Backstrom v. Iowa Dist. Court for Jones County

• Decision Date: 24 November 1993
• Docket Number: No. 91-1449,91-1449
• Citation: 508 N.W.2d 705
• Parties: Michael BACKSTROM, Plaintiff, v. IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR JONES COUNTY, Defendant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 705

508 N.W.2d 705

Michael BACKSTROM, Plaintiff, v. IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR JONES COUNTY, Defendant.

No. 91-1449.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Nov. 24, 1993.

Philip B. Mears, Mears Law Office, Iowa City, for plaintiff.

Bonnie J. Campbell, Atty. Gen., and William A. Hill, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant.

Considered en banc.

McGIVERIN, Chief Justice.

Plaintiff Michael Backstrom, an inmate at the Iowa Men's Reformatory, was found guilty by a prison disciplinary committee of violating certain prison rules. After Backstrom exhausted his administrative remedies, he filed an application in the defendant district court seeking postconviction relief. His application was denied and we granted appellate review by writ of certiorari. We annul the writ.

I. Background facts and proceedings. On June 1, 1990, Backstrom received a disciplinary notice charging him with smuggling and distributing alcohol within the confines of the prison institution. The prison disciplinary committee heard the matter and found Backstrom guilty of violating institutional rule 10 (dealing in dangerous drugs), rule 11 (felonious conduct), rule 16 (unauthorized possession), and rule 20 (possession of drugs or intoxicants). Based on the disciplinary committee's findings, various sanctions were imposed on Backstrom, including a loss of sixteen days good conduct time. In rendering its decision, the disciplinary committee relied on the evidence of the report of R. Schafer (a staff member of the prison), confidential information (which the committee deemed reliable), its assessment of Backstrom's credibility, and Backstrom's refusal to take a polygraph test.

Following the decision of the prison disciplinary committee, Backstrom administratively appealed the ruling first to the warden, and then to the Director of Corrections. See Iowa Code § 903A.3(2) (1991). Both appeals were unsuccessful.

Backstrom then filed an application for postconviction relief in district court. See Iowa Code §§ 663A.2(6) and 663A.3 (1991). ¹ He claimed in the postconviction court that the prison officials denied his due process rights by (1) failing to give him adequate notice of the charges against him, (2) failing to provide counsel substitute to assist him in the proceedings, (3) disciplining him on the basis of insufficient evidence, and (4) failing to apply the proper standard of proof in its determination that he violated rules of prison conduct.

The district court denied Backstrom's application for postconviction relief, and he appealed.

Because Iowa Code section 663A.9 allows an appellate review from a prison disciplinary ruling resulting in a loss of good conduct time (as was the case here) only by a petition for a writ of certiorari, we treated Backstrom's notice of appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari. We granted his petition and issued the writ.

We note that certiorari is a procedure to test whether a lower board, tribunal, or court exceeded its proper jurisdiction or otherwise acted illegally. Iowa R.Civ.P. 306. It is an action at law and is not triable here de novo. Gibb v. Hansen, 286 N.W.2d 180, 184 (Iowa 1979). When the action alleges violations of basic constitutional safeguards, however, we make our own evaluation of the facts from the totality of the circumstances. Iowa Freedom of Information Council v. Wifvat, 328 N.W.2d 920, 922 (Iowa 1983).

II. Notice of disciplinary charges. Backstrom first contends that the disciplinary notice of alleged violations that he received from the prison officials failed to meet the notice requirement of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution. Specifically, he claims that the notice failed to specify how he smuggled alcohol onto the premises of the institution. He asserts that because the notice included only the time and place of the violation, and not the specific acts that constituted it, he never had a fair opportunity to defend himself. The postconviction court ruled against Backstrom, holding that the notice sufficiently apprised him of the allegations against him. We agree with the court's determination.

