Baas v. Society for Christian Instruction

• Decision Date: 02 December 1963
• Docket Number: No. 24,24
• Citation: 371 Mich. 622,124 N.W.2d 744
• Parties: Irene BAAS, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. The SOCIETY FOR CHRISTIAN INSTRUCTION and Auto-Owners Insurance Company, Defendants and Appellants.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 744

124 N.W.2d 744

371 Mich. 622

Irene BAAS, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. The SOCIETY FOR CHRISTIAN INSTRUCTION and Auto-Owners Insurance Company, Defendants and Appellants.

No. 24.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Dec. 2, 1963.

Cholette, Perkins & Buchanan, Grand Rapids (Edward D. Wells, Grand Rapids, of counsel), for appellants.

Marcus, McCroskey, Finucan & Libner, Muskegon (Benjamin Marcus and Robert Libner, Muskegon, of counsel), for appellee.

Before the Entire Bench.

KELLY, Justice.

The sole question presented is: Did plaintiff's injuries arise out of and in the course of her employment as a school teacher? The hearing referee answered 'no.' On appeal, the appeal board answered 'yes'.

Plaintiff, who lived in Holland, Michigan, was injured when her automobile collided with another as she was driving to her employment as a second grade school teacher at the Cherry school in Zeeland.

The appeal board found that plaintiff was a teacher of limited training and experience and that she did a substantial amount of school work at home, which was in accordance with an established and approved practice of teachers at the employer's school; that on the weekend before her injury she took school books and papers home with her and performed work at home in connection therewith; that at the time of the injury she was traveling from her home to the school and had with her books and papers for use in her school work; that while plaintiff could have remained at the school at the conclusion of the work day the temperature at the school was lower than usual during the day, after 4:30, janitor services and protection were not available, and the cafeteria was then closed; that plaintiff 'was injured as the direct result of a 'special hazard' consisting of the very icy and dangerous highway which she was compelled to travel on her way to school.'

Appellants, claiming the appeal board refused to consider the law applicable, call attention to the fact that they cited and relied upon Murphy v. Flint Board of Education, 314 Mich. 226, 22 N.W.2d 280, as being directly in point, but the appeal board wholly ignored and made 'no reference or attempt to distinguish the case,' and 'their silence we submit is significant.'

Appellee, answering, states that while Murphy v. Flint Board of Education is 'a scholarly and carefully decided case' and 'seemingly opposed to the proposition for which we are contending,' yet 'on close examination the proofs in Murphy do not measure up to the particular facts of the instant case'; that, 'Unlike Murphy, supra, in the instant case plaintiff was truly a neophyte in the teaching profession. This was her first experience at any type of actual educational instruction. Not having had any practical experience or special instruction in teaching in prior years, plaintiff was duty-bound to make an additional effort to enable her to properly perform her work.'

The instant case and Murphy v. Flint Board of Education, supra, are similar in the following respects: 1) In both cases plaintiffs claimed the proper performance of their duties as a teacher required them to do work at home; 2) Both plaintiffs were injured while journeying between their schools and their homes and both were carrying school books and papers: 3) In both cases the records justify the conclusion that teachers engaged in school work prepare work when necessary outside of the school in which they are employed; 4) Neither was injured at home because of homework or carrying papers or books, nor was either injured while working on papers or books during travel from school to home, and the hazards of street travel would have been the same if they had completed their work at school; 5) Neither was provided transportation as part of her employment and both could travel from school to their homes in any way they chose.

The Murphy opinion says in part (314 Mich. p. 229, 22 N.W.2d p. 281):

'On behalf of plaintiff it is claimed, in substance, that the proper performance of her duties as a teacher required her to do work at home, or at least outside of the school building where she was regularly employed. Plaintiff testified on the hearing before the deputy commissioner that the building in which she worked was regularly locked by the janitor at 4:30 in the afternoon, but that teachers remaining there after that hour could get out of the building prior to 5 o'clock on request to an office employee. Plaintiff claims, however, that had she remained in the building as long as possible she would not have had sufficient time to do the work that she wished to do. The record justifies the conclusion that many teachers engaged in public school work prepare work, when necessary outside of the school in which they are employed, and the testimony of the principal of plaintiff's school indicates that he expected his teachers, including plaintiff, to be prepared, and to do home work if such was required for proper performance of teaching duties.'

