B.L. by and through Levy v. Mahanoy Area School District

• Decision Date: 21 March 2019
• Docket Number: NO. 3:17-CV-01734,3:17-CV-01734
• Citation: 376 F.Supp.3d 429
• Parties: B.L., a minor, BY AND THROUGH her father, Lawrence LEVY, and her mother, Betty Lou Levy, Plaintiff, v. MAHANOY AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

376 F.Supp.3d 429

B.L., a minor, BY AND THROUGH her father, Lawrence LEVY, and her mother, Betty Lou Levy, Plaintiff,

v.MAHANOY AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant.

NO. 3:17-CV-01734

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed March 21, 2019

Mary Catherine Roper, Molly Tack-Hooper, American Civil Liberties Union of Pennsylvania, Arleigh P. Helfer, Theresa E. Loscalzo, Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP, Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiff.

David William Brown, Michael I. Levin, Levin Legal Group, P.C., Huntingdon Valley, PA, John G. Dean, Elliott Greenleaf & Dean, Scranton, PA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

A. Richard Caputo, United States District JudgeThis case raises the question of whether a public school can lawfully remove a student from an extracurricular activity for her profanity, transmitted off school grounds on a Saturday to fellow students. Plaintiff B.L., a student at Mahanoy Area High School, was dismissed from the cheerleading squad for uttering "fuck school, fuck softball, fuck cheer, fuck everything" off school grounds on a Saturday. I hold that B.L.'s words were constitutionally protected by the First Amendment.

Indeed, I granted B.L.'s motion for a preliminary injunction for this reason and suggested that holding otherwise would "allow school children to serve as Thought Police—reporting every profanity uttered—for the District." B.L. by Levy v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. , 289 F.Supp.3d 607, 613 (M.D. Pa. 2017). The District now proffers one Dr. Mussoline as an expert, and moves for summary judgment on the ground that the undisputed evidence gathered since the preliminary injunction hearing proves the District did not violate B.L.'s rights. B.L. cross-moves for summary judgment, arguing just the opposite; B.L. also moves to oust Dr. Mussoline. All three motions are presently before me. Because the undisputed evidence shows the District violated B.L.'s rights, her motion for summary judgment will be granted. The District's motion will accordingly be denied, and B.L.'s motion to exclude the expert report and testimony of Dr. Mussoline will be denied as moot.

I. Background

Both sides agree on the facts. The Mahanoy Area School District is located in Mahanoy City, a small borough in Schuylkill County, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 40 at ¶ 5 (Defendant's Statement of Undisputed Facts) ). B.L. is a junior at Mahanoy Area High School, which is a part of the District. (Id. ¶ 2).

In her freshman year, B.L. joined the junior varsity cheerleading squad led by Coaches Nicole Luchetta-Rump (a math teacher at the High School) and April Gnall (a third-grade teacher in the District). (Id. ¶¶ 6-9). The squad held tryouts for the next school year in May of B.L.'s freshman year. (Id. ¶ 12). Before she could try out, however, B.L. was required to agree to a number of rules that would apply to her if she made the squad again. (Id. ¶¶ 16-23). These rules—the "Cheerleading Rules" or "Rules"—state: "Please have respect for your school, coaches, teachers, other cheerleaders and teams. Remember you are representing your school when at games, fundraisers, and other events. Good sportsmanship will be enforced, this includes foul language and inappropriate gestures." (Id. ¶ 19 (the "Respect Provision") ). The Rules also warn: "There will be no toleration of any negative information regarding cheerleading, cheerleaders, or coaches placed on the internet." (Id. ¶ 23 (the "Negative Information Rule") ). Coaches Luchetta-Rump and Gnall adopted these Rules from their predecessor, and did not need the District's permission to adopt or enforce them. (Id. ¶¶ 15, 24, 45).

B.L. and her mother reviewed the Rules prior to tryouts, and signed a document acknowledging B.L. would be bound by them. (Id. ¶ 18). Unfortunately for B.L., tryouts did not go so well—she was placed on the junior varsity squad again for her sophomore year. (Id. ¶ 34). And, to add insult to injury, an incoming freshman made the varsity squad. (Id. ¶ 35).

