B v. B

• Decision Date: 23 April 1974
• Citation: 78 Misc.2d 112,355 N.Y.S.2d 712
• Parties: Frances B v. Mark B, formerly known as Marsha B.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 712

355 N.Y.S.2d 712

78 Misc.2d 112

Frances B v. Mark B, formerly known as Marsha B.

Supreme Court, Special Term, Kings County, Part V.

April 23, 1974.

Alexander Ginsberg, Brooklyn, for plaintiff.

Levidow & Levidow, P.C., New York City, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM

LOUIS B. HELLER, Justice.

Plaintiff raises the question whether defendant is a man or woman.

In this annulment action plaintiff charges in her complaint 'the Plaintiff and the defendant were and are women, members of the Female Gender of the human race' (Par. 2); 'that on or about April 5, 1972 . . . the Plaintiff and Defendant were purportedly married' (Par. 3); that defendant fraudulently represented that the defendant's name was Mark B---, when in fact defendant's name was Marsha B--- (Par. 4); that at the time of the marriage defendant fraudulently, with intent to deceive plaintiff and the authorities, represented 'that defendant was and is a Male person and capable and qualified to marry with a female person' (Par. 5); that plaintiff believed defendant's statements and representation and from defendant's dress and appearance 'to be a man capable of entering into a marriage state and performing all the duties and relations of a husband' (Par. 11); that 'Plaintiff endeavored to cohabit with defendant as defendant's wife, but was unable to have normal sexual intercourse with the defendant by reason of defendant's physical incapacity' (Par. 12); that 'defendant was and still is incapable of normal cohabitation or normal sexual intercourse or of entering into the marriage state by reason of the fact that defendant does not have male sexual organs, does not possess a normal penis, and in fact does not have a Penis' (Par. 13); that defendant 'was and still is a woman, a member of the Female Gender of the Human Species and hence defendant is incapable of normal cohabitation or normal sexual intercourse or of entering into the marriage with another woman' (Par. 14); that 'at the time of the marriage and ever since (defendant) remained physically incapable of entering into the marriage state or of consummating the said marriage by reason of said condition and that said condition is incurable' (Par. 15); that defendant, with knowledge of defendant's disability and that the incapacity was permanent and incurable, fraudulently induced plaintiff to rely on defendant's representation that defendant was physically capable of entering into the marriage, and plaintiff, relying upon defendant's representation, did in fact enter into the marriage (Par. 16); 'that defendant, since the marriage, informed the Plaintiff, that defendant entered into the marriage for the sole purpose of alleviating defendant's distressed mind and . . . thoughts that defendant though a female was truly a male, person, and for no other purpose' (Par. 17); and that at all times 'Plaintiff and defendant were and are Women, members of the Female Gender of the Human Race' (Par. 22).

Defendant denies the allegations and asks for leave to amend the answer to include a counterclaim for divorce on the ground of abandonment in that more than one year first elapsed on January 18, 1974 (during pendency of this action) since plaintiff abandoned defendant.

Plaintiff cross moves for a physical examination of defendant.

Before considering the legal problems raised by the papers, an understanding of defendant's history and background is helpful.

Defendant is what is commonly termed a transsexual. 'Transsexualism is a disorder of gender identity differentiation' (Charles L. Ihlenfeld, M.D., Journal of Contemporary Psychotherapy, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 63--69, Winter 1973). Transsexuals strongly believe that their physical anatomies do not reflect their true genders. Thus, a transsexual with an apparently normal female anatomy will seek masculinization. While the condition is gender disorientation, the transsexual feels he was born with the wrong body. The origins of the condition are obscure and have not yet been isolated with sufficient certainty to be dealt with successfully. At present hormonal and surgical sex reassignment is the only known treatment for adults since gender identity differentiation once established seems unsuitable and immune to analytic effort at alteration (Charles L. Ihlenfeld, M.D., supra).

The birth certificate identifies defendant as Marsha B---, a female. In April 1972 defendant applied ex parte to this court for, and was granted, leave to assume the name Mark in place and stead of Marsha. Defendant's petition in support of the application (p. 8) reads:

'That at the time of my birth it was thought that I was a female person and thus, I was given a female name which is reflected in my Certificate of Birth Registration. However, from my earliest youth, I have had difficulty as to my sexual identity, since I felt in myself that I was, in fact, a male person. However, the fact that I possessed what are ostensibly female genitalia, kept my doubts as to my true sexual identity quiescent.

'As I grew older, I came to live in a constant state of torment since I felt that a male person was entrapped inside of me.

'On March 14, 1972 I had surgery performed upon my person in the form of a mastectomy * * * and on March 16, 1972 . . . a hysterectomy. Both operations were performed so as to conform the physical manifestations of my sex with my true male identity.'

A specialist in the field of transsexual phenomena, says in support of the name change that defendant was under his care and treatment to resolve medical problems resulting from defendant's conflict of gender identity; that clinical examination, testing and history confirm that he was dealing with a male entrapped in the body of a female and that change of name to a male designation will aid defendant's orientation, phychological and emotional status.

If from the facts it appears that defendant could prevail on the counterclaim, the amendment should be allowed for that is the imprimatur of a proper amendment. But if from the facts the defendant may not prevail as a matter of law, the request to amend the answer to include a counterclaim for divorce should be denied.

A pleading may be amended to set forth subsequent or additional occurrences at any time by leave of the court. Such leave shall be given freely (CPLR 3025(b)) but need not be granted in all cases. If the underlying facts relied on are the proper subject for relief, opportunity ought to be afforded the pleader to test the claim on the merits (Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222). However, if the new matter is palpably insufficient or immaterial the court need not exercise its discretion affirmatively; and leave should be denied (Norton v. Norton, 12 A.D.2d 1003, 211 N.Y.S.2d 458; McGrath v. City of New York, Sup., 191 N.Y.S.2d 993). Generally, the inquiry is limited to the propriety of the amendment, not to the merits of the litigation or the sufficiency of the pleading (Brody v. Brody, 58 Misc.2d 265, 294 N.Y.S.2d 900, affd. 60 Misc.2d 812, 304 N.Y.S.2d 191; Daniels v. City of Albany, 21 A.D.2d 920, 251 N.Y.S.2d 208; Van Wie c. C. M. Gridley, 21 A.D.2d 842, 250 N.Y.S.2d 986); and the question of sufficiency of the pleading is left to a motion addressed to it (Griffel v. Belfer, 20 A.D.2d 890, 248 N.Y.S.2d 940; Manning v. Hyland, 19 A.D.2d 652, 241...