Murphy v. Bd. of Educ. of Sch. Dist. of  Flint

• Decision Date: 01 April 1946
• Docket Number: No. 52.,52.
• Parties: MURPHY v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF SCHOOL DIST. OF CITY OF FLINT.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

314 Mich. 226

22 N.W.2d 280

MURPHY

v.BOARD OF EDUCATION OF SCHOOL DIST. OF CITY OF FLINT.

No. 52.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

April 1, 1946.

Appeal from Department of Labor and Industry.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Edna V. Murphy, employee, against Board of Education of the School District of the City of Flint, employer, to recover compensation for an injury. From an order awarding compensation, employer appeals.

Order set aside.

Before the Entire Bench.

Guy W. Selby, of Flint, for appellant.

H. H. Warner, of Lansing, for appellee.

CARR, Justice.

Defendant appeals from an order of the department of labor and industry, awarding compensation to plaintiff because of an injury sustained by her, January 15, 1945, while on a public street. The material facts are not in dispute. At the time of the injury plaintiff was employed by defendant, on a monthly salary, as a teacher in the technical high school in Flint. Her class work on the day in question was completed at 3 o'clock in the afternoon. The room to which she had been assigned was used after regular school hours by a musical organization and it was, in consequence, impossible for plaintiff to continue her work there. It is her claim that she had certain class papers to examine and that she also wished to prepare examination questions for use the following week. The principal of the school testified that if plaintiff had appealed to him he would have found a place within the school building where she might have continued her work. However, she did not consult him and, not knowing of any place that was available for her use, left the school building, shortly after 3:30, for her rooming place some three blocks away. She carried the class papers referred to and also two small shorthand textbooks, which she intended to use in preparing examination questions. On the way home, and about two blocks from the school, she sustained the injury in question, a fractured ankle. No claim is made that the fact that she was carrying the books and papers referred to contributed in any way to the injury she suffered.

On behalf of plaintiff it is claimed, in substance, that the proper performance of her duties as a teacher required her to do work at home, or at least outside of the school building where she was regularly employed. Plaintiff testified on the hearing before the deputy commissioner that the building in which she worked was regularly locked by the janitor at 4:30 in the afternoon, but that teachers remaining there after that hour could get out of the building prior to 5 o'clock on request to an office employee. Plaintiff claims, however, that had she remained in the building as long as possible she would not have had sufficient time to do the work that she wished to do. The record justifies the conclusion that many teachers engaged in public school work prepare work, when necessary, outside of the school in which they are employed, and the testimony of the principal of plaintiff's school indicates that he expected his teachers, including plaintiff, to be prepared, and to do home work if such was required for proper performance of teaching duties.

The question presented is whether the injury suffered by plaintiff arose ‘out of and in the course of’ her employment. Comp.Laws 1929, § 8417, as amended by Act No. 245, Pub. Acts 1943, Stat.Ann. 1945 Cum.Supp. § 17.151. The determination of such question necessarily rests on the particular facts and circumstances disclosed by the record. Amicucci v. Ford Motor Co., 308 Mich. 151, 13 N.W.2d 241;Rector v. Ragnar-Benson, Inc., et al., 313 Mich. 277, 21 N.W.2d 129. This court has, however, in the decision of cases involving the interpretation of the language of the statute above quoted, recognized and applied certain general principles. Thus in Buvia v. Oscar Daniels Co., 203 Mich. 73, 168 N.W. 1009, 1010, 7 A.L.R. 1301, in setting aside an award of the department of labor and industry in favor of the plaintiff, it was said: ‘We have frequently held that, in order to entitle the injured person to compensation under the act, the injury must arise out of the employment as well as in the course of the employment. Tarpper v. Weston-Mott Co., 200 Mich. 275, 166 N.W. 857 [L.R.A.1918E, 507], and cases cited. An injury arises out of the employment when there is apparent to the rational mind, upon consideration of all the circumstances, a causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury. [In re] McNicol, 215 Mass. 497, 102 N.E. 697, L.R.A.1916A, 306. The injury must be the result of one of the risks incident to the employment.’

