Bach v. County of Butte

• Decision Date: 29 September 1983
• Parties: Maxim N. BACH, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF BUTTE et al., Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 21774.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 268

195 Cal.Rptr. 268

147 Cal.App.3d 554

Maxim N. BACH, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF BUTTE et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Civ. 21774.

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

Sept. 29, 1983.

Hearing Denied Dec. 15, 1983.

[147 Cal.App.3d 558] Maxim N. Bach, Oroville, in pro. per., for plaintiff and appellant.

Price, Burness, Price, Davis & Brown and Robert L. Davis, Chico, for defendants and respondents.

SIMS, Associate Justice.

In this case we hold that California state courts should apply federal law to determine whether a complaint sufficiently pleads a cause of action under the federal Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C., § 1983, referred to hereinafter simply as " § 1983").

Plaintiff Maxim Bach, an attorney, sued the City of Oroville, two Oroville employees, the County of Butte and one Butte County Deputy District Attorney under the federal Civil Rights Act. (§ 1983 et seq.) Plaintiff alleges these defendants conspired to vex, annoy, or injure him by filing and prosecuting a criminal action against him, knowing it was baseless. The demurrer of the county and its deputy district attorney to plaintiff's fourth amended complaint was sustained without leave to amend on the ground the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action (Code Civ.Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e)) because the action is barred by prosecutorial immunity. ¹ Plaintiff appeals contending that the complaint states a good cause of action against the deputy district attorney and, alternatively, that the county is liable because no derivative prosecutorial immunity shields it in a federal civil rights action. We reject these contentions and affirm.

FACTS

Plaintiff's fourth amended complaint alleges as follows:

Plaintiff Bach is an attorney and his law office is in Oroville. He is the only attorney in the Butte County area who advertises "in the various media." Throughout the period in question plaintiff has represented clients in pending civil actions naming Defendant Carrington is a deputy district attorney and employee of Butte County. Defendants Lyde and Barr are city attorneys and employees of the City of Oroville.

Butte County and specified employees as defendants.

On March 1, 1976, the Oroville City Council adopted a resolution "Establishing Criteria for the Inspection, Repair or Demolition and Removal of Earthquake Damaged Buildings within the City of Oroville." According to the complaint, "On November 8, 1977, defendants, and each of them, pursuant to a conspiracy, caused to be filed or prosecuted an illegal, unfounded and/or totally specious misdemeanor criminal complaint against plaintiff wherein was alleged in two counts that said plaintiff did not have an occupancy permit for his law office building and that he did not have a business license from the CITY OF OROVILLE because he had not complied with the said illegal Earthquake Resolution."

Before filing the complaint, defendants Carrington, Barr, and Lyde had investigated plaintiff's compliance with the earthquake damage resolution and knew he had not violated its provisions or any provision of the City of Oroville code. Lyde and Carrington knew the resolution was not a duly enacted ordinance and that it had no criminal sanction for noncompliance. Plaintiff became the object of the conspiracy in part because he advertised his services as an attorney and represented persons suing Butte County.

On November 21, 1977, Lyde was recused as prosecuting attorney in the criminal proceedings. Thereafter, the court in the criminal action directed the Butte County District Attorney to assume the role of prosecutor and Carrington was assigned the job. On March 21, 1978, Carrington was recused. Carrington then petitioned the superior court for a writ of mandate to set aside his recusal. The petition was denied. Thereafter, the Attorney General assumed the role of prosecutor and on June 20, 1978, the criminal proceedings were dismissed on his motion.

In paragraph IV of his second cause of action, plaintiff alleges that "The defendant, the CITY OF OROVILLE, and the defendant, the COUNTY OF BUTTE, at all times herein, acted pursuant to an Earthquake Resolution passed by the defendant CITY OF OROVILLE, which was illegal and had no criminal sanctions therein (a copy of which is attached hereto and made a part hereof), and each of its general policies, regulations, customs, habits and usages in criminally proceeding against plaintiff in an action that was totally unfounded in law, as well as in fact, and the said wrongful prosecution of plaintiff by each of said defendants was done pursuant to the said defendants' unconstitutional and illegal laws, policies, procedures, regulations, rules, habits, customs, and usages."

Plaintiff alleges that defendants' acts caused him embarrassment, anxiety, humiliation, distress, discomfort, mortification, and damage to his reputation, all to his damage in the amount of $300,000.

DISCUSSION

I

A

At the outset, we investigate the rules pursuant to which we shall measure the adequacy of plaintiff's complaint.

