Avis Rent, LLC v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 31 October 2019
• Docket Number: A19A0928, A19A0929
• Citation: 836 S.E.2d 114,352 Ga.App. 858
• Parties: AVIS RENT A CAR SYSTEM, LLC et al. v. JOHNSON; and vice versa.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

352 Ga.App. 858

836 S.E.2d 114

AVIS RENT A CAR SYSTEM, LLC et al.

v.JOHNSON; and vice versa.

A19A0928, A19A0929

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

October 31, 2019

Holland & Knight, Laurie W. Daniel, Matthew D. Friedlander; Downey & Cleveland, G. Lee Welborn; Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Brantley C. Rowlen, V. Ashley Waller, Jason P. Wright; Swift Currie McGhee & Hiers, William T. Casey, Jr.; Wheeler Trigg O'Donnell, Robert L. Shannon, Jr., for Avis Rent A Car System, LLC et al. Bondurant Mixson & Elmore, Michael B. Terry, Naveen Ramachandrappa, Amanda K. Seals; Th Law Offices of Michael L. Neff, P.C., Michael L. Neff, D. Dwayne Adams, Susan M. Cremer, T. Shane Peagler, for Johnson. Brittany B. Wilson, amicus curiae (case no. A19A0928).

Brianna Johnson was seriously injured when she was struck by a sport utility vehicle that had been stolen from an Avis car rental lot in downtown Atlanta. She sued appellants Avis Rent A Car System, LLC, Avis Budget Group, Inc., and Peter Duca, a regional security manager for Avis Budget Group (together, ‘‘Avis’’), as well as CSYG, Inc., the operator of the downtown Avis location, and Yonas Gebremichael, CSYG's owner. (Johnson also sued Byron Perry, the former CSYG employee who stole the vehicle, but she dismissed him without prejudice before trial.)

After a 13-day trial, the jury returned a verdict finding that Johnson was entitled to recover from Avis Rent A Car System and Avis Budget Group, but not from CSYG, Gebremichael, or Duca, and awarded Johnson $7 million in damages.

Avis filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial as to liability. The trial court denied the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict but granted a new trial as to liability. Avis appeals the denial of its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Johnson appeals the grant of Avis's motion for new trial on the issue of liability.

We hold that under longstanding Georgia authority, any breach of duty was not the proximate cause of Johnson's injuries, so Avis is entitled to judgment on Johnson's claims based on Avis's own negligence. We also hold that the jury's exoneration of Avis's employees requires judgment in Avis's favor on Johnson's claims based on Avis's vicarious liability. So we reverse the denial of Avis's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and dismiss as moot Johnson's appeal from the grant of new trial.

1. Facts and procedural posture .

Viewed in the light most favorable to Johnson, Jones v. Sperau , 275 Ga. 213 (1), 563 S.E.2d 863 (2002), the trial evidence showed that CSYG operated an Avis car rental lot on Courtland Street in downtown Atlanta. CSYG hired Byron Perry to wash and refuel cars at the location. On the night of August 23, 2013, after the Avis lot had closed, Perry stole a Ford Edge sport utility vehicle from the lot, intending to sell it.

The Ford Edge was driven around Atlanta at regular speeds for hours. But shortly before midnight, five hours after the lot had closed, the driver of the stolen Ford Edge was fleeing from police when the vehicle crashed into a brick wall. Johnson and her friend, Adrienne Smith, were sitting on the wall at the time of the collision and were seriously injured. Perry, who was in the vehicle, fled from the scene and later pled guilty to multiple crimes arising from the incident, including theft by taking, failure to maintain lane, attempting to elude police, reckless driving, and hit and run.

Johnson filed this lawsuit. She alleged that Avis was liable for negligently failing to secure its vehicle and for negligently hiring, training, supervising, and retaining CSYG and Gebremichael. She also alleged that Avis was vicariously liable for Gebremichael's and CSYG's negligence.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of Johnson for $7 million. On the special verdict form, the jury found that Avis Rent A Car System and Avis Budget Group were 100 percent at fault. It found that Duca, CSYG, Gebremichael, and Perry, the vehicle thief, were zero percent at fault. Finally, it found that the Avis defendants, CSYG, and Gebremichael were not liable for punitive damages, but that Perry (who was no longer a party) was liable for punitive damages.

