Ayers v. Doth, Civ. No. 98-1563 (PAM/RLE).

• Decision Date: 01 June 1999
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 98-1563 (PAM/RLE).
• Citation: 58 F.Supp.2d 1028
• Parties: John Duane AYERS, Petitioner, v. David DOTH, Commissioner of Human Services, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

58 F.Supp.2d 1028

John Duane AYERS, Petitioner, v. David DOTH, Commissioner of Human Services, Respondent.

Civ. No. 98-1563 (PAM/RLE).

United States District Court, D. Minnesota.

June 1, 1999.

Brain Cook Southwell, Faulkner & Faulkner, Minneapolis, MN, for petitioner.

Steven J. Lokensgard, Attorney General, St Paul, MN, for respondent.

ORDER

MAGNUSON, Chief Judge.

Based upon the Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Raymond L. Erickson, and after an independent review of the files, records and proceedings in the above-titled matter, it is —

ORDERED:

That the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [Docket No. 1] is denied, without prejudice.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ERICKSON, United States Magistrate Judge.

At Duluth, in the District of Minnesota, this 6th day of May, 1999.

I. Introduction

This matter came before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to a general assignment, made in accordance with the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), upon a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, see, Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which alleges that the Petitioner is being illegally detained by the Respondent for reasons which are violative of his rights under the Constitution, laws or Treaties of the United States.

The Petitioner has appeared by Brian C. Southwell, Esq., and the Respondent has appeared by Steven J. Lokensgard, Assistant Minnesota Attorney General.

For reasons which follow, we recommend that the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

The Petitioner, who has been indeterminately committed to the custody of the Minnesota Sexual Psychopathic Treatment Center ("MSPTC"), presents a facial constitutional challenge to the Minnesota Sexually Dangerous Persons Act ("SDP Act") of August 31, 1994, ch. 1, 1995 Minn. Laws 5, 5-9 (1994 first Special Session), codified in relevant part at Minnesota Statutes Sections 253B.02, Subdivision 18c, 253B.185. On November 6, 1996, a Minnesota District Court committed the Petitioner, in accordance with the terms of the Minnesota Commitment and Treatment Act, Minnesota Statutes Chapter 253B. See, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Committing Respondent as a Psychopathic Personality and a Sexually Dangerous Person ("Commitment Order"), Resp.'s App. pp. 1-29. More precisely, the Court committed the Petitioner as a sexual psychopathic personality ("SPP"), under the Psychopathic Personality Commitment Act ("PP Act"), Minnesota Statutes Section 253B.02, Subdivision 18b, and as a sexually dangerous person ("SDP"), under the SDP Act. The Petitioner urges us to vacate his commitment under the SDP Act, because commitment under the SDP Act does not require proof that he suffers from a "mental disorder," or that he "lacks the ability to control his impulses." Petition at 5; see also, Minnesota Statutes Section 253B.02, Subdivision 18b(b).

In 1939, the Minnesota Legislature enacted legislation which provided for the civil commitment of any person proved to be a "psychopathic personality." The Statute withstood an immediate constitutional challenge on vagueness and equal protection grounds. See, Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, Minn., 309 U.S. 270, 274, 60 S.Ct. 523, 84 L.Ed. 744 (1940); see also, Nicolaison v. Erickson, 65 F.3d 109, 111 (8th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1125, 116 S.Ct. 939, 133 L.Ed.2d 864 (1996). As it is currently embodied in Minnesota Statutes Section 253B.02, Subdivision 18b, the PP Act defines a "Sexual psychopathic personality" to mean:

[T]he existence in any person of such conditions of emotional instability, or impulsiveness of behavior, or lack of customary standards of good judgment, or failure to appreciate the consequences of personal acts, or a combination of any of these conditions, which render the person irresponsible for personal conduct with respect to sexual matters, if the person has evidenced, by a habitual course of conduct in sexual matters, an utter lack of power to control the person's sexual impulses and, as a result, is dangerous to other persons.

Minnesota Statutes Section 253B.02, Subdivision 18b [emphasis added].

