Axelsen v. Hillsboro Union High School Dist. No. 3
| Decision Date | 17 July 1995 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 94-542-JO. |
| Citation | 898 F. Supp. 719 |
| Parties | Judee K. AXELSEN, Plaintiff, v. HILLSBORO UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 3, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Oregon |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
James E. McCandlish, Mark Edward Griffin, Griffin & McCandlish, Portland, OR, for plaintiff.
Peter R. Mersereau, Mersereau & Shannon, Portland, OR, for defendants.
Plaintiff Judee Axelsen, a former principal of Brown Junior High School in Hillsboro, Oregon, brings this action against defendant Hillsboro Union High School District No. 3 ("District"), the District superintendent, several individual school board members, and two assistant superintendents pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges that in connection with the termination of her employment as principal in June 1992, the defendants violated her rights to due process and liberty under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
The case is before me on defendants' motion for summary judgment (# 22). After considering the parties' arguments and the evidence submitted, defendants' motion is DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN PART.1
Plaintiff was employed by the District as a "building principal" from July 1, 1989, until June 30, 1992. The parties evidently agree that during those three years, at least until April 1, 1992, plaintiff was a probationary employee.
In February and March 1992, plaintiff received performance evaluations. Both evaluations identified "performance deficiencies" related to plaintiff's management style. Following the February 1992, evaluation, plaintiff was placed on a plan of assistance, to "assist her in correcting the performance deficiencies" described in the plan. The plan of assistance set forth certain "improvement targets" for plaintiff to meet, and established dates for an interim evaluation (March 15, 1992) and a final evaluation (June 15, 1992).
By March 30, 1992, plaintiff was aware that the District was considering terminating her employment and through her attorney, she was negotiating the terms of a resignation agreement. The District Board met in executive and open sessions on March 30, 1992, but the minutes of those sessions do not demonstrate any action the Board may have taken or discussion it may have had concerning plaintiff. Apparently the District did not send plaintiff a written notice of renewal or nonrenewal of her contract by April 1, 1992, as required by O.R.S. 342.513(1) and 342.835(2).
Plaintiff states in her affidavit that on April 6, 1992, she learned that she would be removed as Brown's principal after the 1991-1992 school year. Plaintiff claims that certain staff members at Brown waged a campaign against her and celebrated when they learned that she would be removed.
On April 24, 1992, Nancy Hungerford, an attorney representing the District, wrote to plaintiff's attorney and informed him that unless plaintiff signed a resignation before May 5, 1992, the superintendent intended to recommend to the Board at its May 5 meeting that she be dismissed effective at the end of the 1991-1992 school year. The letter also stated that if plaintiff refused to resign, she would be provided an opportunity for a pretermination hearing before the Board's executive session on May 5.
Plaintiff did not resign, and she and her attorney appeared at the pre-termination hearing and argued against dismissal. On May 21, 1992, the Board voted to accept the superintendent's recommendation to dismiss plaintiff, effective June 30, 1992. The Board informed plaintiff of its decision by a memorandum dated May 22, 1992. The memorandum specified the reason for her dismissal as "failure to meet Principal performance target 7.5: `Effectively resolves conflicts at the school level,'" and referred to specific examples of performance deficiencies noted in the plan of assistance.
Plaintiff was relieved of her duties as principal in May 1992, and terminated on June 30, 1992. Since termination, plaintiff asserts she has been unable to find employment in her chosen profession as a school administrator.
Plaintiff's complaint alleges, in essence, two claims2 arising out the above events: (1) deprivation of her property interest in continued employment without due process; and (2) violation of her right to liberty. Defendants seek summary judgment on all claims.
Summary judgment should be granted if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). If the moving party shows that there are no genuine issues of material fact, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and designate facts showing an issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A scintilla of evidence, or evidence that is merely colorable or not significantly probative, does not present a genuine issue of material fact. United Steelworkers of America v. Phelps Dodge, 865 F.2d 1539, 1542 (9th Cir.1989).
