Babcock v. St. Joseph's Hospital, No. 58778-1-I (Wash. App. 11/26/2007)
| Decision Date | 26 November 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 58778-1-I.,58778-1-I. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Sharon Babcock, and Larry Babcock, Appellant, v. St. Joseph's Hospital, Northwest Emergency Physicians, Dr. Robert O. Olson, Dr. Bradley D. Bigelow, Dr. M. Omar Shokeir, Dr. Hull A. Cook, John Does and Jane Does, 1-50, inclusive, Respondent. |
Appeal from Whatcom County Superior Court. Docket No. 05-2-02718-1. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 06/05/2006. Judge signing: Honorable Ira J Uhrig.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Lawrence Andrew Hildes, Attorney at Law, Po Box 5405, Bellingham, WA, 98227-5405.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Hal Thurston, Zender Thurston PS, Po Box 5226, Bellingham, WA, 98227-5226.
Christopher Holmes Anderson, Fain Sheldon Anderson & VanDerhoef PLLC, 701 5th Ave Ste 4650, Seattle, WA, 98104-7030.
John Coleman Graffe Jr., Johnson Graffe Keay Moniz, 925 4th Ave Ste 2300, Seattle, WA, 98104-1145.
Robin Jan Mar, Johnson Graffe Keay Moniz & Wick LLP, 925 4th Ave Ste 2300, Seattle, WA, 98104-1145.
Heath Sharpless Fox, Johnson Graffe Keay Moniz & Wick LLP, 925 4th Ave Ste 2300, Seattle, WA, 98104-1145.
A number of health care providers successfully moved to summarily dismiss a medical malpractice action filed against them. In addition to granting the motion for summary judgment, the trial court imposed Civil Rule (CR) 11 sanctions against the plaintiffs' attorney, Lawrence Hildes. We affirm the imposition of sanctions under CR 11.
On the evening of November 29, 2002, Sharon Babcock was rushed to St. Joseph's Hospital in Bellingham after she began experiencing heavy vaginal bleeding. She had previously been told by her obstetrician/gynecologist Dr. Hull Cook, to go to the hospital in the event something like that happened because it would mean she had an unviable pregnancy. Ms. Babcock was examined by Dr. Bradley Bigelow, an emergency room physician, who then contacted the on-call obstetrician/gynecologist, Dr. Robert Olson. Receiving treatment for a spontaneous miscarriage, Ms. Babcock had a small gelatinous sac removed from her uterus. After completing the procedure, Dr. Olson noted in the report he filled out that Ms. Babcock's bleeding had stopped. Several hours later, Ms. Babcock was discharged from the hospital.
Nearly three years later, Sharon Babcock and her husband Larry commenced a lawsuit against St. Joseph's Hospital and a number of its nursing staff, and others including Drs. Olson, Cook and M. Omar Shokeir (herein collectively referred to as Doctors). The Babcocks alleged that Ms. Babcock was discharged prematurely from the hospital and that this resulted in her having a prolonged and painful recovery. The Babcocks further alleged that Ms. Babcock continued to bleed profusely following the procedure performed by Dr. Olson and that Ms. Babcock expressed her concerns to the nurses treating her. Along with their complaint, the Babcocks filed a letter from Dr. E. M. Noyes. Expressing concern over the amount of blood Ms. Babcock might have lost, Dr. Noyes questioned the adequacy of her treatment at the hospital.
The defendants all moved for summary judgment. The Doctors attached a copy of certain hospital records to their motion, which addressed many of the concerns raised by Dr. Noyes. The Doctors' motion also included a request for sanctions pursuant to CR 11. In their response to the motions for summary judgment, the Babcocks submitted a declaration from Dr. Noyes.
A hearing was held on April 14, 2006. At the hearing, the court noted that Ms. Babcock had not filed a declaration in support of the claims raised in the Babcocks' pleadings. The court also stated that the declaration filed by Dr. Noyes was too conclusory, and based for the most part on speculation and conjecture. The court went on to explain that the declaration provided by Dr. Noyes, an emergency department physician, was not sufficient to establish the standard of care applicable to Drs. Cook and Olson, obstetricians/gynecologists, and Dr. Shokeir, a pathologist. In the end, the court dismissed the Babcocks' claims against all the defendants on summary judgment. The court specifically reserved ruling on the Doctors' request for CR 11 sanctions.
The Babcocks moved for reconsideration, requesting a continuance and submitting a declaration from Ms. Babcock. The Babcocks' motion for reconsideration was denied.
