Ayala-Vazquez v. United States
| Decision Date | 31 October 2018 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL NO. 15-2447 (PG) |
| Parties | Angel Ayala-Vazquez, Petitioner, v. United States of America, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Related Crim. No. 09-0173-1 (PG)
Before the court is Petitioner Angel Ayala-Vazquez's ("Petitioner" or "Ayala-Vazquez") motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Dockets No. 1, 22, 28) and the United States' (or the "Government") opposition thereto (Docket No. 11). For the following reasons, the court DENIES Petitioner's motion to vacate.
On April 15, 2010, a Grand Jury returned a Second Superseding Indictment charging Ayala-Vazquez, his brother, Luis Xadiel Cruz-Vazquez, and sixty-three other co-defendants for their involvement in a drug-trafficking conspiracy. See Crim. No. 09-173 (PG) (herein "Crim."), Docket No. 775. Ayala-Vazquez was charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 and 860 (Count One); conspiracy to import narcotics into the customs territory of the United States, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963 (Count Two); possession with intent to distribute heroin, crack cocaine, cocaine and marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 860 and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Counts Three to Six); conspiracies to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (Counts Seven to Eleven); and narcotics and money laundering forfeiture allegations, under 21 U.S.C. §§ 853, 881, and 18 U.S.C. § 982. See id.
On April 13, 2011, the court dismissed Count Eleven as to Ayala-Vazquez upon request of both the Government and Petitioner's counsel. See Crim. Dockets No. 1594, 1597, 3019. Ayala-Vazquez proceeded to trial and the jury found him guilty on Counts One through Nine. See Crim. Docket No. 1606. Ayala-Vazquez was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment. He appealed, but the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence. See United States v. Ayala-Vazquez, 751 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2014).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a federal prisoner may move to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence "upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a); Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 426-427 (1962); Ellis v. United States, 313 F.3d 636, 641 (1st Cir. 2002).
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused have a right to the assistance of counsel for their defense. U.S. Const. amend. VI. It has long been recognized that the right to counsel means the right to effective legal assistance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14 (1970)). Where, as here, a petitioner moves to vacate his sentence on ineffectiveassistance of counsel grounds, he must show that "counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result." Strickland 466 U.S. at 686; see also Argencourt v. United States, 78 F.3d 14, 16 (1st Cir. 1996) (). "Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
For Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim to succeed, he must satisfy a two-part test. First, Petitioner needs to show that "counsel's representation 'fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.'" Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366 (2010) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). Second, Petitioner must establish that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been more favorable to him. See United States v. Carrigan, 724 F.3d 39, 44 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1409 (2012)). Petitioner must demonstrate both incompetence and prejudice. Failure to prove one element proves fatal for the other. See United States v. Caparotta, 676 F.3d 213, 219 (1st Cir. 2012). Nonetheless, the court "need not address both requirements if the evidence as to either is lacking." Sleeper v. Spencer, 510 F.3d 32, 39 (1st Cir. 2007). Thus, "[i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice...that course should be followed." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
On October 5, 2015, Ayala-Vazquez filed the pending motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking his conviction and sentence. See Docket No. 1. At the underbelly ofPetitioner's arguments lies a recurring and persistent belief that his trial was marred with unfairness as a result of allegedly improper conduct by the Government and this court. The court will only attend the six claims that were adequately presented and developed, alongside the litany of ineffective assistance of counsel claims tied to each of them.
Except for the judicial bias claim analyzed in Section D of this Opinion and Order, Petitioner failed to present at least five other arguments on appeal. Therefore, he has the added burden of proving good cause and actual prejudice with respect to the procedurally defaulted claims. See Owens v. United States, 483 F.3d 48, 56 (1st Cir. 2007) (). The First Circuit has held that "[o]ne way to meet the cause requirement is to show constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)." Wider v. United States, 806 F.3d 653, 658 (1st Cir. 2015). Conversely, if Petitioner fails to establish that the procedural default was the result of his attorney's ineffectiveness, then such claims cannot be presented by way of a § 2255 motion. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165 (1982) ().
Furthermore, the court has deemed waived any other argument that is merely mentioned in passing or is hidden behind Petitioner's primary complaints as a mere afterthought. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) ().
Against this background, the court will address Petitioner's adequately developed claims in turn.
First, Ayala-Vazquez contends that his rights to due process and a fair trial were infringed when the Government failed to disclose a DEA-61 report detailing a conversation held between a confidential source ("CS") and a task force agent. See Docket No. 1 at 19-23. Petitioner's argument is centered on the fact that the confidential source identified Carlos Gonzalez as the supervisor of the drug distribution points controlled by Ayala-Vazquez. On the other hand, the Government's witnesses at trial testified that it was Xadiel Cruz-Vazquez, Ayala-Vazquez's brother, who was in charge of the daily operations of Ayala-Vazquez's drug point at the Barbosa Housing Project. Therefore, Petitioner believes that this DEA-6 report could have served as critical impeachment evidence challenging the veracity of Government's witnesses at trial. Additionally, Petitioner contends that his appellate counsel's assistance was ineffective for failing to present this issue. See id. at 31.
In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), the Supreme Court held that the government violates the accused's due process rights whenever it suppresses evidence favorable to the accused, because it is material to determining either guilt or punishment. A true Brady violation has three components, namely, "[t]he evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued." Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-282 (1999).
It is possible to impeach a witness by presenting a prior statement made by said witness that is inconsistent with his testimony at trial. See Fed. R. Evid. 613. However, in the present case the record does not show, nor does Ayala-Vazquez claim that either the confidential source mentioned in the DEA-6 report or the task force agent that prepared said report testified at trial. As a result, the DEA-6 report in question would have been inadmissible as impeachment evidence.
Even if any of the declarants mentioned in the DEA-6 report had testified at trial, Petitioner still fails to establish the third component of a Brady violation because he has not shown that the withheld document caused him prejudice. To establish prejudice, Petitioner has to prove that there is a "reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different if the suppressed documents had been disclosed to the defense." Jackson v. Marshall, 634 F. Supp. 2d 146, 160 (D. Mass. 2009) (quoting Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289). Therefore, "[w]e do not ... automatically require a new trial whenever a combing of the prosecutors' files after the trial has disclosed evidence possibly useful to the defense but not likely to have changed the verdict." United States v. Dumas, 207 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972)). There is nothing in the report here at issue that could have reasonably led the jury to reach a different verdict in Ayala-Vazquez's case. If anything, the report would have been prejudicial to Ayala-Vazquez's defense because it confirms that he "controls drug distribution points located at the Barbosa...
To continue reading
Request your trial