Backman v. Lawrence

Decision Date12 May 2009
Docket NumberNo. 35151.,35151.
Citation210 P.3d 75,147 Idaho 390
PartiesBob BACKMAN and Rhonda Backman, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Counterdefendants-Appellants, v. Thomas L. LAWRENCE and Debra A. Lawrence, husband and wife, Defendants, and James A. Spagon and Linda I. Spagon, husband and wife; Keith G. Lloyd and Priscilla I. Lloyd, husband and wife; Bruce Johnson and Deborah Johnson, husband and wife; Weston Scott Millward, a married man; and Pend O'Reille View Estates Owners' Association, Inc., an Idaho nonprofit organization; Gregory Zirwes and Theresa Zirwes, husband and wife; Christopher Bessler, an individual; Patrick Mc Kenna and Michelle Mc Kenna, husband and wife; Christopher E. Grant and Susan R. Grant, husband and wife; and Kevin D. Schrader, a single person, Defendants-Counterclaimants-Respondents.
CourtIdaho Supreme Court

Featherston Law Firm, Chtd., Sandpoint, for respondent Grant.

BURDICK, Justice.

Appellants Bob and Rhonda Backman (the Backmans) seek access to their property in Bonner County via roadways that pass over land owned by Respondents Thomas and Debra Lawrence, James and Linda Spagon, Keith and Priscilla Lloyd, Bruce and Deborah Johnson, Weston Millward, Gregory and Theresa Zirwes, Christopher Bessler, Patrick and Michelle McKenna, Christopher and Susan Grant, and Kevin Schrader (Respondents). In addition, one of the roadways is maintained by Respondent Pend Oreille View Owners' Association, Inc. (POVE). The Backmans assert a right to access their property based upon claims of prescriptive easement, easement by necessity, and private condemnation. We affirm the district court's denial of the Backmans' claims.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Backmans own 100 acres of property in Bonner County, Idaho, within the northwest quarter of Section 8, which they purchased from Randy Powers in 2005. Respondents own the properties in Section 7 over which the Backmans seek access to their property. Respondent POVE maintains and controls the private roads identified as Turtle Rock Road, Redtail Hawk Road, and Inspiration Road that run through Section 7 as well.

Prior to 1904, all of the properties at issue in this dispute were owned by the United States Government. Following patents by the government, Humbird Lumber acquired ownership of the 120 acres in Section 8 that is now owned by the Backmans and Schrader. Humbird Lumber also owned an adjoining 120 acre parcel that consisted of the properties currently owned by Respondents Lawrence, Johnson, Lloyd, Grant, and Millward. In 1945, Humbird sold the 120 acres in Section 8, which began a series of conveyances that led to Powers acquiring the property in 1994. Powers conveyed the north 20 acres of the 120 acre parcel to Schrader's predecessor in 1995. The Backmans purchased their 100 acres from Powers in 2005.

The Backmans have limited their access claims to Turtle Rock Road and three extensions from that road, referred to as the Upper Road, Middle Road, and Lower Road. Turtle Rock Road runs from the public Baldy Mountain Road across a portion of property owned by the City of Sandpoint, and continues east through the properties of McKenna, Bessler, Zirwes, and Lawrence. The road then turns north across the properties of Johnson, Lloyd, Millward, Grant, Spagon, and Rogers. The three extensions run east off Turtle Rock Road to Section 8. The Lower Road runs northwest over the properties of Lloyd, Johnson, and Grant. The Middle Road runs east across the Millward and Grant properties. The Upper Road runs from the intersection of Inspiration Way and the old Syringa Creek Road (the portion of Turtle Rock Road traveling north from the Millward property to the intersection with Inspiration Way and the Upper Road) east over the properties of Spagon, Rogers,1 and Schrader.

Turtle Rock Road, as it presently exists, generally follows the route of the Syringa Creek Road as shown on the 1966 U.S.G.S. map. By 1966, various undefined logging operations, combined with random public use for outdoor recreation such as hunting and berry picking had established Syringa Creek Road. In the 1980s large landowners, including lumber companies, began to sell parcels in Section 7 to private individuals or developers who were interested in building residences. By the 1990s real estate developers were acquiring parcels in the east half of Section 7 for purposes of residential development and Respondents were purchasers of some of those parcels. While residential development began to occur in the east half of Section 7 in the 1990s, there was no residential development in the northwest quarter of Section 8. However, when the Backmans purchased the property from Powers in early 2005, they divided the 100 acres into five parcels of 20 acres each and advertised the parcels for sale.

