Avins v. Moll

• Decision Date: 06 September 1984
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 79-0089,79-2089 and 81-1248.
• Citation: 610 F. Supp. 308
• Parties: Alfred AVINS v. Clarence R. MOLL, et al. Alfred AVINS v. Clarence R. MOLL, et al. Alfred AVINS v. F. Eugene DIXON, Jr., et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

610 F. Supp. 308

Alfred AVINS v. Clarence R. MOLL, et al.

Alfred AVINS v. Clarence R. MOLL, et al.

Alfred AVINS v. F. Eugene DIXON, Jr., et al.

Civ. A. Nos. 79-0089, 79-2089 and 81-1248.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

September 6, 1984.

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Alfred Avins, pro se.

Franklin Poul, Philadelphia, Pa., John F. Cramp, Media, Pa., for defendants Clarence R. Moll, Widener College, Inc., The Delaware Law School of Widener College, Inc. and the Honorable John B. Hannum.

MEMORANDUM

CAHN, District Judge.

These actions, consolidated for trial purposes, are brought by Alfred Avins ("Avins"), the founder and former Dean of Delaware Law School of Widener University ("DLS").¹ Avins seeks damages and equitable relief against various individual and corporate defendants, whom Avins claims wrongfully ousted him from his position as DLS Dean and faculty member.

These cases have a tortuous and protracted history. For nearly a decade, Avins has engaged in litigation against one or more of the defendants in the consolidated actions: Widener University ("Widener"), DLS, Arthur Weeks, Dean of DLS at various relevant times, Dr. Clarence Moll, President of Widener and DLS at various relevant times, and F. Eugene Dixon, Jr., a trustee of Widener and DLS at various relevant times. Eight such cases have been brought by Avins. Simply put, all the actions arose as a result of the affiliation of DLS with Widener in July of 1975. Avins has sued certain individual and corporate defendants in Delaware state court, in the Federal District Court for the District of Delaware, in New York state court, and in this judicial district.

The factual background of the consolidated actions have been thoroughly described by other members of the judiciary who have adjudicated Avins' claims. See Avins v. White, 627 F.2d 637 (3d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 982, 101 S.Ct. 398, 66 L.Ed.2d 244 (1980); Plechner v. Widener College, Inc., 418 F.Supp. 1282 (E.D.Pa. 1976), aff'd 569 F.2d 1250 (3d Cir.1977);² Avins v. Hannum, 497 F.Supp. 930 (E.D. Pa.1980); Avins v. Widener College, Inc., 421 F.Supp. 858 (D.Del.1976). Accordingly, I will omit a detailed factual statement from this Opinion. Nevertheless, a brief chronological history of the Avins-DLS dispute will place the instant action in its proper perspective.

Avins founded DLS in 1971. At its inception, DLS was an unaccredited law school. That is, the American Bar Association ("ABA"), had not certified the school. In most states, graduation from an ABA-accredited school is a prerequisite for law students who wish to sit for the bar examination.

It was therefore necessary for DLS to obtain ABA accreditation before graduation of the first class of DLS students in 1975. Avins, as Dean of DLS, sought to obtain the ABA "seal of approval." Unfortunately, the Bar Association was reluctant to certify DLS. Relations between Avins and the ABA accreditation officers grew acrimonious, and Avins was ultimately uncooperative in the attempt to obtain accreditation for DLS. Avins was forced to resign as Dean of DLS in September of 1974. He remained a member of the DLS Board of Trustees and of the DLS faculty, and was designated "Dean Emeritus" of DLS.

During the accreditation process, the ABA suggested that affiliation of DLS with an established college or university would markedly approve DLS's chances for obtaining accreditation. In 1975, the DLS Board of Trustees voted to affiliate with Widener. Provisional ABA accreditation was obtained before the first DLS class graduated. DLS is now permanently accredited by the ABA.

Avins opposed the decision to affiliate DLS with Widener. Since the time of the affiliation decision, he has litigated against DLS, Widener, officials and trustees of both schools, and ABA accreditation committee members. In 1976, DLS sought to dismiss plaintiff as a professor at DLS, because his conduct conflicted with the interests of the law school. Hearings were eventually held early in 1978, at which time he was discharged as a DLS faculty member. In August of 1978, Widener chose not to reappoint Avins to the DLS Board of Trustees.

