Back-Wenzel v. Williams, 90,701
Decision Date | 22 April 2005 |
Docket Number | No. 90,701,90,701 |
Citation | 109 P.3d 1194,279 Kan. 346 |
Parties | DEBRA BACK-WENZEL, Appellant, v. LOUIS WILLIAMS, Appellee. |
Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Richard C. Morgan, of Morgan Law Offices, of Newton, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.
Lyndon W. Vix, of Fleeson, Gooing, Coulson & Kitch, L.L.C., of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Debra Back-Wenzel sued Louis Williams for personal injuries arising out of a car accident. Unbeknownst to her, Williams had died before suit was filed. After she learned of his death, she sought to substitute his estate's special administrator as the defendant. The district court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss without prejudice due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals reversed in Back-Wenzel v. Williams, 32 Kan. App. 2d 632, 87 P.3d 318 (2004). This court granted Williams' petition for review under K.S.A. 20-3018(b).
The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in dismissing the case, i.e., in refusing to allow the special administrator to serve as the defendant. We hold the district court was correct. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the district court's dismissal.
The facts are not in dispute. On December 15, 2000, Debra Back-Wenzel was injured in a car accident involving Louis Williams. Williams died on July 4, 2001, from conditions unrelated to the accident. On December 12, 2002, 3 days before the statute of limitations expired, Back-Wenzel filed a petition against Williams alleging his negligence in the accident. The district court found that service was obtained on the defendant by residential service on December 17, 2002.
Approximately 3 months later, on March 13, 2003, Williams' insurance company notified Back-Wenzel that Williams had died. The district court found that the 90 days to obtain service had expired, but ordered an extension to April 17.
On April 1, Back-Wenzel filed a petition in the probate division of the district court seeking appointment of a special administrator of Williams' estate to accept service on his behalf. A special administrator was appointed at that time and letters of special administration issued. That same day Back-Wenzel also filed a suggestion of death of defendant which additionally informed the district court that Michael X. Llamas had been appointed special administrator of the Williams estate. She also filed a motion with the district court to substitute Michael X. Llamas as special administrator, for defendant Williams.
On April 8, Williams' attorneys filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the court lacked subject matter and personal jurisdiction and that Back-Wenzel failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because there was no proper defendant. Back-Wenzel filed no response. On April 18, 1 day after the extension to obtain service expired, the district court denied Back-Wenzel's motion to substitute and granted the defendant's motion to dismiss without prejudice. It essentially held that Williams' pre-suit death precluded subject matter jurisdiction.
Back-Wenzel appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed.
Issue: Did the district court err in dismissing the case, i.e., in refusing to allow the special administrator to serve as the defendant?
The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Whether subject matter jurisdiction exists is a question of law over which this court's scope of review is unlimited. Wichita Eagle & Beacon Publishing Co. v. Simmons, 274 Kan. 194, 205, 50 P.3d 66 (2002).
In support of Back-Wenzel's argument that the district court wrongly dismissed her lawsuit, she points to the fact that she had no knowledge of Williams' death until after suit had been filed and that she immediately followed procedural requirements for bringing a claim against a deceased tortfeasor. Back-Wenzel claims that to not allow her to substitute the defendant places form over substance and would be unjust because of her inadvertent technical mistake. As a result, she advances the Court of Appeals' decision and rationale.
Williams' attorney, however, argues that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a deceased party. Consequently, he alleges there was never a proper defendant, and there was no controversy to be decided. As a result, he relies upon the district court's order of dismissal and rationale.
Although our review of the issue is de novo, we begin our analysis by examining the approaches taken by both lower courts.
The district court exclusively relied upon Moore v. Luther, 29 Kan. App. 2d 1004, 35 P.3d 277 (2001), which it held controlling and indistinguishable from the instant case. There, plaintiffs filed suit for personal injuries and physical damage arising out of a car accident involving Luther. Suit was brought 5 days before the statute of limitations deadline, but more than 18 months after Luther had died. The plaintiffs learned of Luther's death 119 days after the lawsuit was filed. They then filed a motion under K.S.A. 60-225 to substitute Luther's widow, who had previously been the executor of Luther's then-closed estate, as the defendant. The district court denied the motion and eventually dismissed the action with prejudice, finding that the claims were barred by the 2-year statute of limitations.
The Moore court stated that the issue before it was a matter of first impression in Kansas: "Whether a litigant can use this statute [K.S.A. 60-225] to save a cause of action filed against a decedent." 29 Kan. App. 2d at 1008.
K.S.A. 60-225 states in relevant part at (a)(1):
(Emphasis added.)
The Moore court observed that because the Kansas Rules of Civil Procedure are patterned after the federal rules, Kansas appellate courts often turn to federal case law for persuasive guidance. While it acknowledged that the federal counterpart to K.S.A. 60-225 — Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 25 — is not identical, "the differences between the rules do not affect the persuasiveness of federal case law on this issue." 29 Kan. App. 2d at 1008. Accordingly, it cited with approval 7C Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 1951 (1986): (Emphasis added.) 29 Kan. App. 2d at 1009.
The Moore court further observed that "the federal courts have uniformly followed this interpretation" and "other states having statutes or rules similar to the federal rule have held likewise." 29 Kan. App. 2d at 1009. Based upon these reasons, the Court of Appeals in Moore stated:
(Emphasis added.) 29 Kan. App. 2d at 1010.
The Court of Appeals in the instant case agreed with the Moore court: 32 Kan. App. 2d at 633.
The Court of Appeals then parted ways with the Moore court:
The Court of Appeals then proceeded under K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 60-102 ( ) to construe Back-Wenzel's motion as one to amend her pleadings under K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 60-215. With this construction in hand, the court then applied case law where defendants had died before suit was filed and motions to amend pleadings under 60-215 had been granted to allow estate administrators to replace the decedents. See Hinds v. Estate of Huston, 31 Kan. App. 2d 478, 66 P.3d 925 (2003); Yoh v. Hoffman, 29 Kan. App. 2d 312, 27 P.3d 927, rev. denied 272 Kan. 1423 (2001).
The Court of Appeals then used this ...
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