Baar v. JEFFERSON COUNTY BD. OF EDUC.

• Decision Date: 19 February 2010
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 3:06-CV-75-H.
• Parties: Robert Lewis BAAR, Plaintiff v. JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky

686 F.Supp.2d 699

Robert Lewis BAAR, Plaintiff v. JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:06-CV-75-H.

United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, At Louisville.

February 19, 2010.

Daniel T. Taylor, III, Prospect, KY, for Plaintiff.

Byron E. Leet, Christopher Tyson Gorman, Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs, LLP, Louisville, KY, for Defendants.

REVISED AND FINAL MEMORANDUM OPINION

JOHN G. HEYBURN II, District Judge.

Plaintiff, Robert Baar, is a high school science teacher for the Jefferson County Public Schools ("JCPS") who brought this suit challenging the constitutionality of certain disciplinary actions taken against him. Defendants are: (1) the Jefferson County Board of Education ("JCBE"); (2) Stephen W. Daeschner, former superintendent of JCPS; (3) Carolyn Meredith, the Director of Employee Relations for JCPS; (4) Melissa Payne, another science teacher with JCPS who objected to Baar's communications with her; (5) Marsha Dohn, principal of Jeffersontown High School; (6) Minor Daniels, former Executive Director of Business Affairs for JCPS; and (7) James Jury, principal at Ballard High School. Plaintiff sued all of the individual defendants both in their official and individual capacities, seeking both injunctive relief and damages.

This case returns to this Court on remand from the Sixth Circuit. Now, Defendants move for summary judgment on a variety of grounds, most particularly based upon the doctrine of qualified immunity. The Court issued a preliminary opinion and then requested additional briefing. The Court now files its Revised and Final Memorandum Opinion which discusses these difficult issues and explains why Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

I.

The Court's prior opinions contain a more detailed discussion of the facts surrounding this case. For purposes of the present motion, the following facts and procedural history are relevant.

In early February 2002, Plaintiff was teaching at Jeffersontown High School and sent several letters to Defendant Melissa Payne, another Jeffersontown teacher. Ms. Payne considered the letter to be threatening and complained to Defendants Dohn, her principal, and Meredith. School officials agreed with Ms. Payne. Thereafter, Plaintiff entered a memorandum of understanding requiring him "to discontinue communication in any form" with Ms. Payne. A few months later, after further investigation, Dohn issued a formal reprimand containing a similar prohibition (the "2002 Reprimand"). For about three years, Plaintiff had no contact with Ms. Payne.

In September, 2005, Plaintiff received a notice of the next meeting of the Louisville Area Chemistry Alliance ("LACA"), a group of local chemistry teachers that Plaintiff had co-founded and had regularly met with through 2001. Plaintiff had voluntarily stopped attending LACA meetings since sometime in 2001. Nevertheless, on September 23, 2005, he emailed Ms. Payne that he would be attending the upcoming meeting. Ms. Payne was the designated contact person for the LACA meeting. This message violated the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding and the 2002 Reprimand. Ms. Payne was upset and reported all of this to Dohn and Meredith.

Mr. Jury, who was Plaintiff's principal, tried to convince him not to attend the meeting and told him that the 2002 Reprimand would prohibit his contact with Ms. Payne, including his attendance at this LACA meeting. Despite this admonition, Plaintiff continued to insist on attending the meeting. At this point, Jury issued another formal reprimand (the "2005 Reprimand"). The 2005 Reprimand required that Plaintiff abide by the 2002 Reprimand and prohibited him from "representing the Jefferson County Public Schools at any LACA meeting." Plaintiff correctly interpreted the 2005 Reprimand as prohibiting his attendance at LACA meetings.