The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution requires that prison officials give an inmate subject to discipline proper notice of the charges against him. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2978, 41 L.Ed.2d 935, 936 (1974). We apply this requirement in light of the totality of the circumstances. Picard v. State, 339 N.W.2d 368, 373 (Iowa 1983). Our analysis, reflecting that of the Supreme Court, focuses on whether the prison officials have successfully apprised the inmate of the relevant charges. We look to the time, place and nature of the alleged activity, although we allow officials to delete some facts in the notice to the prisoner if disclosure threatens the security of the institution. For example, prison officials sometimes rely on confidential informants for incriminating information; revelation of certain names or facts may lead the prisoners charged with infractions to retaliate against the informants. See, e.g., Morris v. Auger, 414 N.W.2d 858, 861 (Iowa App.1987) (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 562, 94 S.Ct. at 2978, 41 L.Ed.2d at 954). If prison officials use confidential information in their investigation, however, they must state that fact in the disciplinary notice to the prisoner. Morris, 414 N.W.2d at 860.

In this case, the disciplinary notice provided Backstrom with the exact dates on which the prison officials found the alcoholic beverage containers on prison property. The notice stated that a visitor of another inmate, Kelly Johnson, had placed the alcohol outside the prison walls. It stated that the trash tractor crew, on which Backstrom had been working as a tractor driver, smuggled the alcoholic beverages inside the prison walls for consumption by inmates. The notice also indicated that the prison officials relied on informants whose identities would remain confidential to protect the security, tranquillity, and good order of the institution.

We believe that the disciplinary notice presented enough information to apprise Backstrom of the charges alleged against him and to give Backstrom an opportunity to defend himself against those charges. Although some of the evidentiary information remained confidential, the notice gave Backstrom adequate detail regarding the time, place and nature of his activities. Therefore, we conclude that the notice comported with the requirements of due process.

III. Counsel substitute. Backstrom claims the disciplinary committee's failure to appoint counsel substitute to represent him violated his due process rights under the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution. He contends that appointment of counsel substitute would have improved his chances before the disciplinary committee because the counsel substitute would have had access to the confidential information the committee used in its consideration of his case. The postconviction court denied this claim because it believed Backstrom had sufficient ability to represent himself during his disciplinary proceedings. We agree with the court.

Inmates in disciplinary proceedings have no right to either retained or appointed counsel. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 570, 94 S.Ct. at 2981, 41 L.Ed.2d at 959. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, however, affords them the aid of "counsel substitute"--a prison staff member or a selected inmate--to assist them if they lack the ability to read or if they are faced with particularly complex issues. Id.

Backstrom argues that the right to counsel substitute "includes the right to have help where [prisoners] cannot help themselves." Therefore, he concludes, due process considerations demand the appointment of a counsel substitute, who Backstrom believes would have access to the confidential information that constituted a part of the evidence the committee concluded inculpated him. Thus, counsel substitute, knowing all the facts, would have the ability to represent Backstrom in the manner he deserves.

Backstrom bases his argument on a misconception of the role of counsels substitute. A counsel substitute has no authority to review confidential information in a prison disciplinary proceeding. In Howard v. State, 439 N.W.2d 193, 194 (Iowa 1989), we held that neither inmates nor their attorneys have a right to the confidential information used in prison disciplinary proceedings. This principle applies with even stronger force to counsels substitute, because selected inmates or prison staff members often serve as such counsel. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 570, 94 S.Ct. at 2982, 41 L.Ed.2d at 959. To allow counsel substitute to have access to confidential information in disciplinary proceedings would pose a major threat to the security, tranquillity, and good order of our penal institutions.

Backstrom's claim for counsel substitute also is contrary to a recent ruling of our court of appeals that disciplinary charges which rely on confidential information do not in themselves render a case sufficiently complex to require the appointment of counsel substitute. Sauls v. State, 467 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Iowa App.1990). This holding reflects the reasoning in Wolff.

Here, Backstrom possessed the necessary ability and information to defend himself. The district court found that Backstrom had a high school education plus one year of college and was very articulate. The court also found that the issues in this case were not complex. As discussed above, the disciplinary notice gave enough specificity for Backstrom to claim an alibi or to find witnesses to exculpate him, if he so chose. Even if we characterized the right to counsel substitute as including the right to have help whenever prisoners cannot help themselves--which we decline to do--we believe that Backstrom had all the necessary resources at his disposal. Applying the test we adopted from Wolff, we note that Backstrom...