On March 24, 2008, Plaintiff filed her application for Title II and Title XVI disability benefits due to carpal tunnel syndrome, a shoulder injury, and a knee replacement. (AR 125-34, 156.) Plaintiff alleged an onset date of May 17, 2003. (AR 157.) The application was denied administratively. (AR 80-84.) Plaintiff then requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). (AR 85.)
The hearing before the ALJ commenced on October 13, 2009, at which time Plaintiff appeared and testified. (AR 8-62.) Testimony was also taken from a vocational expert ("VE"), as well as Plaintiff's daughter, Marie Torres ("Torres"). (AR 48-62.)
On January 13, 2010, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision (AR 65-76.), and Plaintiff appealed. (AR 6, 206-09.) The Appeals Councildenied review, thus making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner.1 Plaintiff then filed this action seeking judicial review.
In the Joint Stipulation, Plaintiff raises the following issues:
The Court, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §405(g), has the authority to review the Commissioner's decision denying Plaintiff's disability benefits to determine whether her findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether the Commissioner used the proper legal standards in reaching her decision. Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir. 1999); Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998).
A claimant is "disabled" for the purpose of receiving benefits under the Social Security Act if the claimant is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity due to an impairment which has lasted, or is expected to last, for a continuous period of at least twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A); 20 CFR §§404.1505(a), 416.905(a). "The claimant bears the burden ofestablishing a prima facie case of disability." Roberts v. Shalala, 66 F.3d 179, 182 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1122 (1996); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1289 (9th Cir. 1996).
Regulations promulgated by the Commissioner establish a five-step sequential evaluation process to be followed by the ALJ in a disability case. 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520, 416.920. In the First Step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; if so, a finding of nondisability is made and the claim is denied. 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If the claimant is not currently engaged in substantial gainful activity, in the Second Step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments significantly limiting the claimant from performing basic work activities; if not, a finding of nondisability is made and the claim is denied. 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520(c), (416.920(c). In the Third Step, if the claimant has a severe impairment, the ALJ must compare the impairment to those impairments in the Listing of Impairments ("Listing"), 20 C.F.R. §404, Subpart P, App. 1. If the impairment meets or equals an impairment in the Listing, disability is conclusively presumed and benefits are awarded. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(d), 416.920(d). When the claimant's impairment does not meet or equal an impairment in the Listing, in the Fourth Step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has sufficient residual functional capacity despite the impairment or various limitations to perform the claimant's past work; if so, a finding of nondisability is made and the claim is denied. 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520(e), 416.920(e). When the claimant shows an inability to perform past relevant work, a prima facie case of disability is established and, in Step Five, theburden shifts to the Commissioner to show the claimant can perform other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520(f), 416.920(f).
Following this sequential evaluation process, at Step One, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in any substantial gainful activity since her alleged disability onset date of May 17, 2003. (AR 71, Finding 2.) At Step Two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has an impairment or combination of impairments considered severe, determined in the decision to be musculoskeletal impairments, obesity, diabetes mellitus, and hypertension. (AR 71, Finding 3.) At Step Three, it was found that these severe impairments do not meet or medically equal one of the Listings. (AR 71, Finding 4.) The ALJ noted that though there are no Listing criteria specific to the evaluation of obesity impairments, considerations regarding Plaintiff's obesity impairments have been taken into account in reaching the conclusions in Steps Two through Five. (AR 71, Finding 4.) After determining Plaintiff's residual functional capacity ("RFC") (AR 23, Finding 7), the ALJ determined at Step Four that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to perform work requiring lifting/carrying of up to twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently; alternate sitting and standing/walking in one-hour intervals; and that she would be precluded from performing work requiring overhead reaching. (AR 72-75, Finding 5.) At Step Five, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was capable of performing her past relevant work as an office assistant/seasonal clerk (AR 75, Finding 6), thus rendering Plaintiff not disabled as defined in the Social Security Act ("Act"). (AR 76, Finding 7.)
Plaintiff's principal contention is that the ALJ failed to properly consider two bilateral knee x-rays taken in 2008 and 2009 in determining her RFC. (See AR 370, 366.) The bilateral knee x-rays taken on July 1, 2008 revealed "marked narrowing of both lateral joint compartments, more pronounced on the left side." (AR 370.) The bilateral knee x-rays taken on May 12, 2009, revealed "severe osteoarthritis with chondrocalcinosis." (AR 366.) In particular, Plaintiff points to the fact that the ALJ relied upon the non-examining assessment of the State Agency medical consultant, Dr. Beig, who did not take into consideration the 2008 and 2009 knee x-rays when evaluating Plaintiff's exertional capabilities. (AR 75, 358.)
Plaintiff additionally contends that the ALJ's RFC is not supported by substantial evidence because he failed to properly consider Plaintiff's obesity in the RFC assessment, in particular the effect of "severe" osteoarthritis revealed in the 2008 and 2009 bilateral knee x-rays.
A. Analysis.
Though Plaintiff is correct in her factual assertion that the ALJ did not consider the 2008 and 2009 knee x-rays in determining her RFC, his failure to evaluate the x-rays had neither a probative or significant effect on his exertional findings.
In addition to Dr. Beig's evaluation, the ALJ considered an exertional examination conducted by Dr. Ram, dated May 8, 2008. (AR 74-75, 351-56.) Dr. Ram found that:
(AR 354.)
Thus, contrary to Petitioner's contentions, the ALJ clearly did take into account Plaintiff's bilateral knee osteoarthritis.
Plaintiff contends, however, that whereas the 2008 and 2009 x-rays reveal "marked" and "severe" osteoarthritis of the knees (AR 366, 370), Dr. Ram only noted "evidence" of osteoarthritis in his physical evaluation. (AR 354.) This disparity in terminology is ultimately immaterial. Most notably, the x-rays address neither Plaintiff's RFC or Plaintiff's exertional capacity to perform her work-related tasks. As held by the Ninth Circuit, the ALJ is not required to discuss every piece of evidence, as long as the disregarded evidence is neither "probative" or "significant." Howard v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 2003)(quoting Black v. Apfel, 143 F.3d 383, 386 (8th Cir. 1998)); Howard ex rel. Wolff v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff compares the ALJ's disregard of her knee x-rays as akin to "disregard[ing] an MRI of the brain showing lesions and...
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