Ayala v. Looks Great Servs., Inc.
| Decision Date | 23 July 2015 |
| Docket Number | 14-CV-6035 (ADS) (SIL) |
| Parties | RENATO AYALA, BLAS GUTIEREZ, LEONEL JIMINEZ, and MIGUEL SERRANO, individually and on behalf of all other employees similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. LOOKS GREAT SERVICES, INC., KRISTIAN TODD AGOGLIA, and JOHN AND JANE DOES # 1-10, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
APPEARANCES:
SCHILLER LAW GROUP, P.C.
Attorneys for the Plaintiff
New York, NY 10036
By: John V. Golaszewski, Esq., Of Counsel
BOND, SCHOENECK & KING, PLLC
1010 Franklin Avenue, Suite 200
Garden City, New York 11530
By: Mark N. Reinharz, Esq., Of Counsel
This cases arises from the allegation that the Defendant Looks Great Services, Inc. ("Looks Great"), a landscaping company, repeatedly failed to pay its workers overtime compensation from 2004 to 2012.
On October 15, 2014, the Plaintiffs Renato Ayala ("Ayala"), Blas Gutierez ("Gutierez"), Leonel Jimenez ("Jimenez"), and Miguel Serrano ("Serrano") (collectively, the "Plaintiffs"), individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, commenced this action against theDefendants Looks Great, Kristian Todd Agoglia ("Agoglia"), and John and Jane Does #1-10 (collectively, the "Defendants").
The Plaintiffs asserted three causes of action against the Defendants for: (1) violation of 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. (the "FLSA") for failure to compensate the Plaintiffs for overtime and failure to "keep and preserve records with respect to each of its employees sufficient to determine the wages, hours and other conditions and practices of employment"; (2) violation of New York Labor Law § 650, et seq. (the "NYLL") for failure to pay overtime; and (3) violation of NYLL § 195 for the failure to furnish the Plaintiffs with a notice containing their rate of pay. In addition, the Plaintiffs sought to certify a collective action pursuant to FLSA § 216(b) and a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Fed. R. Civ. P.") 23 consisting of current and former employees of the Defendants.
On November 3, 2014, the Defendants filed a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss the original complaint.
In response, on November 5, 2014, the Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). The amended complaint alleges the same three causes of action.
Presently before the Court is a renewed motion by the Defendants pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss the amended complaint in its entirety. In addition, the Defendants seek sanctions against the Plaintiffs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927. The Plaintiffs oppose the motion by the Defendant and in the alternative, seek permission pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) to amend their complaint for a second time.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants the Defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint, denies their motion for sanctions, and grants the Plaintiffs leave to replead.
Unless otherwise stated, the following facts are taken from the amended complaint and are construed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs.
The Plaintiffs Ayala, Gutierez, Jimenez, and Serrano are all residents of New York and former employees of the Defendants. They were employed by the Defendants as "landscape/laborer[s]" whose primary duties were "to cut down trees and/or perform maintenance on trees, as well as related duties."
The Court notes that the introduction and caption of the amended complaint refers to the Plaintiff Miguel "Serrano." However, the amended complaint also refers to him as "Serranois." For ease of reference, the Court will refer to him as "Serrano."
Allegedly, the Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendants during the following periods: (1) Ayala was employed by the Defendants from "approximately 2004 through at least March 2012"; (2) Gutierez was employed by the Defendants from "approximately 2005 through at least March 2011"; (3) Jimenez was employed by the Defendants from "approximately 2004 through at least December 2010"; and (4) Serrano was employed by the Defendants from "approximately 2006 through at least March 2011."
The original complaint alleged that Ayala was employed by the Defendant "from 2004 to 2011." (Compl. at ¶ 8.) In their memoranda, the Defendants allege that the Plaintiffs changed the end-date of Ayala's employment from 2011 to "March 2012" in the amended complaint solely to avoid the statute of limitations on the FLSA claims.
The Defendant Looks Great is a New York corporation with its principal place of business located in Huntington, New York. It is a landscaping company that "employed at least twenty (20) employees at any time."
The Defendant Agoglia is "an owner, shareholder, and manager" of Looks Great. Her residency is not specified in the amended complaint.
The Defendants John and Jane Does # 1-10 are "owners, officers, shareholders, and/or managers of Looks Great."
According to the amended complaint, the Plaintiffs were never given a notice containing the following information:
i) the rate or rates of pay and basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other; ii) allowances, if any, claimed as part of the minimum wage; iii) the regular pay day designated by the employer in accordance with section one hundred ninety-one of Article nineteen; iv) the name of the employer; v) any 'doing business as' names used by the employer; vi) the physical address of the employer's main office or principal place of business, and a mailing address if different; or, vii) the telephone number of the employer, and anything otherwise required by law.
In addition, the amended complaint alleges that "[t]hroughout their employment by [the] Defendants, [the] Plaintiffs worked more than ten (10) hours from Monday through Saturday every workweek." (Id. at ¶ 49.)
Allegedly, the "Defendants willfully refused to pay [the] Plaintiffs compensation for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week." (Id. at ¶ 56.)
The Plaintiffs seek to represent a proposed collective action pursuant to FLSA § 216(b) and a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 of "all persons who were employed by Defendants at any time since 2004 to the entry of judgment in this case . . . who were non-exempt employees within the meaning of the New York Labor Law and have not been paid spread-of-hour pay and overtime wages in violation of the New York Labor Law[.]" (Id. at ¶¶ 20, 31.)
In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court generally '"accept[s] all allegations in the complaint as true and draw all inferences in the non-moving party's favor.'" LaFaro v. New York Cardiothoracic Grp., PLLC, 570 F.3d 471, 475 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003)). However, a complaint must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face" to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twomly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). In particular, "[w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations . . . a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a cause of action's elements will not do." Id.; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) () (citation omitted); Luna v. N. Babylon Teacher's Org., 11 F. Supp. 3d 396, 401 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2014) () (citing Achtman v. Kirby, McInerney & Squire, LLP, 464 F.3d 328, 337 (2d Cir. 2006)).
The Plaintiffs assert two claims under the FLSA against the Defendants: (i) a claim for failure to pay overtime and (ii) a claim for failure failure to "keep and preserve records with respect to each of its employees sufficient to determine the wages, hours and other conditions and practices of employment."
The Defendants assert that the FLSA claims should be dismissed because: (1) the claims are time-barred; and (2) the claims are based on conclusory and speculative allegations. In turn, the Court will address each argument.
FLSA § 255(a) provides that a cause of action under the FLSA must be commenced "within two years after the cause of action accrue[s]" or if the "cause of action aris[es] out of a willful violation," "within three years after the cause of action accrue[s.]"
"The cause of action for FLSA and NYLL claims accrues on the next regular payday following the work period when services are rendered[.]" Nakahata v. New York-Presbyterian Healthcare Sys., Inc., 723 F.3d 192, 198 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 790.21(b) (2012)).
"[T]o prove a willful violation of the FLSA within the meaning of § 255(a), it must be established that the employer either knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the statute." Parada v. Banco Indus. De Venezuela, C.A., 753 F.3d 62, 71 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Reich v. Waldbaum, Inc., 52 F.3d 35, 39 (2d Cir. 1995)).
Here, the Plaintiffs allege that "[t]hroughout their employment by [the] Defendants, [the] Plaintiffs worked more than ten (10) hours from Monday through Saturday every workweek." (Id. at ¶ 49.)
Allegedly, the Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendants during the following periods: (1) Ayala was employed by the Defendants from "approximately 2004 through at least March 2012"; (2) Gutierez was employed by the Defendants from...
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