Babcock-Davis Corp. v. Paine

• Decision Date: 02 March 1922
• Parties: BABCOCK-DAVIS CORPORATION v. PAINE et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

240 Mass. 438

134 N.E. 342

BABCOCK-DAVIS CORPORATION

v.PAINE et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

March 2, 1922.

Report from Superior Court, Suffolk County; John D. McLaughlin, Judge.

Action by the Babcock-Davis Corporation against Robert T. Paine and others, trustees, for the conversion of certain iron staircases installed under a conditional sale contract in a building, to which defendants subsequently acquired title. Reported from the superior court after a ruling by the judge as matter of law that plaintiff was not entitled to recover. Judgment for defendants.

The parties agreed that the contract for installation of the staircases was made and recorded, that the parties thereto were the actual and record owners of the real estate, that the staircases were installed, and that defendants took title and possession with no actual notice of plaintiff's claim or of the recorded agreement and had refused to deliver the staircases.

Elias Field and Brown, Field & McCarthy, all of Boston, for plaintiff.

C. F. French and A. R. Smith, Jr., both of Boston, for defendants.

CARROLL, J.

On March 2, 1916, the plaintiff made a written contract with Werby & Davis, the owners of certain real estate in Boston, whereby the plaintiff was to deliver and install certain iron staircases in the building then in process of construction on the premises. The agreement provided that the ‘materials, goods and chattels shall remain the property of said Babcock-Davis Corporation until fully paid for in cash’ and ‘shall remain personal property no matter how the same may be affixed to any real estate until the same is fully paid for in cash.’ On March 6, 1916, the contract was recorded in the office of the city clerk of Boston. Part of the front staircases were delivered before the agreement was signed. The remainder of the front stair cases and all of the rear staircases were delivered and wrought into the building after the contract was signed. The value of the staircases delivered and installed after March 2 was $1,708. According to the statement of agreed facts, these staircases are the sole stairways in the six-story building, and can be removed and replaced by other staircases.

On March 20, 1917, when defendant took title to and possession of said real estate, the staircases were wrought into the building, and payment had not been made to the plaintiff, except a partial payment of $1,300 by Werby & Davis. On March 28, 1917, the plaintiff made demand on defendants for the redelivery of the staircases because of default in payment for the same under the conditional sale agreement. The action is in tort for the conversion of the property. In the superior court the judge ruled that the plaintiff could not recover and reported the case to this court.

St. 1912, c. 271, which was in force at the time in question (see now G. L. c. 184, § 13; St. 1920, c. 2), provided that--

‘No conditional sale of heating apparatus, plumbing goods, ranges or other personal property which are afterward wrought into or attached to real estate shall be valid as against any mortgagee, purchaser or grantee of such real estate, unless within ten days after the making of the contract of conditional sale, such contract, or memorandum thereof signed by both parties thereto, is recorded in the clerk's office of the city or town in which the real estate is situated.’

It is conceded by the plaintiff that prior to the enactment of this statute the staircases would have become a part of the realty. Stone v. Livingston, 222 Mass. 192, 110 N. E. 297;Clary v. Owen, 15 Gray,...