Baca v. Wootton
| Decision Date | 13 April 1896 |
| Citation | 44 P. 850,8 Colo.App. 94 |
| Parties | BACA et al. v. WOOTTON et al. |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
Appeal from district court, Pueblo county.
Action by Luis Baca and others against Richens L. Wootton and others to recover possession of certain real estate. There was judgment for defendants, and plaintiffs appealed. Affirmed.
A.W Archibald, for appellants.
John A Gordon, for appellees.
Felipe Baca pre-empted some government land in the vicinity of Trinidad about 1870. The title thus initiated ripened into a fee by the issue of a government patent some time subsequent to his death, which occurred in April, 1874. At this time Trinidad was a straggling village of a few hundred people largely made up of a Spanish-speaking race. One of these settlers was Juan Antonio Garcia, who came up from New Mexico about the year 1870. He was evidently a laborer, and at various times worked for his more prosperous countryman, Felipe. He settled in the vicinity of Trinidad, and first occupied some log cabins which the testimony describes as located in the neighborhood of the gas works. After he had been there some little time, Felipe Baca put him in possession of a lot, which is the subject-matter of the present controversy. The whole suit depends on the legal character of this transaction, and the rights, if any, inuring to Garcia and the subsequent grantees, who were the defendants in the present suit. After Felipe's demise there were left surviving him his widow and several children. The property descended to his heirs, under the Colorado statutes, whereby the widow became the owner of one-half, and the children of their proportionate share of the remainder, which was divided, by reason of their numbers, into eighteenths. The entire title to this lot ultimately vested in three,--Luis, Facundo, and Rosa,--who brought this action against Wootton, Firth, and Brigham, for partition. Taking into consideration the allegations of the complaint, and the proofs which the plaintiffs offered, it was a singularly conceived suit. It was their contention that the entire title was in them by virtue of their heirship, and the purchase from their co-heirs, and the title purporting to be held by Wootton and Brigham was acquired by a conveyance from Garcia, who never had any title at all. Firth held a mortgage on the property, and his right was dependent on the establishment of Garcia's claims, and the claims of Garcia's grantees. Just exactly how partition could be enforced against persons without interest, it is difficult to apprehend. There was an allegation of a claim by the defendants of some estate or interest in the premises. How parties out of possession, holding by a legal title, and having an absolute right to sue at law, could maintain such a suit against these defendants, is not clear. Passing by this difficulty, the defendants denied all the various allegations of the complaint, and set up by way of defense, and also by way of cross complaint, a title in Garcia, coming by mesne conveyances to the present defendants; stated the claims of the plaintiffs; and prayed a judgment establishing their title. This will now be stated. It will assume the form outlined by the defendants' witnesses, since we shall concur in the judgment of the trial court. No question of law is presented which requires any attention, and the whole opinion will be virtually nothing more than a general statement of the case made by the proofs as we accept them.
Preliminarily we suggest, the appellants insist the judgment is wrong because the defendants were not so situated with respect to the title and the property as to have the right to maintain their cross bill, which was in the nature of a bill quia timet. This matter is easily disposed of. The interpretation put on our statute by the supreme court settles this matter adversely to the appellants. Under section 255 of the Code, any person in possession of property may bring an action against anybody who claims an interest adverse to him, in order to determine the status of this adverse claim. The nature of the possession is wholly unimportant, and the question of title does not seem to enter into the prerequisites of the right to maintain the suit. If the party is in possession, he may bring the action. If a party has been made defendant in a suit concerning the same property, and of a sort which permits a cross action, there seems to be no good reason why, by way of cross complaint, if in no other way, the matter may not be stated, and the appropriate relief prayed. Bank v. Newton, 13 Colo. 245, 22 P. 444; Phillippi v. Leet, 19 Colo. 246, 35 P. 540; Mulock v. Wilson, 19 Colo. 296, 35 P. 532; Brown v. Wilson, 21 Colo. 309, 40 P. 688. In any event, we do not regard the appellants as in a position to complain of the judgment quieting the defendants' title when they were found to have no title or interest in the property. It was adjudged to belong to the defendants, and they are unharmed by the entry. Should the judgment appear to affect the rights of other persons, who are not parties to the suit, and the judgment is a cloud upon their title, they would, of course, be unaffected by it, and, in the proper way, could remove it. There is some stress laid on the necessity for full proof of a parol gift, in order to establish a title as against the legal holder. This is conceded, though the extent and character of that proof varies with the situation of the suit, the time which has elapsed since the gift was made, and during which the holders of the apparent legal title have slept on their rights. Slight proof would sustain a gift, under the circumstances of the present case, even though it might not suffice if the action had been brought by Baca in his lifetime, or by the heirs directly after his death, and shortly subsequent to the inception of the title. Wat.Spec.Perf. §§ 284 291; Allison v. Burns, 107 Pa.St. 50; Haines v. Haines, 6 Md. 435.
We will now recur to the matters preceding the devolution of the title on the heirs of Felipe Baca. In 1871 Baca offered to give Garcia a lot on which to build a home. Together with other parties, they went to the premises in dispute, and the land was pointed out, and the lot marked by stones put at the four corners, and the lines defined by a furrow plowed by Garcia, under Baca's direction, with a team and a plow which he furnished. This transaction is testified to by several witnesses, and, if their story is to be believed, occurred in 1871, in about that way. Another witness was produced who testified to several declarations...
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