O & B, Inc. v. Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission

Citation279 Md. 459,369 A.2d 553
Decision Date22 February 1977
Docket NumberMARYLAND-NATIONAL,No. 60,60
PartiesO & B, INCORPORATED t/a Central Avenue Sunoco et al. v.CAPITAL PARK AND PLANNING COMMISSION.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Maryland

Darlene G. Perry, Riverdale (Edward P. Camus and Camus & Perry, Riverdale, on the brief), for appellants.

Barbara A. Sears, Silver Spring (Sanford E. Wool, Silver Spring, on the brief), for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C. J., and SINGLEY, SMITH, DIGGES, LEVINE, ELDRIDGE and ORTH, JJ.

ELDRIDGE, Judge.

The principal question presented by this case is whether the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission (hereinafter referred to as the 'Commission') is a state agency for purposes of the defense of sovereign immunity in tort suits.

On July 22, 1974, fourteen individuals brought in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County an action in trespass and conversion against O & B, Inc., t/a Central Avenue Sunoco, and Ronald Osbourn. The plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that while they were attending an event at the Washington National Arena, known as the 'Capital Centre,' at Largo, in Prince George's County, their automobiles were wrongfully towed from the Capital Centre's parking lot by the defendants' employees and taken to defendants' garage, where the defendants refused to release them upon demand or tender of reasonable fees. In answering interrogatories propounded to them, the defendants indicated that the automobiles had been 'illegally parked' and therefore removed and 'impounded' by them at the express direction of the Commission's Park Police.

Pursuant to Maryland Rule 315, the defendants impleaded the Commission, alleging that the Commission was responsible for 'any and all acts of conversion alleged to have occurred.' Subsequently, a motion raising preliminary objection, pursuant to Rule 323b, was filed on behalf of the Commission, requesting dismissal of the third-party complaint 'on the ground that it has governmental immunity as an agency of the State of Maryland.' After a hearing, the trial court (Levin, J.) granted the motion and, upon the court's express determination that there was no just reason for delay, directed the entry of a final judgment in favor of the Commission pursuant to Rule 605a. O & B and Osbourn appealed from the judgment to the Court of Special Appeals, and we granted a writ of certiorari prior to a decision by that court.

(1)

The broad doctrine of sovereign immunity for the state or its agencies is firmly established in Maryland law. Recently, in American Structures v. City of Balto., 278 Md. 356, 359, 364 A.2d 55, 56 (1976), the principle was stated as follows:

'In Maryland, the rule of our cases is clear. If an action is brought for a money judgment in contract or in tort against the State or an agency of the State without the State's consent, actual or implied, it must be defended on the ground of sovereign immunity, which cannot be waived unless funds have been appropriated for the purpose or the agency can provide funds by taxation. Calvert Associates Limited Partnership v. Department of Employment & Social Services, 277 Md. 372, 357 A.2d 839 (1976); Charles Brohawn & Bros. v. Board of Trustees of Chesapeake College, 269 Md. 164, 304 A.2d 819 (1973); Jekofsky v. State Roads Comm'n, 264 Md. 471, 287 A.2d 40 (1972); University of Maryland v. Maas, 173 Md. 554, 559, 197 A. 123, 125 (1938); Dunne v. State, 162 Md. 274, 159 A. 751 (1932); State v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 34 Md. 344 (1871), aff'd, 21 Wall. 456, 22 L.Ed. 678 (1875). See also Central Collection Unit v. Atlantic Container Line, Ltd., 277 Md. 626, 356 A.2d 555 (1976).' 1

However, unlike the total immunity granted to the state and its agencies with respect to actions arising in tort, the immunity of counties, municipalities or local governmental agencies in such actions is limited in scope. In a tort action, it has been held that a political subdivision may invoke the defense of governmental immunity only when the alleged tortious conduct occurred while the county or municipality was exercising a 'governmental' rather than a 'proprietary' function. Carey v. Baltimore County, 262 Md. 491, 278 A.2d 6 (1971); Robinson v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 262 Md. 342, 278 A.2d 71 (1971); Godwin v. County Comm'rs, 256 Md. 326, 260 A.2d 295 (1970); Baltimore v. State, 173 Md. 267, 195 A. 571 (1937).

In view of these principles, the issue before us is whether the Commission is properly characterized as an agency of the state or as a local governmental agency for the purpose of determining its immunity from tort suits. For the reasons set forth below, we believe that the Commission is a state agency.

