Axelson v. Williamson
| Decision Date | 17 September 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 81-1278.,81-1278. |
| Citation | 324 NW 2d 241 |
| Parties | Gloria Kopet AXELSON, as Trustee for the Heirs of Patricia Kopet, Decedent, Appellant, v. David WILLIAMSON, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Hoversten, Strom, Johnson & Rysavy, Austin, for appellant.
Alderson, Ondov, Leonard & Sween, Richardson & Richardson, Austin, for respondent.
Considered and decided by the court en banc without oral argument.
This is a wrongful death action brought by the trustee for the heirs of the decedent. On November 20, 1977, plaintiff's decedent, Patricia Kopet, a 15-year-old girl, was killed in a one-car accident in Mower County. David Williamson, the defendant and owner of the automobile involved in the accident, permitted Kopet to drive, and while driving she lost control of the car and crashed, suffering the severe injuries that resulted in her death. Appellant contended at trial that Williamson was negligent in entrusting the operation of his vehicle to Kopet. Following trial the jury found that both Williamson and Kopet were negligent, but that Williamson's negligence was not the proximate cause of Kopet's injuries.
The trial judge denied appellant's alternative motions for a new trial or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The motions were based on appellant's contention that the answers to the special verdict were logically inconsistent. Appellant appeals from the denial of her motions.
It is uncontroverted that on November 20, 1977, Patricia Kopet, the appellant's decedent, was permitted by David Williamson, the respondent, to drive his Datsun 240Z automobile, and that while driving Kopet lost control of the car, crashed, and was killed. Brenda Cooklin, a passenger in the car at the time of the accident, testified that respondent asked Kopet if she had a driver's license or a learner's permit, and she responded that she had neither. Despite her admissions Williamson allowed her to drive while Williamson sat in the front seat and Cooklin sat in back. Shortly after she had begun driving the vehicle, the decedent lost control. Williamson testified that he thought Kopet was driving properly, but when he bent forward in his seat to pick up a cigarette she swerved into the ditch.
The appellant made a number of allegations in her complaint concerning the respondent's negligence, including:
(1) that respondent negligently allowed the decedent to drive his motor vehicle while the respondent knew or reasonably should have been expected to know that the decedent was not a licensed driver and was underage;
(2) that respondent knew or should have known that decedent was inexperienced in the handling of automobiles;
(3) that the automobile involved in the accident was dangerous and unsafe under the conditions which existed at the time and place of the accident.1
Following trial, the jury was supplied with the following instruction:
The act of allowing the driving of an automobile knowing the driver to be inexperienced or incompetent is negligence and such negligence becomes the proximate cause of injury when it combines with a negligent act of the driver causing the damage.
The jury was also supplied with a special verdict consisting of six interrogatories, and made the following findings:
1. State whether or not the defendant was negligent at the time and place in question.
Answer: Yes.
2. If the answer to # 1 is No, do not answer this question. If the answer to # 1 is Yes, then answer this question: Was the Defendant's negligence a proximate cause of Plaintiff's injury?
Answer: No.
3. State whether or not Patricia Kopet was negligent at the time and place in question.
Answer: Yes.
4. If answer to # 3 is No, do not answer this question. If the answer to # 3 is Yes, then answer this question: Was Patricia Kopet's negligence a proximate cause of her own death?
Answer: Yes.
Interrogatory # 5 concerned the apportionment of negligence. The Jury did not respond to this interrogatory as they had been instructed that they were not required to answer it unless they had submitted a Yes answer to all questions cited above.
6. State the total amount of damages suffered by the Plaintiff.
Answer: $55,000.00.
Appellant contends that the response to question # 2 is patently inconsistent with the responses to questions # 1 and # 3, given the law of the case as set out in the instruction listed above. The issue presented, therefore, by this appeal is whether the jury's special verdict is logically inconsistent as well as in violation of the law of the case.
It is the appellant's position that the trial court properly instructed the jury that the negligence of the defendant owner in entrusting his automobile to an inexperienced driver combines with the negligent acts of that driver to become the proximate cause of an ensuing accident. Appellant further contends that given such an instruction, proximate cause must follow ipso facto, from a finding of negligence by both the entruster and the entrustee.
The first question concerns the appropriateness of the proximate cause instruction given by the trial judge. Generally, the tort of negligent entrustment as it applies to the entrustment of a chattel to an incompetent or inexperienced person is described in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390 (1977):
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for the use of another whom the supplier knows or has reason to know to be likely because of his youth, inexperience, or otherwise, to use it in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical harm to himself and others whom the supplier should expect to share in or be endangered by its use, is subject to liability for physical harm resulting to them.
comment c to section 390 reminds the reader that negligence in entrusting a chattel to someone who is incompetent creates only the potential for liability on the part of the supplier. In order for liability to attach the supplier must be found to be the "legal cause of the bodily harm complained of", id., Comment c, by the injured person.
The instruction given by the trial court appears to have...
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