Avis filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or in the alternative for a new trial as to liability. The trial court denied the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, finding, among other things, that Avis knew of the risk of car thefts and that the harm to Johnson was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of car theft. The trial court granted the motion for new trial as to liability. It found that the verdict was contrary to the evidence or strongly against the weight of the evidence. See OCGA §§ 5-5-20, 5-5-21. The court found that because the "[j]ury's verdict did not find any negligence on the part of CSYG, Yonas Gebremichael, Peter Duca or Byron Perry, the evidence [did] not support a finding of liability on the part of Avis." The trial court certified its order for immediate review, we granted the parties' applications for interlocutory appeal, and these appeals followed. We first address issues regarding Johnson's claims that Avis is liable for its own negligence. We then address issues regarding Johnson's claims that Avis is vicariously liable for its employees' negligence. We hold that Avis is entitled to judgment on all claims.

2. Avis's direct negligence.

Avis argues that it was entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict on Johnson's claims that it negligently failed to secure the vehicle and negligently hired and supervised CSYG and Gebremichael, because it owed Johnson no duty and the proximate cause of Johnson's injuries was Perry's intervening criminal act. We hold that Perry's intervening criminal act was the proximate cause of Johnson's injuries. So Avis was entitled to judgment on Johnson's claims.

"It is well established that to recover for injuries caused by another's negligence, a plaintiff must show four elements: a duty, a breach of that duty, causation and damages." Goldstein, Garber & Salama, LLC v. J. B. , 300 Ga. 840, 841 (1), 797 S.E.2d 87 (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted). An absence of evidence of any one of the elements will entitle a defendant to judgment in its favor. See, e.g., Barrett Properties v. Roberts Capitol , 316 Ga. App. 507, 729 S.E.2d 621 (2012) (defendants were entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's common law tort claims, given lack of evidence that defendants were the proximate cause of any harm to plaintiff). Cf. Butts v. Williams , 247 Ga. App. 253, 256, 543 S.E.2d 779 (2000) (trial court did not err in denying plaintiff's motion for directed verdict and new trial in negligence action after defense verdict because plaintiff failed to establish the element of proximate cause).

(a) Duty of care.

"Whether a duty exists upon which liability can be based is a question of law." City of Rome v. Jordan , 263 Ga. 26, 27 (1), 426 S.E.2d 861 (1993). The duty of care "can arise either from a valid legislative enactment, that is, by statute, or be imposed by a common law principle recognized in the case law."

Diamond v. Dept. of Transp. , 326 Ga. App. 189, 194 (2), 756 S.E.2d 277 (2014) (citation and punctuation omitted).

We assume that Georgia law imposes a general duty not to cause physical injury to another. See OCGA § 51-1-13 ("A physical injury done to another shall give a right of action to the injured party, whatever may be the intention of the person causing the injury, unless he is justified under some rule of law. However, intention shall be considered in the assessment of damages."). So we turn to causation. See Goldstein , 300 Ga. at 841-843 (1), 797 S.E.2d 87 (deciding case on proximate causation without addressing the issue of the existence of any duty).

(b) Causation.

We conclude that, under our case law, Perry's conduct was the intervening proximate cause of Johnson's injuries.

[W]hen a defendant claims that its negligence is not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries, but that an act of a third party intervened to cause those injuries, the rule is that an intervening and independent wrongful act of a third person producing the injury, and without which it would not have occurred, should be treated as the proximate cause, insulating and excluding the negligence of the defendant.

Goldstein , 300 Ga. at 841 (1), 797 S.E.2d 87 (citation and punctuation omitted). Avis argues that it is entitled to judgment under this rule because the proximate cause of Johnson's injuries was the intervening criminal conduct of Perry driving recklessly as he fled police. Johnson invokes an exception to the rule. Under that exception, a defendant is not insulated from liability by the intervening act of a third party when

the defendant had reasonable grounds for apprehending that such wrongful act would be committed. Stated differently, if the character of the intervening act claimed to break the connection between the original wrongful act and the subsequent injury was such that its probable or natural consequences could reasonably have been anticipated, apprehended, or foreseen by the original wrong-doer, the causal connection is not broken, and the original wrong-doer is responsible for all of the consequences resulting from the intervening act.

Id. at 841-842 (1), 797 S.E.2d 87 (citations and punctuation omitted). Johnson argues that Perry's conduct does not insulate Avis from liability because his intervening criminal conduct was foreseeable.

As our Supreme Court explained in Goldstein , "for any such breach [of duty] to be considered the proximate cause of [Johnson's] injuries, [Perry's] criminal acts must be the ‘probable or natural consequences’ of that breach, and it must be the case that those criminal acts could ‘reasonably have been anticipated, apprehended, or foreseen’ by [Avis]." Goldstein , 300 Ga. at 843 (1), 797 S.E.2d 87. We have elaborated on that requirement,...