In Meehan v. Marion Manor Apartments, 305 Mich. 262, 9 N.W.2d 534, 535, Justice Chandler, speaking for the court, stated the issue involved in the following language: ‘The only question presented by the appeal is whether the accident resulting in death arose ‘out of’ deceased's employment as required by 2 Comp.Laws 1929, § 8417, Stat.Ann. § 17.151. An accident, to be compensable, must be one arising ‘out of’ as well as ‘in the course of’ the employment. Appleford v. Kimmel, 297 Mich. 8, 296 N.W. 861. To arise ‘out of’ the employment the injury sustained must have a causal connection with the work to be performed; it must be one which follows as a natural incident to the employment, be connected with it, and not the result of a risk disassociated therefrom. See Appleford v. Kimmel [supra]; Dent v. Ford Motor Co., 275 Mich. 39, 265 N.W. 518;Rucker v. Michigan Smelting & Refining Co., 300 Mich. 668, 2 N.W.2d 808.'

In Appleford v. Kimmel, 297 Mich. 8, 296 N.W. 861, 863, the following language from In re McNicol, 215 Mass. 497, 102 N.E. 697, L.R.A.1916A, 306, was quoted with approval: “It is sufficient to say that an injury is received ‘in the course of’ the employment when it comes while the workman is doing the duty which he is employed to perform. It ‘arises out of’ the employment, when there is apparent to the rational mind, upon consideration of all the circumstances, a causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury. Under this test, if the injury can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work and to have been contemplated by a reasonable person familiar with the whole situation as a resuit of the exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment, then it arises ‘out of’ the employment. But it excludes an injury which cannot fairly be traced to the employment as a contributing proximate cause and which comes from a hazard to which the workman would have been equally exposed apart from the employment. The causative danger must be peculiar to the work and not common to the neighborhood. It must be incidental to the character of the business and not independent of the relation of master and servant. It need not have been foreseen or expected, but after the event it must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment, and to have flowed from that source as a rational consequence.”

On behalf of defendant it is insisted that there was no ‘causal connection’ between plaintiff's injury and her employment. It is contended that, at the time of the accident, plaintiff was not engaged in performing any specific duty for her employer, that she had left the school building to which she had been assigned, and was on her way home for the night in accordance with her customary practice. Reliance is placed on the general rule, as stated in the cases above cited, and also on the opinion of Justice Wiest in Olree v. White Star Refining Co., 252 Mich. 33, 232 N.W. 702, 704. In holding that the order of the department of labor and industry, denying compensation to the plaintiff, should be affirmed, it was said: ‘Plaintiff's work for the day was done, except making up time sheets at his convenience at home or elsewhere. He did not have to go home to make up the time sheets. He was returning to his home for his own purposes of the night, like any other worker at the close of day. His employment did not expose him to the risk of being struck by a train, but his desire to spend the night at home and his travel in order to do so did. If such an accident is to be held to arise out of and in the course of employment, it will have to be so provided by legislation.’

Counsel for plaintiff insists that the record supports the award as made by the department and contends, in substance, that her purpose in going from the school to her rooming place was the continuance of her work as a teacher in defendant's employ, and that she assumed the risks of street travel merely as an incident of the work that she was required to do under her contract. On this premise it is contended that the injury should be regarded as one arising out of and in the course of the employment. In support of this contention reliance is placed on Kunze v. Detroit Shade Tree Co., 192 Mich. 435, 158 N.W. 851, L.R.A.1917A, 252. There the employee was engaged in trimming and planting trees for defendant, and sustained a fatal injury in an automobile accident while traveling on a public street from one place to another in the regular performance of his duties. It was held that the character of his work was such as to compel him to go from place to place and to assume the risks of street traffic. The accident occurred in the course of the performance of plaintiff's duties in the usual manner.

Plaintiff also relies on Clifton v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 217 Mich. 462, 187 N.W. 380, cited by the department of labor and industry in support of its conclusion. In that case the plaintiff was employed as store manager for defendant and the proofs established that it was one of his duties to take home with him each night after closing hours, and safeguard, the money taken in at the store after the banks were closed. Plaintiff further testified that in two or three...