Baccus v. Baccus, 09-89-119

Decision Date25 April 1991
Docket NumberNo. 09-89-119,09-89-119
Citation808 S.W.2d 694
PartiesJimmie Doyle BACCUS, Appellant, v. Gloria Eloise BACCUS, Appellee. CV.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Donald M. Brown, Conroe, for appellant.

Jimmie P. Price, Conroe, for appellee.

Before WALKER, C.J., and BROOKSHIRE and BURGESS, JJ.

OPINION

BROOKSHIRE, Justice.

This is a divorce action in which Appellant, Jimmie Doyle Baccus, the Defendant below, seeks reversal of the judgment of the trial court so that the matter may be remanded for new trial. The Appellant contends that the trial court erred in awarding the Appellee her one-half interest in the retirement benefits based on the September 6, 1988 value rather than the June 1, 1987 agreement and that the Appellant should not be assessed all of the federal income tax liabilities of the parties from the date of the marriage through December 31, 1986. The trial judge signed the final decree of divorce on January 6, 1989.

The Appellant and Appellee were married on or about April 17, 1964. They separated and ceased to live together as husband and wife on or about February 24, 1986. They are parents of three children. However, at the time of the filing of the final decree of divorce, only one child was under the age of eighteen years, Melanie Lane Baccus. Appellee filed for divorce on March 3, 1986.

The Appellant, on March 17, 1986, timely filed his answer by general denial and also filed his cross-action for divorce, which was later abandoned. On June 1, 1987, the Appellant and the Appellee appeared before Judge Lynn Coker for a final, uncontested hearing on the merits of the divorce case. The Appellant and the Appellee announced their agreements as to conservatorship and support regarding the minor child and as to division of most of the community estate of the parties. 1

On June 1, 1987, Judge Coker announced that he was granting the divorce and approved the parties' agreement. The bulk of the community estate consisted of the community homestead, the Appellant's retirement plan through his employers, IRA accounts, cash and savings and shares of corporate stocks and mutual funds. The Appellant and the Appellee agreed to divide the community assets equally between them. The Appellant and the Appellee did not agree, as of June 1, 1987, to assume one-half ( 1/2) of any prior years' income tax liabilities. They had only agreed to divide any income tax refunds for 1986. Importantly, no agreement of any sort was dictated into the record, or approved by Judge Coker or the parties, concerning the tax liabilities of the parties for 1987 and any prior tax years. Furthermore, they had only agreed to divide the specific refund on a 50/50 basis at the first hearing on June 1, 1987.

Shortly after the June 1, 1987, hearing, the Appellant and the Appellee did equally divide the cash accounts, stocks and bonds, etc., with each party receiving approximately $65,000 in cash, plus various IRA's of equal value and stock. The Appellant and the Appellee each received a total amount of approximately $100,000.

The Appellant resumed occupancy of the homestead when the Appellee moved out after five months of occupancy. The Appellant also assumed the payment of the monthly mortgage.

The case at bar was called for trial on the merits on September 6, 1988, in the 2nd 9th Judicial District Court, Judge John C. Martin presiding. The parties appeared in person and with their respective attorneys and announced ready for trial. Neither the Appellant nor the Appellee submitted a proposed Final Decree of Divorce at a prior hearing on June 1, 1987. Also, neither filed a Motion to Enter Judgment based on the proceedings of June 1, 1987.

The Court assessed the following after the September 6, 1988, hearing: that the entire prior tax liability be assessed against the Appellant; awarded the community homestead, subject to the mortgage, to the Appellant; and, divided the retirement benefits equally between the Appellant and the Appellee based on the September 6, 1988, accrued value rather than the June 1, 1987, accrued value.

On February 3, 1989, the Honorable John C. Martin made, and thereby stated, relevant Findings of Fact and pertinent Conclusions of Law:

FINDINGS OF FACT

....

9. On June 1, 1987, Petitioner and Respondent appeared in person and by and through their respective attorneys, Jimmie P. Price on behalf of Petitioner and Donald M. Brown on behalf of Respondent, and advised the 9th Judicial District Court, the Honorable Lynn Coker, Presiding, that an agreement had been reached between the parties on all issues pertaining to conservatorship and support of the child, division of community property, attorneys fees and income tax liabilities.