Prior to his dismissal as a DLS professor, Avins became one of the incorporators of District of Columbia law school in 1977. The institution was designed as a "weekend" law school, where students could attend classes during weekend periods, and not interfere with their weekday occupations. As the name implies, the school was situated in the District of Columbia. Renamed Capitol District Law School, the school was unable to obtain a license empowering it to grant degrees in the District of Columbia. Avins then began another law school in Alexandria, Virginia, which he named Northern Virginia Law School. Later, plaintiff started a division of Northern Virginia in Fall River, Massachusetts, which he named the South-East Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Avins Law School. Both schools are "weekend" law schools, like the now-defunct Capitol District Law School. Neither is accredited by the ABA.

As previously discussed, Avins has participated as intervenor or plaintiff in several actions in this district and in other jurisdictions challenging the affiliation of DLS with Widener. In the course of his litigation against the instant defendants, he has sought to set aside the DLS-Widener merger, to obtain a lifetime position for himself at DLS, and to compel DLS and Widener to grant him various honorary positions. Avins has also charged certain defendants with defamation, invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional and physical injuries. Finally, he claims that defendants violated the federal antitrust laws by monopolizing the market of law students from, and located in, Delaware, sections of Pennsylvania, and New Jersey, and by conspiring to prevent Avins from starting another law school.

Defendants have moved for summary judgment in the consolidated actions. For the reasons set forth in this Opinion, defendants' motion for summary judgment will be granted. Judgment will be entered in favor of all defendants and against the plaintiff, and other outstanding motions in the consolidated actions will be disposed of.

DISCUSSION

1. Antitrust Claims.³

Avins contends that the defendants have violated the federal antitrust laws by deliberately thwarting his ability to compete in the marketplace for part-time law students. Avins claims that defendants viewed the District of Columbia Law School as a competitor for potential DLS students, and therefore attempted to hinder Avins' efforts to develop that institution. On this basis, plaintiff charges monopolization in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act, and conspiracy to restrain trade in violation of sections 1 and 3 of that Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3. Because I have concluded as a matter of law that Avins is unable to state an antitrust claim against the defendants, judgment as to Avins' antitrust claims in the consolidated actions will be entered in favor of the defendants.

Regarding the alleged monopolization, Avins claims that the geographic market DLS dominates encompasses "Delaware, Pennsylvania south of Philadelphia, and New Jersey south of Camden." Pretrial Statement With Respect to the First Cause of Action, ¶ 5. Plaintiff offers no evidence to support his definition of this market. I disagree with Avins' lines of demarcation, which are obviously meant to exclude the Philadelphia area and more specifically, Temple Law School (Philadelphia) and Rutgers Law School (Camden), both of which have evening divisions like DLS. However, even if I accept Avins view of the geographic market, it is certainly true that potential students located in the DLS market have the option of attending other well-established institutions, such as Temple or Rutgers.

I am equally troubled by Avins' silence in failing to address the geographic locale of the District of Columbia Law School, which was located in Washington, D.C. In close proximity to that school are Catholic University's Columbus School of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, George Washington's The National Law Center, University of Baltimore School of Law, and University of Maryland School of Law. All are located in the District of Columbia or Baltimore, all offer evening law school curricula, and all were presumably "competitors" of the District of Columbia Law School. Nevertheless, Avins purports to confine the relevant geographic market to "Delaware, Pennsylvania south of Philadelphia, and New Jersey south of Camden."⁴

Notwithstanding Avins' failure to describe persuasively the market in which the District of Columbia Law School functions, he has also failed to set forth any facts which show that DLS achieved its allegedly monopolistic position in a predatory or deliberate manner.⁵ See United States v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 393, 76 S.Ct. 994, 1006, 100 L.Ed. 1264 (1956); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 86 S.Ct. 1698, 16 L.Ed.2d 778 (1966); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Company, 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093, 100 S.Ct. 1061, 62 L.Ed.2d 783 (1980). In fact, Avins asserts that "by reason of its geographic location, DLS has a monopoly of part-time legal education in its prime market." Pretrial Statement With Respect to the First Cause of Action, ¶ 6. Accordingly, even if DLS dominates a particular "market" in Avin's view, there is no evidence that such domination is due to any factor other than the geographical placement of the school.

I have likewise determined that defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to Avins' Sherman Act restraint of trade claims. Avins incorporates the remaining counts of his complaint into the restraint of trade allegations, claiming that defendants' hostility towards him amounts to an antitrust violation which ultimately harmed his work at District of Columbia Law S...