B.G.C., In Interest of

• Decision Date: 08 February 1991
• Citation: 496 N.W.2d 239
• Parties: In the Interest of B.G.C., A Child, C.C., Natural Mother, Appellant. In the Interest of B.G.C., D.O.B.: 0
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 239

496 N.W.2d 239

In the Interest of B.G.C., A Child C.C., Natural Mother, Appellant In the Interest of B.G.C., D.O.B.: 02-08-91, A Minor Child R.D. and J.D., Appellants D.S., Intervenor-Appellee.

Nos. 91-476, 92-49.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Sept. 23, 1992.

As Corrected Oct. 15, 1992.

Rehearing and Stay Denied Nov. 20, 1992.

As Revised May 17, 1993.

Jacqueline Miller of Dolezal, Miller & Garrels, Cedar Rapids, for C.C. and D.S.

Gary L. Robinson of Klinger, Robinson, McCuskey & Ford, Cedar Rapids, for R.D. and J.D.

Richard Boresi of King, Smith & Boresi, Cedar Rapids, guardian ad litem for B.G.C.

M. Kathryn Miller and Onita Mohr, Des Moines, and Leticia L. Valdes, Legal Intern, for amicus curiae Youth Law Center.

Considered en banc.

LARSON, Justice.

This case is, we observe thankfully, an unusual one. It involves the future of a baby girl, B.G.C., who was born on February 8, 1991. Her mother, Cara, who was not married, decided to give up the baby for adoption and signed a release of parental rights as provided by Iowa Code section 600A.4 (1991). She named "Scott" as the father of the baby, and Scott signed a release of parental rights. Later, both Cara and Scott signed waivers of notice of the termination hearing. After the hearing, the court ordered the termination of the parental rights of both Cara and Scott. Custody of the child was given to the potential adoptive parents, R.D. and J.D.

Cara moved to set aside the termination, asserting that her release was defective for several reasons. She also asserted, for the first time, that the real father was "Daniel," not Scott. She informed Daniel that he was the father of her child, and Daniel intervened in the adoption proceeding to assert his parental rights. The juvenile court denied Cara's motion to set aside the termination of her parental rights, and she appealed.

In the meantime, the adoption case proceeded. The district court found that Daniel was in fact the real father, that he had not released his parental rights, and that he had not abandoned the baby. The court denied the adoption and ordered the baby to be surrendered to Daniel. R.D. and J.D. appealed and obtained a stay of the district court's order transferring custody. The baby has remained in the custody of R.D. and J.D. virtually from the time of her birth.

The court of appeals reversed the termination of Cara's parental rights and remanded the case to the juvenile court. We granted further review of that decision and consolidated it with R.D. and J.D.'s appeal in the adoption case.

We agree with the court of appeals that the juvenile court had jurisdiction to rule on Cara's motion to vacate the order terminating her parental rights and conclude that the court erred in refusing to resolve the motions on their merits. The termination case must therefore be remanded for further proceedings. We agree with the district court in the adoption case that Daniel proved he was the father, that he had not abandoned the baby, and that the adoption proceeding was therefore fatally flawed. Custody of the baby is ordered to be transferred to Daniel.

As tempting as it is to resolve this highly emotional issue with one's heart, we do not have the unbridled discretion of a Solomon. Ours is a system of law, and adoptions are solely creatures of statute. As the district court noted, without established procedures to guide courts in such matters, they would "be engaged in uncontrolled social engineering." This is not permitted under our law; "[c]ourts are not free to take children from parents simply by deciding another home offers more advantages." In re Burney, 259 N.W.2d 322, 324 (Iowa 1977). ¹ We point out that this case does not invalidate an adoption decree. Adoption of the baby was denied by the district court because the father's rights were not terminated.

I. Termination of Cara's Parental Rights.

Under Iowa Code section 600.3(2),

[a]n adoption petition shall not be filed until a termination of parental rights has been accomplished except in the following cases:

a. No termination of parental rights is required if the person to be adopted is an adult.

b. If the stepparent of the child to be adopted is the adoption petitioner, the parent-child relationship between the child and the parent who is not the spouse of the petitioner may be terminated as part of the adoption proceeding by the filing of that parent's consent to the adoption.

The adoption petition alleged that the parental rights of Cara and Scott had been terminated, although, of course, it did not allege the termination of Daniel's parental rights because he was not identified as the father at that time.

