Bachelder v. Woodside
| Citation | 9 N.W.2d 464,233 Iowa 967 |
| Decision Date | 11 May 1943 |
| Docket Number | 46101. |
| Parties | BACHELDER v. WOODSIDE. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Iowa |
John D. Randall and Walter J. Barngrover, both of Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Trewin Simmons & Trewin and Guy P. Linville, all of Cedar Rapids, for appellee.
Plaintiff seeks damages from the defendant as the result of a collision of an automobile driven by the plaintiff, in which his wife was a passenger, and an automobile driven by the defendant. It is plaintiff's claim that the collision was caused by defendant's negligence in failing to have his car under control and in failing to remain on his side of the paved highway at the time of meeting the plaintiff. Defendant plead a general denial and contended that the plaintiff was negligent by reason of his excessive speed at the time of the collision and further contended that plaintiff failed to keep his automobile under reasonable control and that he was driving it on defendant's side of the highway at the time of the collision. The plaintiff's wife assigned her claim to her husband and upon submission of the case to the jury a verdict was returned against the defendant. He has appealed.
The accident which is the basis of plaintiff's action, occurred during the afternoon of october 18, 1940, on U. S. Highway No. 30 some sixteen miles west of the city of Cedar Rapids, Iowa. Plaintiff, accompanied by his wife, was traveling west and the defendant was proceeding east. The day was clear and the pavement was dry. The plaintiff and his wife were seriously injured. The plaintiff was hospitalized for approximately eight weeks and his wife was confined in the hospital for a period of five and a half weeks. The plaintiff suffered injuries to his back, a fracture of his right knee cap and a complete fracture of his right arm between the elbow and the shoulder. He was confined to his home for several weeks after his discharge from the hospital. At the time of the trial there was testimony that he had suffered permanent, partial disability as the result of his injuries and had been unable to do any work of a substantial character. At the time of the accident plaintiff was 61 years of age. It was shown that he had been a traveling saleman for about 22 years and that his income had been approximately $1,500 to $1,800 a year for the immediate years preceding the accident. The wife's injuries included a pressed vertebra or broken back, two front teeth cracked, an injury to one of her fingers and severe cuts and bruises on her head and body.
We summarize the claimed errors of the trial court, as contended by the defendant, and which we deem necessary to comment on, as follows: (1) That the court erred in overruling defendant's motion to suppress the testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses, two highway patrolmen, and in permitting these witnesses to testify as to a claimed confidential communication obtained by them during the course of their official investigation and which communication and report are claimed to be inadmissible by reason of a statute of this state; (2) that the court erred in the admission of the testimony of one of the patrolmen and in thereafter striking it from the record and in overruling defendant's motion for a mistrial; (3) that the court erred in not admitting defendant's offer in evidence, as a part of the cross-examination of the plaintiff, of a certain section of the 1939 Code relative to the necessity of filing Iowa State Income Tax returns by individuals and the refusal of the court to give an instruction in regard to this statute; (4) that the court erred in submitting and including certain specifications of negligence; (5) that the court erred in permitting the award of damages for "loss of time, past and future," inasmuch as it was claimed that no such issue was plead and no competent evidence submitted in support thereof; (6) that the court erred in the giving of an instruction relative to the claimed negligence of the defendant as to the violation of the statute relative to meeting and turning to the right and the statement that such claimed violation of the statute was presumptive evidence of negligence; (7) that the court erred in its refusal to grant a new trial because the verdict was excessive and was the result of passion, prejudice, misconduct and sympathy of the jury.
The claimed error to which the defendant directs his most severe criticism pertains to the action of the trial court in first admitting the testimony of one of the two highway patrol officials and his later action in striking his testimony. A short time after the accident highway patrolman Fels arrived at the scene of the collision and made an investigation. At the time of the trial he testified that he examined the cars, the marks on the paving and on the shoulder, and talked with the defendant, Woodside. He also identified certain exhibits which purported to be pictures of the scene of the accident and which showed certain marks on the pavement and on the shoulder. He further testified as to certain statements which he said the defendant, Woodside, made to the effect that he, Woodside, had attempted to pass a bus that was ahead of him and in so doing swung over to the left hand side of the pavement; that he then saw the approaching car from the east which was the Bachelder car; that he saw that he could not pass the bus safely and then swung back to the right side of the pavement; that he apparently lost control of his automobile and it went over to the right hand shoulder, and in attempting to bring it back on the pavement he made a sharp turn and then swung across the pavement over the black line into the Bachelder car. He further testified that the defendant pointed out where the collision occurred and discussed with him, the patrolman, the tire marks on the paving. This witness, on cross-examination, testified that he had made out a written report which was signed by the defendant and which was thereafter turned into the highway patrol headquarters. The highway patrolman also stated that he had refreshed his memory from the written statement given him by the defendant.
During the course of the examination of this witness objection was made to his testimony on the ground that it was of a confidential nature; that the accident report was of a confidential nature and made without prejudice to the defendant, and that testimony based upon this report was not admissible and could not be used as evidence in any civil action arising out of the facts on which the report was based.
A further witness called by the plaintiff was another state highway patrolman by the name of Parr, who arrived at the scene of the accident later than Fels and who, in connection with Fels, made observations as to the accident. Objections were made to his testimony on the same grounds as that directed to the testimony of the witness, Fels. These objections were overruled.
A motion was made to strike the testimony of highway patrolman Parr and all evidence introduced in connection therewith on the grounds that it was incompetent and that the report of the accident was of a confidential nature and was inadmissible. This motion was overruled in that this witness' testimony related only to his observations.
Subsequent to the proceedings relative to the introduction of the testimony of the witnesses Fels and Parr, and on the morning of the second day after Fels testified, the court announced to the jury that he had changed his ruling in connection with the testimony of this witness and that he was striking his testimony, and he directed that the jury disregard it for any purpose whatsoever in the case. The defendant, in connection with these proceedings, then moved for a mistrial and to discharge the jury, claiming that prejudice had developed by the claimed improper reception of such evidence. This motion was overruled.
I. Consideration of the question raised by the objections made to the testimony of the two patrolmen and the later proceedings in regard to the striking of the testimony of the witness, Fels, necessitates our interpretation of the statutes by which it is claimed by the defendant that the testimony of the highway patrolman was inadmissible.
Section 5020.06 of the 1939 Code requires that the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person or total property damage to an apparent extent of twenty-five dollars shall report the accident, together with information concerning it, to a peace officer. It is further required that a written report of the accident shall thereafter be forwarded to the highway patrol department.
Section 5020.11 of the 1939 Code is as follows:
This last referred to section was passed by the 48th General Assembly (1939). It is found in Chapter 123, Section 2, of the Acts of the 48th General Assembly, and it is therein stated that section three hundred two (302) of Chapter one hundred thirty-four (134) Acts of the Forty-seventh (47th) General Assembly of Iowa, was repealed and the present statute substituted for it. Later comment will be made as to the legislative history of the present statute.
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Bachelder v. Woodside
...233 Iowa 9679 N.W.2d 464BACHELDERv.WOODSIDE.No. 46101.Supreme Court of Iowa.May 11, Appeal from District Court, Linn County; G. K. Thompson, Judge. Action for damages alleged to have been sustained by plaintiff and his wife by reason of a collision between an automobile driven by him and an......