10. On June 1, 1987, Judge Lynn Coker granted a divorce to the parties and approved the agreements as requested and made a docket entry to that effect, and requested that the agreement be reduced to writing and signed by both Petitioner and Respondent and their respective attorneys before submitting the Decree of Divorce to Judge Coker for his approval.

11. At no time did either Petitioner or Respondent submit a proposed Final Decree of Divorce to Judge Lynn Coker for signature, approval, or entry, nor was a Motion to Enter a Final Decree of Divorce filed by either party.

12. Between the period of time from June 1, 1987, and September 6, 1988, both Petitioner and Respondent revoked their consent to portions of the agreement reached on June 1, 1987, and such partial revocation was allowed by this Court.

13. On September 6, 1988, this case was called for trial on the merits, and Petitioner and Respondent each appeared in person and by and through their respective attorneys and each announced ready for trial.

....

25. On June 1, 1987, there was a potential tax liability owed by Petitioner and Respondent which was not disclosed by either Respondent or his attorney.

26. Respondent intentionally and knowingly withheld income tax liability information from Petitioner.

27. From June 1, 1987 to September 6, 1988, Respondent allowed the income tax liability, including penalty and interest, to increase substantially.

28. Respondent was aware of the income tax liability and received notice of same from the Internal Revenue Service.

29. Respondent took no steps to pay the income tax liability, including penalty and interest, when it was at its lowest amount, even though he had sufficient funds to do so.

30. Respondent could have paid the income tax liability, including penalty and interest, and could have requested entry of Decree of Divorce based upon the agreement of June 1, 1987, but did neither.

31. Once Petitioner received notice of the tax liability, she delivered the notice to Respondent.

32. Each party specifically repudiated that portion of the agreement of June 1, 1987, and such was allowed by the Court on September 6, 1988.

33. Repudiation of the previous agreement of June 1, 1987, was evidenced by testimony in Court on September 6, 1988, and by virtue of the fact that neither Petitioner nor Respondent requested entry of a proposed Final Decree containing the terms pertaining to the tax matters.

....

35. Respondent intentionally and knowingly withheld information about personal income tax liability owed by the parties prior to and during settlement negotiations and for a period of time after June 1, 1987.

36. The personal income tax liability of Petitioner and Respondent is derived from an investment by Respondent into a tax shelter and this investment was made by Respondent without the knowledge of Petitioner.

37. Petitioner would not have agreed to be responsible for one-half of the personal income tax liabilities owed by the parties up through June 1, 1987, had the tax liability information been disclosed by Respondent.

38. The information concerning the personal income tax liability owed by Petitioner and Respondent was material information.

39. Awarding of the personal income tax liabilities owed by the parties through June 1, 1987, as being the sole and separate responsibility and liability of Respondent, was just and right having due regard for the rights of each party and the child.

....

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

....

4. That the evidence is sufficient as a matter of law to justify and sustain the findings that the agreement of June 1, 1987, was repudiated in part and re-ratified in part on September 6, 1988;

....

8. That the evidence is sufficient as a matter of law to justify and sustain the findings that the Respondent invested into a tax shelter without disclosing same to Petitioner and such investment was the contributing cause to the tax liabilities of the parties;

9. That the evidence is sufficient as a matter of law to justify and sustain the findings that the Respondent withheld from Petitioner information concerning the tax liability resulting from investment in the tax shelter during negotiations prior to and through June 1, 1987, and shortly thereafter;

10. That the evidence is sufficient as a matter of law to justify and sustain the findings that Petitioner would not have agreed to be responsible for one-half of the personal income tax liabilities owed by the parties up through June 1, 1987, had the tax liability information been disclosed by Respondent;

11. That the evidence is sufficient as a matter of law to justify and sustain the findings that the information concerning the personal income tax liability owed by Petitioner and Respondent was material information;

12. That the evidence is sufficient as a matter of law to justify and sustain the findings that awarding of the personal income tax liabilities owed by the parties through June 1, 1987, as being the sole and separate responsibility and ability of Respondent and denial of any claim for attorneys fees was just and right having due regard for the rights of each party and the child.

The law in Texas is that, when findings of fact and conclusions of law are filed in conjunction...

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