Cara's motion to vacate her release of custody asserted that the release was procured by fraud, coercion, and misrepresentations of material fact. See Iowa Code § 600A.4(4). She also alleged that she had "good cause" for revocation, id., because the release was obtained less than seventy-two hours following the birth. See Iowa Code § 600A.4(2)(d). Moreover, she contends, if Iowa Code chapter 600A is interpreted to allow this termination to stand, it is unconstitutional.

The juvenile court did not pass on the merits of Cara's motion, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction because a petition for adoption had been filed at the time Cara filed her posttrial motions. See Iowa Code § 600A.9(2). That raises the first issue.

A. Juvenile court jurisdiction. Section 600A.9(2) provides:

If an order is issued [terminating parental rights], the juvenile court shall retain jurisdiction to change a guardian or custodian and to allow a terminated parent to request vacation of the termination order if the child is not on placement for adoption or a petition for adoption of the child is not on file. The juvenile court shall grant the vacation request only if it is in the best interest of the child.

(Emphasis added.)

Considering the substance of Cara's "Request to Revoke Release of Custody or Vacate Orders," we consider it as a motion for new trial. See Kagin's Numismatic Auctions v. Criswell, 284 N.W.2d 224, 226 (Iowa 1979) ("We look to the substance of a motion and not to its name...."). Cara's motion was filed within the ten days provided by Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 247 for the filing of posttrial motions. Nevertheless, R.D. and J.D. argue, filing of the adoption petition precluded the court's jurisdiction because of the emphasized language of section 600A.9(2).

Under this interpretation of section 600A.9(2), a natural parent would have no remedy in juvenile court to set aside termination orders, even those based on fraud or coercion, if prospective adoptive parents immediately file an adoption petition. That, in fact, is what happened in this case; the order terminating Cara's parental rights and the petition for adoption were filed simultaneously.

This court routinely remands cases in which a notice of appeal is filed, prematurely, while posttrial motions are pending. See, e.g., Blunt, Ellis & Loewi, Inc. v. Igram, 319 N.W.2d 189, 195 (Iowa 1982); Loudon v. Hill, 286 N.W.2d 189, 192 (Iowa 1979). See generally Iowa R.App.P. 12(g).

Section 600A.7(1) provides that termination hearings shall be conducted in accordance with our rules of civil procedure, and under rule 247, a party has ten days to file a posttrial motion.

We believe section 600A.9(2) was intended to preserve juvenile court jurisdiction, not to deny a parent the right to challenge a termination by posttrial motions. Motions for new trial are necessarily to be resolved, in the first instance, by the trial court, and an adoption petitioner should not be allowed to avoid such a remedy by filing a petition for adoption immediately on receipt of a termination order.

In interpreting a statute, one of the considerations is the practical effects of a particular interpretation. If the filing of an adoption petition divests the juvenile court of jurisdiction to rule on new-trial motions, this would normally require an appeal to this court and a limited remand back to the juvenile court to rule on the pending motions. This time-consuming process would be counterproductive in custody cases, which are entitled to disposition on a priority basis. We do not attribute such an intent to the legislature in enacting section 600A.9(2).

In re Adoption of M.M.B., 376 N.W.2d 900, 902 (Iowa 1985), must be distinguished because that case did not involve a challenge to the termination order within the ten days provided by rule 247. In that case, the adoption petition had been filed, and the ten days following the order in question had expired. In fact, M.M.B. suggests that the juvenile court's jurisdiction would not be lost under the circumstances of the present case, noting that the parent in that case made no claim of fraud in the termination. 376 N.W.2d at 902. We do have a claim of fraud in the present case.

We agree with the court of appeals that the juvenile court did not lose jurisdiction to rule on Cara's posttrial motions.

B. Interpretation of section 600A.4. Under section 600A.4(2),

[a] release of custody:

....

d. Shall be signed, not less than seventy-two hours after the birth of the child to be released, by all living parents.

(Emphasis added.)

It is undisputed that Cara's release did not satisfy the seventy-two-hour requirement of section 600A.4(2)(d); it was signed only about forty hours after the baby's birth. Cara argues that the release is therefore invalid. R.D. and J.D. counter that a seventy-two-hour waiting period was not required because of this language of the subsection that follows in section 600A.4:

3. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection 2, an agency or a person making an independent placement may assume custody of a minor child upon the signature of the one living parent who has possession of the minor child if the agency or a person making an independent placement immediately petitions the juvenile court designated in section 600A.5...