Babl v. Pere Marquette Ry. Co., 52.

• Decision Date: 03 June 1935
• Docket Number: No. 52.,52.
• Citation: 261 N.W. 292,272 Mich. 184
• Parties: BABL v. PERE MARQUETTE RY. CO.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

272 Mich. 184

261 N.W. 292

BABL

v.PERE MARQUETTE RY. CO.

No. 52.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

June 3, 1935.

Appeal from Department of Labor and Industry.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Elisabeth Babl, claimant, for the death of her daughter, Veda Babl, employee, opposed by the Pere Marquette Railway Company, employer. From an award of compensation by the Department of Labor and Industry, the employer appeals.

Award affirmed.

WIEST, J., dissenting.

Argued before the Entire Bench.

W. K. Williams and N. F. Crawford, both of Detroit, for appellant.

Gloster, Giller & Briggs, of Detroit, for appellee.

FEAD, Justice.

Veda Babl was an employee of defendant, doing clerical work, posting in car record books the location of defendant's cars on its own or other roads. About half of the cars were engaged in interstate transportation. Her work commenced at 8 o'clock a. m.

Defendant leased the second, third, and fourth floors, with halls, corridors, and toilets thereon, and the elevator in the Fort Street Depot in Detroit. Several railroad companies used the depot, which is owned by the Fort Street Union Depot Company. Veda worked on the fourth floor.

The Fort Street entrance leads into a ‘lobby,’ in which are the elevator and the stairs to the upper floors, telephone booths, etc. The lobby opens into the general waiting room, to which there are entrances from Third street. The Fort Street entrance is the more direct way to the elevator.

September 14, 1931, at 7:50 a. m., Veda came into the lobby from Fort street, slipped on the wet floor, and hurt her knee. Defendant reported the accident as noncompensable. In November, 1933, Veda made claim for compensation, but died before hearing. Her mother claims as a dependent, and had an award, which is here reviewed. Except for questions of fact regarding the injury and its connection with Veda's death, upon which there was testimony and he finding of the department is final, the issue here concerns the place of the injury and the settlement therefor made by Veda in December, 1932.

Defendant claims Veda was not on its premises when injured, but was in a public place analogous to a highway. We need not consider the cases dealing with injury on a street in going to or from work. Reed v. Bliss & Van Auken Lumber Co., 225 Mich. 164, 196 N. W. 420, nor with injuries off of, but in proximity to, the employer's premises, Hills v. Blair, 182 Mich. 20, 148 N. W. 243. A railroad depot is not like a highway in respect of the rights of its users. Persons using a railroad depot do so in different capacities, as passengers, licensees, or trespassers, which govern their rights and liabilities. Defendant's lease was useless without a right of way from the elevator to the street. Such right of way of necessity attached to the lease, and would affect the rights and liability of defendant's employees in using it, as against the depot company. Veda was hurt on premises of which defendant had right of use for ingress and egress of its employees. The commission was justified in holding the place of injury part of the employer's premises because provided by it for the purpose of reaching the elevator. Black v. Herman, 297 Pa. 230, 146 A. 550.

When the injury occurred, defendant denied liability, taking the position that Veda was engaged in interstate commerce and the state law did not apply. Erie R. Co. v. Szary, 253 U. S. 86, 40 S. Ct. 454, 64 L. Ed. 794;Erie R. Co. v. Collins, 253 U. S. 77, 40 S. Ct. 450, 64 L. Ed. 790. Those cases were later overruled. Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 284 U. S. 296, 52 S. Ct. 151, 76 L. Ed. 304.

On December 22, 1932, Veda's attorney and Mr. Kirkpatrick, a general claim agent, made an adjustment for the injury at $600. Mr. Kirkpatrick testified that he was the general claim agent of the different railroad companies using the depot and of the depot company. He understood his salary was apportioned among the companies, but did not know. He said he made the settlement solely in behalf of the depot company because Veda was injured on its property, and not for the defendant. He said he instructed the bill be made against the depot company, but payment of claims is handled by the accounting division. He produced no written instruction for payment by, or charge against, the depot company. A voucher for $600 was issued by defendant, and recited that it was in full settlement for damages to persons or property received while employed as a clerk by defendant, ‘and in full of all claims to date against the said Pere Marquette Railway Company.’ The depot company is not mentioned in the voucher. Mr. Kirkpatrick stated that the check was made by defendant as a matter of convenience and common practice in connection with the relations between the railroads and the depot company. He produced no documentary evidence to support the statement. The actual payment was not within his knowledge. There was no evidence that defendant ever charged the depot company or was reimbursed by it on account of the settlement.

The department held, as facts, that the settlement...