There is no single test for determining whether a governmental body is an agency of the state for purposes of sovereign immunity. Rather, it is necessary to examine the relationship between the state and the governmental entity to determine its status as either a state agency or a county or municipal agency. For example, we have held that a community college, partially funded by local funds and having a board of trustees comprised of members of the board of education for the county, is a state agency. We reached this conclusion in view of the fact that community colleges, although somewhat local in nature, are created by the state and not by the action of the counties in which they are located, and because the powers of the boards of trustees of the community colleges are set forth in public general laws. Board v. John K. Ruff, Inc., 278 Md. 580, 366 A.2d 360 (1976); Chas. E. Brohawn & Bros. v. Board, 269 Md. 164, 167-171, 304 A.2d 819 (1973). Cf. Prince Geo.' § Co. v. Bd. of Trustees, 271 Md. 21, 313 A.2d 678 (1974).

The history of the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission was reviewed by the Court in Pr George's Co. v. Md.-Nat'l Cap., 269 Md. 202, 205-207, 306 A.2d 223, 226 (1973), as follows:

'The General Assembly originally created the Commission by Chapter 448 of the Laws of 1927 (Chapter 448). By this extensive statute, the Commission administered certain park development, planning and zoning functions within those portions of Prince George's and Montgomery Counties adjoining the District of Columbia. Designated as the Maryland-Washington Metropolitan District (Metropolitan District), this original area was roughly located between the District of Columbia and what is now the Capital Beltway. The Commission was given the power to sue and be sued, issue bonds, implement land use and subdivision regulations and generally effectuate the purpose of Chapter 448 which was the 'coordinated, comprehensive, adjusted, systematic and harmonious development of the (Metropolitan) District.' Exclusive power over planning and zoning was vested in the Commission and the Boards of County Commissioners of the two counties.

'Chapter 714 of the Laws of 1939 created the Maryland-Washington Regional District (Regional District) under the jurisdiction of the Commission. The Regional District included basically the Metropolitan District with some additions. Under this Chapter, the Commission's 'park and planning functions in the district were separated, and the Maryland-Washington Regional District . . . was created as the planning and zoning district.' Prince George's Co. v. Laurel, 262 Md. 171, 174, 277 A.2d 262, 264 (1971).

'In 1943, the General Assembly by Chapter 992 repealed Chapter 714 and re-enacted it 'with amendments as a bi-county act applicable to the Maryland-Washington Regional District in Montgomery and Prince George's Counties and not as a public local law of either county . . ..' Likewise, in 1943, the General Assembly indicated its intent to clarify the status of the law pertaining to the Metropolitan District by enacting Chapter 1008 'as a single bi-county Act . . . and not as a public local law or laws of either county.'

'In 1959, the General Assembly consolidated all of the provisions relating to the Commission by enacting Chapter 780 of the Laws of Maryland. It repealed certain sections of the Codes of Montgomery and Prince George's Counties pertaining to the Commission, repealed all earlier Chapters (discussed above) and enacted in lieu thereof a new subtitle 'Park and Planning Commission.' The law basically continued the Commission, expanded the areas under its jurisdiction and redesignated its functions under the subheadings 'Metropolitan District' and 'Regional District."

More recently, the laws pertaining to the Commission were codified as Maryland Code (1957, 1976 Cum.Supp.), Art. 66D, pursuant to Ch. 892 of the Acts of 1975.

Like community colleges, the Commission functions only on a regional basis and is subject to some control by the counties within the region. All activities of the Commission are presently limited to Prince George's and Montgomery Counties. Members of the Commission are appointed by the county executive and the county council of the two counties as provided in Art. 66D, § 2-101. Additionally, the county council of each county 'may add to, delete from, increase, or decrease, any part of the portion of the (Commission's) budget allocated solely to its county,' § 2-118(4).

Despite this degree of local control, the Commission, like the community colleges, was created by the State and not by the action of Prince George's or Montgomery Counties. The powers and duties of the Commission are set forth in public general laws, and the counties may exercise only that control over the Commission which is expressly permitted by the General Assembly. As pointed out in Pr. George's Co. v. Md.-Nat'l Cap., supra, 269 Md. at 229-230, 306 A.2d 323, the Commission, created by a public general law, is not a county agency subject to the...

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