Ayers-Schaffner v. DiStefano
| Decision Date | 21 July 1994 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 94-0344 P. |
| Citation | 860 F. Supp. 918 |
| Parties | M. Janice AYERS-SCHAFFNER, Shirley A. Chapian, and Robbin Shackleton, on behalf of themselves and the class of all others similar situated, Plaintiffs, v. Joseph DiSTEFANO, Jonathan K. Farnum, Louise Mauran, and William P. Shields, in their capacities as members of the Rhode Island Board of Elections, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island |
Michael DiBiase, Blish & Cavanagh, Providence, RI, for plaintiffs.
Anthony J. Bucci, Jr., Licht & Semonoff, Providence, RI, for defendants.
On June 7, 1994, a primary election was held for the Warwick School Committee. The Board of Elections subsequently invalidated that election and scheduled a new election. The new election was restricted to those candidates and voters who had participated in the first election. M. Janice Ayers-Schaffner, Shirley A. Chapian, and Robbin Shackleton ("plaintiffs") are registered voters in the City of Warwick who did not vote in the first election but wish to vote in the second election. They brought suit against Joseph R. DiStefano, Jonathan K. Farnum, Louise Mauran, and William Shields ("defendants") in their capacities as members of the Rhode Island Board of Elections ("the Board"), alleging violations of their rights of free speech, association, equal protection, and due process guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).1 Plaintiffs seek a judgment declaring that the Board decision to limit the July 19 primary election to those who voted in the June 7 election constitutes a violation of plaintiff class members' constitutional rights. For the reasons set forth below, plaintiffs' request is granted.
The facts in this case are undisputed. The Warwick School Committee consists of five members: two members-at-large and one district member from each of the three school committee election districts into which the City is divided. The members serve four-year terms, with the at-large members elected in the general election in presidential election years, and the district members elected in the general election between Presidential elections. Election of school committee members in Warwick is non-partisan.
A primary election for the Warwick School Committee was held on June 7, 1994. There were four candidates for School Committee District 1, seven candidates for District 2, and four candidates for District 3. Also included on the ballot was a local bond referendum question. Of the 50,252 eligible voters, only 5,913 voters (approximately 12%) actually voted at the June 7 election. Voters at the June 7 primary election were permitted to vote for up to two candidates for school committee offices. After the election, three candidates filed a protest of the election with the Board, alleging that each voter should have been limited to a single vote. On June 14, 1994, the Board issued a decision finding the election to have been in error in allowing voters to cast two votes. The Board further held that there was a probability that the election results would have been different had voters been limited to one vote. The Board ordered that a new election and limited that election to those candidates and those voters who participated in the June 7 election. The new election was scheduled for July 19, 1994.
Plaintiffs filed this action to enjoin the Board from holding the July 19 primary and to require the Board to permit all registered voters to vote in the new primary. Plaintiffs originally asked for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the July 19 election. However, after a conference with the court, the Board agreed to stay its decision and postpone the election until early October of 1994. Thus, the request for a preliminary injunction is moot and I shall proceed directly to the merits of the case.
It is important to first note what is not being challenged by the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs do not challenge the validity of the Board's decision that the June 7 primary was in error or the decision to call a new election. Nor do plaintiffs question the Board's decision to limit the new primary to the candidates who participated in the June 7 primary. The only issue before this court is the decision of the Board to limit the new primary to those voters who voted in the June 7 primary. With this in mind, I now turn to that issue.
The importance of the right to vote cannot be understated. "The right to vote is the wellspring from which many other cherished rights flow in our representative democracy." Devine v. Rhode Island, 827 F.Supp. 852 (D.R.I.1993). "It is beyond cavil that `voting is of the most fundamental significance under our constitutional structure.'" Burdick v. Takushi, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 2063, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992) (quoting Illinois Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184, 99 S.Ct. 983, 990, 59 L.Ed.2d 230 (1979)). Thus, "it has been repeatedly recognized that all qualified voters have a constitutionally protected right to vote." Griffin v. Burns, 570 F.2d 1065, 1074 (1st Cir.1978). This right extends to primaries and local elections. Id. at 1075.
Even though the right to vote is fundamental, every voting regulation is not subject to strict scrutiny. Burdick, ___ U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2063. Thus, "the rigorousness of our inquiry into the propriety of a state election law depends upon the extent to which a challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights." Id. When the right to vote is subjected to "severe" restrictions, the regulation must be "`narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance.'" Id. (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, ___, 112 S.Ct. 698, 705, 116 L.Ed.2d 711 (1992)). When the state law imposes only reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions upon the rights of voters, "`the State's important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify the restrictions.'" Id. at ___ - ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2063-64 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 1570, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983)).
I must therefore first determine if the restriction on the right to vote in the present case is a "severe" restriction. Defendants argue that there is no burden on plaintiffs' rights. "It is especially difficult to find any burden on the plaintiffs' first amendment rights by the Board's Decision when one considers the easy access provided to the original regularly scheduled election of June 7, 1994." Defs.' Br. at 10. Defendants further argue that "it was the plaintiffs own voluntary choice not to participate and they cannot now complain that their rights have been violated." Id. at 9. In support of their argument that was no burden on plaintiffs' rights, defendants cite Felice v. Rhode Island Bd. of Elections, 781 F.Supp. 100 (D.R.I. 1991). According to defendants, the court in Felice held that "a candidate's rights were not violated by the Board's refusal to certify the candidate for her failure to file a declaration as her name appeared on the voting list." Defs.' Br. at 3. Before making this finding, the court determined that being a candidate for public office is not a fundamental right and applied the rational relationship test. Because the right at issue in the present case is a fundamental right, Felice is not on point. It is apparent from defendants' arguments that they have misplaced the focus of the relevant inquiry. The burden placed on the right to vote in the originally scheduled election is immaterial to determine the burden placed on the second election. The question is not whether the first election was open to all but whether the Board may limit the second election.
The relevant focus therefore is on the second election and the relevant question is whether the Board's decision places a severe burden on the plaintiffs' rights. I believe that it is unquestionably so. This case does not involve the more common issues raised in voting rights cases. It does not involve regulations which limit access to ballots, Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983) (), challenges to set aside an election due to irregularities or ballot illegality, Griffin v. Burns, 431 F.Supp. 1361 (D.R.I.1977), aff'd, 570 F.2d 1065 (1st Cir.1978), nor challenges to the appearance of state ballots, Devine, 827 F.Supp. 852. Rather, this case concerns a complete prohibition of the right to vote. By limiting the new primary to those voters who had voted in the June 7 election, the Board disenfranchised almost 90% of the registered voters of Warwick. As plaintiffs aptly state, "the United States Supreme Court has viewed any substantial disqualification of otherwise eligible voters to constitute a severe restriction warranting the highest level of scrutiny." Pltfs.' Br. at 8. See Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 95 S.Ct. 1637, 44 L.Ed.2d 172 (1975) (); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 89 S.Ct. 1886, 23 L.Ed.2d 583 (1969) (); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966) (). Defendants argue that the above cited cases are inapplicable in that those cases involved a "substantial disqualification of otherwise eligible voters in the first and regularly...
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Ayers-Schaffner v. DiStefano
...defective election? The district court found no state interest served by such a limitation, and rejected it as unconstitutional, 860 F.Supp. 918. We agree, and thus affirm the district court's order directing that the contested new election be open to all registered and qualified voters. I.......