The substantive law governing a claim determines whether a fact is material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); see also T.W. Elec. Service v. Pacific Elec. Contractors, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.1987). Reasonable doubts as to the existence of a material factual issue are resolved against the moving party. T.W. Elec. Service, 809 F.2d at 631. Inferences drawn from facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. at 630-31.
The Fourteenth Amendment protects against the deprivation of property or liberty without due process. See, e.g., Brady v. Gebbie, 859 F.2d 1543, 1547 (9th Cir.1988). An employee has a protected property interest in continued employment only if the employee has a "reasonable expectation or a `legitimate claim of entitlement' to it, rather than a mere `unilateral expectation.'" Brady, 859 F.2d at 1547-48, quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). As explained in Brady, whether an Oregon public employee has a property interest in continued employment depends on state law:
A legitimate claim of entitlement arises if it is created by "existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law." ... Thus, "state law defines what is and what is not property" that is subject to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Brady, 859 F.2d at 1548 (citations omitted).
See also Trivoli v. Mult. Co. Rural Fire Protection, 74 Or.App. 550, 554, 703 P.2d 285 (1985) (). Under Oregon law, a probationary teacher does not have a property interest in his or her job, "at least in the absence of a contract giving the teacher greater rights than does the statute." Maddox v. Clackamas Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 25, 51 Or.App. 639, 643, 626 P.2d 924 (1981), aff'd as mod., 293 Or. 27, 643 P.2d 1253 (1982).
Defendants argue that plaintiff's due process claim fails as a matter of law because as a probationary employee, she had no protected property interest in continued employment beyond June 30, 1992, the expiration of her probationary period. Defendants further argue that even if plaintiff was entitled to Fourteenth Amendment procedural protections, as a matter of law she was given all the process that was due under the circumstances.
Plaintiff argues that under the Oregon Fair Dismissal Law, the District's failure to notify her in writing of nonrenewal of her contract by April 1, 1992, conferred permanent teacher status upon her automatically and gave her a property interest in continued employment. She also asserts that the defendants' conduct created a reasonable expectation of continued employment. I discuss plaintiff's arguments in turn.
At the outset, I note that the parties have not identified any District rules or regulations that might apply. The District is a "fair dismissal district," O.R.S. 342.815(4), and plaintiff qualifies as a "teacher" under the fair dismissal statutes. See O.R.S. 342.120(9) and 342.815(1). "Permanent teacher" is defined for fair dismissal purposes as:
any teacher who has been regularly employed by a fair dismissal district for a period of not less than three successive school years and who has been reelected by the district after the completion of such three-year period for the next succeeding school year. O.R.S. 342.815(5).
A "probationary teacher," in contrast, is "any teacher * * * who is not a permanent teacher." O.R.S. 342.815(6).
A district board may dismiss a probationary teacher "at any time during a probationary period for any cause considered in good faith sufficient by the board." O.R.S. 342.835(1). Upon the teacher's request, the district board is required to provide a written copy of the reasons for dismissal and "a hearing thereon" by the board. Similarly, a district board may refuse to renew a probationary teacher's contract for any cause deemed in good faith to be sufficient, provided that notice of nonrenewal is given by April 1. O.R.S. 342.835(2). O.R.S. 342.513(1) refines the April 1 notice requirement by further requiring the district to give notice of nonrenewal in writing. If the district fails to give the required notice, "the contract shall be considered renewed for the following school year at a salary not less than that being received at the time of renewal."3
The Oregon Court of Appeals has interpreted O.R.S. 342.513(1) to require that the employee "actually receive a written notice of nonrenewal by the statutorily designated date." Ambrose v. Board of Ed. of Sch. Dist. # 17-C, 51 Or.App. 621, 625, 626 P.2d 916 (1981) (original emphasis deleted), citing, among other cases, Wallis v. Crook County...
To continue reading
Request your trial