The state courts of California have accepted concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts to adjudicate suits brought under the federal Civil Rights Act (§ 1983). ² (Williams v. Horvath (1976) 16 Cal.3d 834, 837, 129 Cal.Rptr. 453, 548 P.2d 1125; see Maine v. Thiboutot (1980) 448 U.S. 1, 3, fn. 1, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 2503 fn. 1, 65 L.Ed.2d 555; Martinez v. California (1980) 444 U.S. 277, 100 S.Ct. 553, 62 L.Ed.2d 481; Brown v. Pitchess (1975) 13 Cal.3d 518, 522-523, 119 Cal.Rptr. 204, 531 P.2d 772.)

It is undisputed that since an action under section 1983 is based on federal statutory law, state courts look to federal law to determine what conduct gives rise to an action under the statute. "Congress has not evinced any intention to defer to the states the definition of the federal right created in section 1983 ...." (Donovan v. Reinbold (9th Cir.1970) 433 F.2d 738, 742; see Note, Civil Rights Suits Against State and Local Governmental Entities and Officials: Rights of Action, Immunities, and Federalism (1980) 53 So.Cal.L.Rev. 945, 952-954; 1 Antieau, Federal Civil Rights Acts (2d ed. 1980) §§ 51-52, pp. 94-95.) There remains a question, however, with respect to whether state or federal law should apply to determine whether a plaintiff has filed a complaint that adequately alleges the wrongful conduct giving rise to a cause of action or claim for relief under section 1983.

The rules of pleading in federal court are generally different from the rules of pleading in California state courts, since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure recognize a form of "notice pleading," usually designed simply to put a defendant on notice of the nature of a claim, whereas California requires the pleading of facts pursuant to its system of "code pleading" derived from the New York Code of 1848, known as the "Field Code." (See Diodes, Inc. v. Franzen (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 244, 250, 67 Cal.Rptr. 19; Code Civ.Proc., § 425.10, subd. (a); Fed.Rules Civ.Proc., rule 8(a); 3 Witkin, Cal.Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Pleading, §§ 1-2, pp. 1690-1691, §§ 268-269, pp. 1939-1941.)

California state courts have assumed that California pleading law should be applied to test the adequacy of a complaint brought under the federal Civil Rights Act. ³ (See, e.g., Bush v. California Conservation Corps (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 194, 200, 185 Cal.Rptr. 892, mod. 136 Cal.App.3d 1063f, 185 Cal.Rptr. 892; Logan v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 116, 127, 185 Cal.Rptr. 878; Graham v. City of Biggs (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 250, 255, 157 Cal.Rptr. 761; Kanarek v. Davidson (1978) 85 Cal.App.3d 341, 344, 148 Cal.Rptr. 86.) The same assumption has been made with respect to complaints filed in state court pursuant to the Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 U.S.C., § 51 et seq., hereinafter "FELA"). (See McMillan v. Western Pac. R.R. Co. (1960) 54 Cal.2d 841, 845, 9 Cal.Rptr. 361, 357 P.2d 449.) Indeed, the general rule is that where an action founded on a federal statute is properly brought in the state courts, the law of the state, in the absence of any contrary provisions in the federal statute, ⁴ controls in matters of practice and procedure. (King v. Schumacher (1939) 32 Cal.App.2d 172, 181, 89 P.2d 466, cert. den. 308 U.S. 593, 60 S.Ct. 123, 84 L.Ed. 496.)

However, "the purposes underlying section 1983--i.e., to serve as an antidote to discriminatory state laws, to protect federal rights where state law is inadequate, and to protect federal rights where state processes are available in theory but not in practice [citation] ... may not be frustrated by state substantive limitations couched in procedural language." (Williams v. Horvath, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 841, 129 Cal.Rptr. 453, 548 P.2d 1125, fn. omitted; see Morse v. Southern Pac. Transportation Co. (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 128, 135, 133 Cal.Rptr. 577.) Moreover, it is clear that local rules of pleading can constitute unlawful substantive limitations on a federal statutory right. Thus in Brown v. Western Railway of Alabama (1949) 338 U.S. 294, 70 S.Ct. 105, 94 L.Ed. 100 a Georgia trial court had sustained a general demurrer to a complaint seeking money damages under the FELA. The trial court had relied on a Georgia rule of practice requiring that pleadings allegations be construed most strongly against the pleader. Writing for the majority, Justice Black concluded it was the duty of the Supreme Court "to construe the allegations of this complaint ourselves in order to determine whether petitioner has been denied a right of trial granted him by Congress. This federal right cannot be defeated by the forms of local practice. [Citation.] And we cannot accept as final a state court's interpretation of allegations in a complaint asserting it. [Citations.]" (Id., 338 U.S. at p. 296, 70 S.Ct. at pp. 106-107, 94 L.Ed. at p. 102.)

Brown makes it clear that the United States Supreme Court...