Aycock v. State, 28244.

• Decision Date: 09 July 1940
• Docket Number: No. 28244.,28244.
• Citation: 62 Ga.App. 812,10 S.E.2d. 84
• Parties: AYCOCK. v. STATE.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

10 S.E.2d. 84

62 Ga.App. 812

AYCOCK.

v.STATE.

No. 28244.

Court of Appeals of Georgia,

Division No. 1.

July 9, 1940.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. "The whole question of the credibility of witnesses is wisely left to the jury under any and all circumstances, and, though Ananias and Sapphira spoke again, the law would not strike them dead; but would leave their testimony to be weighed and accepted or rejected by the jury." This court is therefore powerless to interfere with the verdict of a jury where there is any evidence, however slight, to support it, and regardless of what may be the character of the witnesses for the State.

2. The conduct and extent of redirect examination of witnesses, which follows and is intended to neutralize the effect of cross-examination, is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and will not be controlled unless abused.

3. To "bolster" a witness is frequently stated as the introduction of evidence of the good reputation of a witness for truth and veracity for the purpose of supporting suchwitness' testimony. It is true that evidence tending to support the character of a witness (to "bolster" such witness) is not admissible when offered by the party producing that witness, until the character of said witness is attacked by the adverse party. However, considerable latitude must be allowed in the admission of corroborative evidence and under the facts of this ease it was permissible to strengthen a witness' testimony by evidence of matters showing its consistency and reasonableness and tending to indicate that the facts probably were as stated by the witness.

Error from Superior Court, Fulton County; Hugh M. Dorsey, Judge.

F. J. Aycock was convicted of bribery, and he brings error.

Judgment affirmed.

Howard, Tiller & Howard, of Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.

John A. Boykin, Sol. Gen., E. E. Andrews, and J-Walter Le Craw, all of Atlanta, for defendant in error.

MacINTYRE, Judge.

The defendant, F. J. Aycock, and G. B. Scoggins, policemen for the City of Atlanta, were jointly indicted for the offense of bribery, it being charged in the indictment in one count that they received $25 in money from a named person and in another count that they had received $25 in money from another named person. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on both counts. The defendant's motion for new trial as amended was overruled and he excepted.

1. It is conceded by the defendant that the evidence, "if credible and if believed by the jury, was sufficient to authorize the conviction of the defendant." However, the defendant urges the general grounds and contends that "all the material witnesses for the State in this case had criminal records, " and that this court should "take into consideration the type of witnesses used by the State in making out its case against the defendant." The Court of Appeals has said: "This court is a court for the correction of errors in law and in equity alone. It has no authority to entertain an assignment of error that the verdict is contrary to the evidence, if there is any evidence at all to support the verdict. This ground in the motion for new trial is addressed to the discretion of the trial judge, upon whom is imposed the duty of being satisfied with a verdict before he approves it." Bell Brothers v. Aiken, 1 Ga.App. 36 (2), 57 S.E. 1001. Our Supreme Court has' said in a case where the verdict would have been an outrage upon justice unless a particular witness in behalf of the plaintiff in the court below had testified truly: "The credibility of this witness was attacked by every means known to the law, including contradiction by another witness, evidence of bad character, and his own previous affidavit to a written report of the facts, at variance with his testimony at the trial. Yet the jury, if not themselves corrupt, must have believed him, for they found for the plaintiff; and, the court below having approved their finding, this court is constrained by law to acquiesce. Relatively to the revising powers of this court, the jury are the exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses. The law provides for setting aside judgments obtained by perjury after conviction of that offense." Rome Railroad Company v. Barnett, 94 Ga. 446 (5), 20 S.E. 355. This court has said: "The whole question of the credibility of witnesses is wisely left to the jury under any and all circumstances, and, though Ananias and Sapphira spoke again, the law would not strike them dead, but would leave their testimony to be weighed and accepted or rejected by the jury." Brown v. State, 10 Ga.App. 50, 56, 72. S.E. 537, 539. "The evidence for the State, if believed, was sufficient to support the verdict. The jury being the judges of the weight of the evidence, this court cannot disturb the judgment * * * refusing a new trial." Carter v. State, 58 Ga.App. 16, 197 S.E. 333, 334. "Relatively to the revising powers of this court, the jury are the exclusive judges of the credibility of witnesses." Rome Railroad Co. v. Barnett, supra.. "The right of the jury to settle disputed issues of fact is supreme and exclusive." Charles v. Brooker, 1 Ga.App. 219, 58 S.E. 218, 219. Barnes v. State, 57 Ga.App. 183, 194 S.E. 839. Applying these rules of law to the facts in this case, we can not say that the jury were not authorized to arrive at the conclusion set forth in their verdict.

2. Special ground 1: "On the trial of the case Jimmie Roberts, a witness for the State, testified that he had made paymentsof money as a bribe to the defendant on trial, F. J. Aycock and to G. B. Scoggins, who was jointly indicted with Aycock. The witness testified that he went before the grand jury on the advice of his attorney and testified before the grand jury that he had paid money to the defendant. Counsel for the defendant asked the witness if he had given testimony before the grand jury against every officer to whom he had paid money as a bribe. Counsel for the State objected to the question upon the ground that evidence as to what other officers the witness testified about having paid was irrelevant and immaterial. Counsel for the defendant stated to the court that he desired to show by the witness that he had picked out the defendants Scog-gins and Aycock and testified against them, and had shielded others to whom he might have made payments. The witness declined to answer the question as asked but stated that he testified against all of the persons about whom he was asked. Counsel for the defendant insisted that he was entitled to have the witness answer the question and state whether or not he had given the names of all persons to whom he had paid bribes, for the reason that the testimony would be relevant on the question of the credibility of the witness. The court sustained the objection and refused to require the witness to answer the question."

The answer of the witness took in the whole scope of questions asked by the grand jury. But the defendant wanted the witness in this trial to go further and go into the history of his whole past life relative to whether he had ever bribed any other officers, Federal, State, county or municipal, whether in Fulton County or elsewhere, and give their names in addition to the ones he had testified against before the grand jury. This the witness refused to do, and while the defendant has the right of cross-examination, thorough and sifting, yet the cross-examination must end somewhere and the trial judge is the one who has the discretion to end the cross-examination. The rule is that "the trial judge has a discretion to control the right of cross-examination within reasonable bounds, and an exercise of this discretion will not be controlled by a reviewing court, unless it is abused." Rogers v., State, 18 Ga.App. 332 (2), 89 S.E. 460; Granison v. State, 49 Ga.App. 216, 174 S.E. 636; Fields v. State, 46 Ga.App. 287 (3), 167 S.E. 337. It should be borne in mind that the witness had gone...