Plaintiff's lawsuit eventually followed. After extensive discovery and motion practice, on February 8, 2008, this Court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment on all claims. Of particular interest now, this Court analyzed JCPS's prohibition of Plaintiff's attendance at LACA meetings under U.S. v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 115 S.Ct. 1003, 130 L.Ed.2d 964 (1995) (herein after "NTEV") and Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Township High Sch. Dist. 205, Will County, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968). The Court found, as a matter of law, that Plaintiff's association with the LACA was not a matter of public concern. To undertake the Pickering balancing test, therefore, was unnecessary. Plaintiff appealed on all issues.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed all the dismissals except the claim that Jury and Meredith violated Plaintiff's right to freedom of association by prohibiting his attendance at all future LACA meetings.¹ As to the LACA meetings, the Circuit made two rulings of significance for the current motions. First, it held, as a matter of law, that Plaintiff's association with the LACA was a matter of public concern and, therefore, any prohibition of it was subject to the Pickering balancing test. Second, it said that Plaintiff had satisfied the Pickering test "at this stage of the case" and that he had presented sufficient evidence to avoid summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit did not say that Plaintiff himself was entitled to summary judgment.²

After the Circuit Court decision, JCPS and Jury removed the ban on Plaintiff's attendance of LACA meetings. Upon remand, this Court set a trial date for the earliest convenient date. Soon afterwards, Defendants filed the current dispositive motions. The Court will identify and consider each relevant issue in turn.

II.

As a division of local government, JCBE may be sued directly. See Memphis Police Dept. v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985).³ Moreover, its employees may be sued for constitutional violations under two concurrent legal theories: (1) the employee may be sued in her official capacity; and (2) the employee may be sued in her personal (sometimes called "individual") capacity. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985). In this section, the Court will consider claims against JCBE and the individuals in their official capacities. Success of either of these claims would result in a judgment directly against the Jefferson County Board of Education.

A.

Suing a government employee in his official capacity "generally represents only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent." Id. at 165-66, 105 S.Ct. 3099 (quoting Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)). "As long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity." Id. at 166, 105 S.Ct. 3099 (citing Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-72, 105 S.Ct. 873, 83 L.Ed.2d 878 (1985)). Here, JCBE did receive notice of this suit against its employees and itself, and has responded appropriately. Thus, any judgment against the individual defendants in their official capacities will, in reality, be a judgment against JCBE and will only be collectible against JCBE.

The Sixth Circuit has never specifically decided whether district courts should actually dismiss official capacity claims where the local governmental entity is already a party.⁴ In the Eastern and Western Districts of Kentucky, however, the judges have adopted the practical approach of dismissing the official capacity claims. See Clark v. Kentucky, 229 F.Supp.2d 718, 721-22 (E.D.Ky.2002); Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. Of Educ., No. 3:02-CV-620-H, 2007 WL 3342258, at *2 (W.D.Ky. Nov. 9, 2007). This Court believes this is the more logical approach. Thus, the official capacity claims will be dismissed and the Court will next consider the potential damages liability of JCBE itself. To the extent Plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief, the Court can impose such an order upon JCBE, its officers, agents and employees.

B.

So far in this litigation, neither this Court nor the Sixth Circuit has had occasion to consider whether JCBE, either directly or through suit against an employee in her official capacity, could be liable to Plaintiff for violations of his constitutional rights. The Supreme Court has described the circumstances for such § 1983 liability in Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). A local governmental entity is considered a person within the meaning of § 1983, Id. at 662, 98 S.Ct. 2018; it has no liability simply because its employee violates another's constitutional rights, Id. at 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018; and it is liable only where the employee's act represents an official policy or custom of that government, Id. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018. See also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985). Since Monell, the Sixth Circuit has elaborated on the scope of municipal liability:

While local governing bodies are not liable under respondent superior for an employee or officer's acts, it may be sued for having caused a constitutional tort through "a policy statement, ordinance regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers." Since such bodies can act only through natural persons, the critical question is whether the person committing the act did so pursuant to official policy. A formally adopted policy is not required; established usage or custom may be sufficient.

Adkins v. Bd. of Educ. of Magoffin County, Ky., 982 F.2d 952, 957 (6th Cir.1993). Under this jurisprudence, the actions of a single official can also only create liability for the local government where that official has "final policymaking authority." Id. "Whether an official has such final authority is a question of state law." Id. (citing City of St....