In frustration, B.L. took to Snapchat that Saturday. (See id. ¶¶ 37, 40). (Snapchat is a social media application for smartphones that allows users to send private text, photo, and video messages to other users—but these messages are limited in duration, cannot be accessed from the web, and can only be viewed temporarily, see B.L. by Levy v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. , 289 F.Supp.3d 607, 610 n.1 (M.D. Pa. 2017) ). Posing in street clothes with a friend, middle fingers raised, B.L. took a "selfie" at the Cocoa Hut, a local store and student stomping ground. (See id. ¶¶ 37-40). On top of the photo, B.L. added the following text: "fuck school fuck softball fuck cheer fuck everything." (Id. ). B.L. then posted the captioned photo—the "Snap"—on her private Snapchat account, where it could have been viewed briefly by about two-hundred and fifty (250) of her friends. (Id. ¶¶ 37-42). She posted a follow-up Snap just after, reading: "Love how me and [my friend] get told we need a year of jv before we make varsity but that[ ] doesn't matter to anyone else?" (Id. ¶ 41). Many of B.L.'s friends on Snapchat are students at District schools; some are fellow cheerleaders. (Id. ¶¶ 42-43).

One of those cheerleaders, Coach Gnall's daughter, came across the Snaps, took screen shots of them (as they were not publicly viewable), and brought them to the coaches' attention. (Id. ¶ 43). Meanwhile, with the weekend now over, word of B.L.'s Snaps spread through the school. (See id. ¶¶ 57-60). Several students, "both cheerleaders and non-cheerleaders[,] approached Coach Luchetta-Rump to express their concerns that the Snaps were inappropriate." (Id. ¶ 59). "Students were visibly upset and voiced their concerns to [Coach] Luchetta-Rump repeatedly for several days." (Id. ¶ 60). Accordingly, "Coaches Gnall and Luchetta-Rump jointly decided to suspend B.L. from the cheerleading team for one year for violating the Cheerleading Rules by posting the offensive Snaps." (Id. ¶ 44). Specifically, "B.L. was disciplined for violating the Respect Provision and the Negative Information Rule of the Cheerleading Rules...." (Id. ¶ 57). Even though electronic squabbling amongst cheerleaders at the High School "is a fairly typical occurrence," the coaches felt the need to enforce the Rules against B.L. "to ‘avoid chaos’ and maintain a ‘team-like environment.’ " (Id. ¶¶ 55-56). "The cheerleading coaches would not have suspended B.L. from the team if her Snaps had not referenced cheerleading," though. (Id. ¶ 58).

B.L.'s father appealed to the School Board, but the Board declined to get involved. (Id. ¶ 49-51). Accordingly, B.L., through her parents, filed suit against the District for declaratory and injunctive relief. (See Doc. 1; Doc. 33-1 (giving up her claim for damages) ). B.L. contemporaneously filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction (Doc. 2); I granted the TRO pending resolution of the preliminary injunction motion (Doc. 5). After holding a hearing, I issued a preliminary injunction, finding that, among other things, B.L. was likely to succeed on the merits. See B.L. by Levy v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. , 289 F.Supp.3d 607 (M.D. Pa. 2017). The District subsequently answered the complaint (Doc. 16), discovery ensued, and both sides have moved for summary judgment. (Docs. 33, 37). B.L. also moves to exclude the expert report and testimony of Dr. Lawrence J. Mussoline, whom the District retained to opine on a number of matters related to cheerleading, school discipline, and sports teams. (Doc. 135).

All three motions have been fully briefed and are now ripe for review.

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment shall be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "A court may grant a motion for summary judgment if, after it considers all probative materials of record, with inferences drawn in favor of the non-moving party, the court is satisfied that there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep't of Corr. , 806 F.3d 210, 218 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 330, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ; Brooks v. Kyler , 204 F.3d 102, 105 n.5 (3d Cir. 2000) ). "A fact is ‘material’ under Rule 56 if its existence or nonexistence might impact the outcome of the suit under the applicable substantive law. A dispute over a material fact is ‘genuine’ if ‘a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’ " Santini v. Fuentes , 795 F.3d 410, 416 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ). "In determining whether the dispute is genuine, the court's function is not to weigh the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter ...." American Eagle Outfitters v. Lyle & Scott Ltd. , 584 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ).

The moving party bears the initial burden to identify "specific portions of the record that establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Santini , 795 F.3d at 416 (citing Celotex , 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ). If this burden is satisfied by the movant, the burden then "shifts to the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and ‘come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ " Id. (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ). The non-movant's burden is not satisfied by "simply show[ing] that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Chavarriaga , 806 F.3d at 218 (quotation omitted).

Although the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment, this legal standard remains the same. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Stevens & Ricci, Inc. , 835 F.3d 388, 401 (3d Cir. 2016). Normally, a court considers each motion independently, ...