In 1994, the Minnesota Legislature conducted a Special Session to amend the Civil Commitment Statute in order to provide for the civil commitment of "sexually dangerous persons." Under the SDP Act, a "sexually dangerous person" is a person who: (1) has engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct; (2) has manifested a sexual personality, or other mental disorder or dysfunction; and (3) as a result is likely to engage in acts of harmful sexual conduct. Id., Subdivision 18c(a). Most significantly, and in contrast to the PP Act, the SDP Act declares that, for purposes of commitment as a SDP, "it is not necessary to prove that the person has an inability to control the person's sexual impulses." Id., Subdivision 18c(b).

On June 13, 1996, while the Petitioner was imprisoned for felonies involving criminal sexual conduct, and was weeks away from his scheduled release date, his prison warden petitioned for his indefinite commitment as an SPP and as an SDP. Hearings were held in July of 1996, at which time the Petitioner was 66 years old. The Petitioner admitted to a history of sexually abusing young boys that dated back at least as far as 1971. The evidence adduced at the commitment Hearing, which included expert psychiatric testimony, as well as a lengthy record of criminal sexual misconduct, convinced the District Court that the Petitioner satisfied the criteria for commitment under the PP Act, and the SDP Act. Among several conclusions which supported the Petitioner's commitment, the Court observed:

The record shows by clear and convincing evidence that the [Petitioner] displays an utter lack of power to control his sexual impulses. This is demonstrated by the nature and frequency of the sexually inappropriate acts perpetrated on young boys, the pervasive quality of the grooming behaviors [Petitioner] used to attract potential victims, the lack of any victim empathy or belief that his actions were wrong, and the complete unwillingness on [Petitioner]'s part to participate in any sex offender treatment.

Commitment Order at 12-13 [emphasis added].

On appeal, the Petitioner claimed, as pertinent, that the SDP Act was unconstitutional on several grounds, including that it violated due process of law. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Petitioner's Commitment Order, and upheld the constitutionality of the SDP Act. See, In re Ayers, 570 N.W.2d 21 (Minn.App.1997).¹ The Petitioner did not seek discretionary review by the Minnesota Supreme Court but, instead, sought a Writ of Habeas Corpus from this Court on June 22, 1998. As noted, the Petitioner presents a single claim; namely, that his commitment under the SDP Act violated his right to due process, because the Act, in failing to require proof of a mental disorder or an inability to control his impulses, sets too low a standard for commitment.

The Petitioner's claim is founded upon the Supreme Court's recent decision in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997), where a prison inmate, who was committed as a sexually violent predator under the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act, claimed that his commitment violated the Due Process, Double Jeopardy, and Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States Constitution. As pertinent to the Petitioner's claim, the Supreme Court held, in Hendricks, that the requirement of the Kansas Act, for a finding of "future dangerousness," coupled with the existence of a "`mental abnormality' or `personality disorder' that makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the person to control his dangerous behavior," adequately protected the inmate's vital, substantive due process right to be free from physical restraint. Id. at 358-60, 117 S.Ct. 2072. Although the Court rejected the contention, that due process makes a finding of "mental illness" a prerequisite for civil commitment, and left to State legislators the task of adopting suitable terminology that would comport with due process, Hendricks strongly implies that the required mental abnormality prong of a civil commitment standard must incorporate a finding of volitional impairment. The Court explained that "proof of some additional factor, such as `mental illness' or `mental abnormality,'" in addition to a showing of dangerousness, "serve[s] to limit involuntary civil confinement to those who suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control." Id. at 358, 117 S.Ct. 2072 [emphasis added]. As a consequence, the majority upheld the Kansas Statute because "it set forth criteria relating to an individual's ability to control his dangerousness," and affirmed the inmate's commitment because his "admitted lack of volitional control, coupled with a prediction of dangerousness, adequately distinguishe[d] Hendricks from other dangerous persons who are perhaps more properly dealt with exclusively through criminal proceedings." Id. at 360, 117 S.Ct. 2072. To the extent that the SDP Act differs from the Kansas law, by providing that no proof of an inability to control sexual impulses is necessary to sustain civil commitment, the Petitioner urges that the Court vacate his commitment under the SDP Act, as being contrary to the Supreme Court's adjudication of the due process standard in Hendricks.

III. Discussion

A. Standard of Review. "[A] district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States." Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). "In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the laws, or treaties of the United States." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116...