A hearing was held on the Doctors' motion for CR 11 sanctions, but Hildes did not attend. At the May 26, 2006 hearing, the Doctors presented evidence that they had incurred over $16,000 in attorney fees in defending against the lawsuit. The trial court ordered Hildes to pay $ 9,000 in sanctions under CR 11. In support of the award, the court found that the complaint filed by Hildes "was not well-grounded in fact or warranted by existing law." The court also found that Hildes failed to make a reasonable inquiry into the factual and legal basis for the lawsuit and that his "responses to the court contained misstatements of material fact." As to the latter, the court orally explained:
There were [sic] in this case what I deemed to be a number of misstatements to the court. We can all look at something and see something and perceive something and even recall something different, but there were some things that seemed to me to be misstatements, even in the response to this motion that the comment that the court specifically denied CR 11 sanctions when, in fact, I specifically recall reserving the issue.
A motion for reconsideration was denied. This appeal followed. The underlying issues of the lawsuit are not before us; the propriety of Hildes' CR 11 sanctions is all that remains.1
Hildes contends that the superior court abused its discretion in imposing the CR 11 sanctions. Thus, Hildes argues, the sanctions against him should be reversed. We disagree.
"[T]he purpose behind CR 11 is to deter baseless filings and to curb abuses of the judicial system." Biggs v. Vail, 124 Wn.2d 193, 197, 876 P.2d 448 (1994). Sanctions are properly imposed if three conditions are met: "(1) the action is not well grounded in fact; (2) it is not warranted by existing law; and (3) the attorney signing the pleading has failed to conduct reasonable inquiry into the factual or legal basis of the action." John Doe v. Spokane & Inland Empire Blood Bank, 55 Wn. App. 106, 110, 780 P.2d 853 (1989). The primary task is to determine whether the attorney acted "reasonably in taking the action."
Id. at 111. The imposition and amount of sanctions under CR 11 are matters within the broad discretion of the trial court. Bryant v. Joseph Tree, Inc., 119 Wn.2d 210, 222, 829 P.2d 1099 (1992); Cascade Brigade v. Economic Dev. Bd., 61 Wn. App. 615, 619, 811 P.2d 697 (1991).
In order to recover damages for negligent medical treatment, the patient must establish the medical care provider did not comply with the accepted standard of care. RCW 7.70.030(1). A medical malpractice plaintiff also must show that the failure of the health care provider to meet the standard of care was the proximate cause of the injury complained of. RCW 7.70.040(2).
"In an action for medical negligence, a doctor is entitled to summary judgment once he [or she] establishes the plaintiff lacks competent expert testimony." Morinaga v. Vue, 85 Wn. App. 822, 832, 935 P.2d 637 (1997). To defeat a motion for summary judgment, "the nonmoving party cannot rely on the allegations made in its pleadings." Young v. Key Pharms., Inc., 112 Wn.2d 216, 225, 770 P.2d 182 (1989).
Hildes claims that he had not previously worked on a medical malpractice case and that it was "outside his area of expertise." This argument appears to overlook the universal maxim that ignorance of the law excuses no one. See Kingery v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 132 Wn.2d 162, 175, 937 P.2d 565 (1997). Even if a lawyer is practicing in an area of the law that he or she is not familiar with, this is all the more reason for counsel to take a careful and measured approach before filing a lawsuit.
CR 11 sanctions are justified where the lawyer failed to conduct "preliminary research to discover whether naming particular defendants in a summons and complaint has a proper foundation in law or fact." Doe, 55 Wn. App. at 123.
Where important facts are easily ascertainable and where telephone calls and correspondence would lead a prudent person to further inquiry before resorting to legal process, the lawyer who simply files suit and waits for the facts to sort themselves out surely will be exposed to CR 11 sanctions if it turns out that no facts support the case. Cascade Brigade, 61 Wn. App. at 625.
By his own admission, Hildes "relied greatly" on the word of his clients to determine what had happened and did not "file discovery requests of his own until early-mid March of 2006."2 This kind of "blind reliance" on a client's assertions will seldom support a finding that the attorney acted reasonably in taking the action. Watson v. Maier, 64 Wn. App. 889, 897, 827 P.2d 311 (1992); Southern Leasing Partners, Ltd. v. McMullan, 801 F.2d 783, 788 (5th Cir. 1986) (). Watson, 64 Wn. App. at 897.
Here, there is no evidence that either Dr. Cook or Dr. Shokeir played any role in the decision to discharge Ms. Babcock from the hospital on November 29. Nothing suggests that Ms. Babcock either saw or spoke with Dr. Cook during the relevant...
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