We do not agree with appellee that the fact plaintiff was 'a neophyte' is sufficient to constitute a legal basis for a distinction between the instant case and the Murphy Case.

In White v. Public Service Commission, 338 Mich. 282, 287, 61 N.W.2d 31, 33, we stated:

'The mere inference from the fact that Commissioner White took work home with him would not establish that his transportation to and from Lansing was incident to and a part of his employment. Nor would it justify the conclusion that the public service commission had another office in Niles, Michigan. See the rule applied in Murphy v. Board of Education of the School District of the City of Flint, 314 Mich. 226, 22 N.W.2d 280, and Kelly v. Dixie Fuel & Supply Company, 329 Mich. 466, 45 N.W.2d 356.'

The school building was plaintiff's place of work, and the fact that she did work at home did not make her home a second place of employment.

We do not agree with appellee that 'the Murphy holding is distinguishable and should not bar an award in this case.' The following from Murphy v. Flint Board of Education, supra, is applicable to this case (314 Mich. pp. 237, 238, 241, 242, 22 N.W.2d p. 285):

"The claim is based entirely upon the theory that while at her home she did some work in preparation for her school duties, and that therefore she was in the course of her employment not only while in the school building, but while traveling from the school to her home, and while in her own home and also while en route back to school. It would follow from an application of that theory that the workmen's compensation fund would become a general insurance fund covering accidental injury or death of such employee, whatever the cause, and wherever and whenever it may have occurred. Payment would thus be required in this case had the injury been caused by a fall, or otherwise, in the decedent's own home.

"Let us again apply the test of hazard of employment, and inquire whether the injury was sustained in the course of or arose out of the employment. It is not contended, and cannot be, that the decedent sustained any injury as a result of any risk or hazard of the employment itself, or that the fatal injury was occasioned in the course of or arose out of the employment. It was not caused by any equipment, tools, or material in any wise connected with her employment, and the employment had no causal connection with the injury either through its activities, its conditions, or its environments. In this respect this case differs essentially from cases cited and relied upon by defendant in error. If there can be a recovery under the facts in this record, then there could be a like recovery in the case of any clerk, stenographer, bookkeeper, or of any other employee employed in an office, bank, store, factory, or other place of employment who carried home any books, papers, statements, et cetera, for any purpose at all connected with his duties, and sustained an injury while absent from the place of employment and while engaged in some act not in any wise connected with the duties of the employment. That would disregard entirely the test of the right to such award, which is whether the employment had some causal connection with the injury.' (Emphasis supplied.) * * *

'Applying general principles, recognized in the decisions of this court above referred to, and likewise in the cases cited from other States, can it be said on the basis of the testimony in the record that plaintiff's injury arose out of and in the course of her employment? We think not. It is apparent that on the completion of her duties in the school building, which was the regular and ordinary place of her employment, she would have gone to her home as a matter of course and without reference to her intention to do work there in preparation for her further teaching duties. The situation would have been precisely the same, in so far as incurring the hazards of street travel were concerned, if she had fully completed her work before leaving the school. She was not at the time of injury engaged in any specific mission for her employer. The risks incident to street travel did not arise in the course of her employment under her contract; nor was there any 'causal connection' between the unfortunate injury that she sustained and the work that she was required to do.'

The hearing referee was right in refusing an award. The workmen's compensation appeal board was wrong in granting the award and, therefore, we reverse the award of the workmen's compensation appeal board and reinstate the award of the hearing referee. Costs to appellants.

CARR, C. J., and DETHMERS, J., concurred with KELLY, J.

BLACK, Justice (for affirmance).

The distinctive facts of this case present anew the most recurrent of all questions arising under the workmen's compensation law. Did plaintiffhs injury and resultant law. Did plaintiff's injury and resultant of' the scope of her employment? The appeal board, relying particularly on...