Mr. Backman testified that when he inspected the property before purchase the "only obvious way" to the property was on Redtail Hawk Road, and they walked the rest of the property. However, the Backmans may have initially believed there was deeded access to the property when they purchased it, based upon a legal description in a title insurance policy. The parties agree that the property is legally landlocked in that it is not served by any public road and has no established right of easement access. Following trial, the district court filed its Memorandum Opinion on November 14, 2007, denying the Backmans' claims for prescriptive easement, easement by necessity, private condemnation, and any combination of the three theories. The district court then awarded Respondents their costs on March 10, 2008. The Backmans appeal the district court's denial of their claims for legal access to their property.

II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of review.

When reviewing the decision of the district court, this Court determines whether the evidence supports the court's findings of fact and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law. Beckstead v. Price, 146 Idaho 57, 61, 190 P.3d 876, 880 (2008). "We will not disturb findings of fact that are supported by substantial and competent evidence, even if there is conflicting evidence." Akers v. D.L. White Constr., Inc., 142 Idaho 293, 298, 127 P.3d 196, 201 (2005). Evidence is substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would accept and rely upon it in determining findings of fact. Id. Furthermore, this Court will give due regard to the district court's appraisal of the credibility of witnesses who personally appear before the court. Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474, 479-80, 129 P.3d 1223, 1228-29 (2006). However, this Court exercises free review over the district court's conclusions of law: "this Court freely reviews the question of whether the facts found, or stipulated to, are sufficient to satisfy the legal requirements for the existence of an implied easement or a prescriptive easement." Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 640, 991 P.2d 362, 365 (1999).

B. Easement by necessity.

The Backmans argue the district court erred in denying their claim for an easement by necessity because there was unity of title and necessity. "An easement is the right to use the land of another for a specific purpose that is not inconsistent with the general use of the property by the owner." Akers, 142 Idaho at 301, 127 P.3d at 204. Two types of implied easements exist in Idaho: (1) a way of necessity, and (2) an easement implied from a prior use. Davis, 133 Idaho at 642, 991 P.2d at 367. One who claims an easement by necessity across another's land must prove "(1) unity of title and subsequent separation of the dominant and servient estates; (2) necessity of the easement at the time of severance; and (3) great present necessity for the easement." Bear Island Water Ass'n, Inc. v. Brown, 125 Idaho 717, 725, 874 P.2d 528, 536 (1994).

The Backmans first assert unity of title has been proven because the district court found that the properties had been commonly owned by the United States. They contend that this Court should overrule the language in Roberts v. Swim, 117 Idaho 9, 15, 784 P.2d 339, 345 (Ct.App.1989), stating that common ownership in the United States does not satisfy the unity of title requirement, because the language in Roberts was dicta. In addition, the Backmans assert that allowing for common ownership in the United States would be in accordance with Idaho's public policy calling for the full use of lands. The district court did not agree with the Backmans and found that unity of title did not exist as to all properties crossed by the access roads. We agree with the district court's determination that common ownership in the United States does not satisfy the unity of title requirement.

The Backmans are correct in their assertion that Idaho public policy favors the full use of lands, and this is one of the driving forces behind easements by necessity:

[An easement by necessity] is of common-law origin and is supported by the rule of sound public policy that lands should not be rendered unfit for occupancy or successful cultivation....

.... It is a universally established principle that where a tract of land is conveyed which is separated from the highway by other lands of the grantor or surrounded by his lands or by his and those of third persons, there arises, by implication, in favor of the grantee, a way of necessity across the premises of the grantor to the highway.

Burley Brick & Sand Co. v. Cofer, 102 Idaho 333, 335, 629 P.2d 1166, 1168 (1981) (quoting Martino v. Fleenor, 148 Colo. 136, 365 P.2d 247 (1961)). However, Idaho courts have not used this public policy to expand the unity of title requirement to allow for it to be satisfied by common ownership in the United States. Specifically, the Idaho...

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