Bacon v. City of Richmond

Decision Date07 September 2005
Docket NumberNo. CIV. 3:05CV425-HEH.,CIV. 3:05CV425-HEH.
Citation386 F.Supp.2d 700
PartiesChristopher BACON, et al. Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF RICHMOND, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia

David Denman Hopper, Cook Heyward Lee Hopper & Feehan PC, Richmond, VA, Benjamin M. Stern, Cynthia D. Vreeland, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP, Boston, MA, Christopher Davies, Christopher J. Herrling, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

Beverly Joanne Agee Burton, Office of the City Attorney, Kimberly Friend Smith, Bradford Allen King, Harrell & Chambliss LLP, William Delaney Bayliss, Edward James Dillon, Jr., Williams Mullen, Richmond, VA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

(Denying Defendants' Motions to Dismiss)

HUDSON, District Judge.

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants City of Richmond (the "City"), L. Douglas Wilder (the "Mayor"), the City Council of Richmond's (the "City Council") (collectively hereinafter the "City Defendants") Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) ("Rule 12(b)(6)"), and Defendant City of Richmond School Board's (the "School Board") Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) and (6). All of the parties have filed memoranda of law in support of their respective positions and oral argument was heard on September 1, 2005.

I. Background

Plaintiffs Christopher Bacon ("Bacon"); "D.B." ("D.B.") suing by and through his mother and next friend Vicky Beatty ("Beatty"), Beatty in her individual capacity; and Citizens for Full Access in Richmond ("C-FAIR") (collectively hereinafter "Plaintiffs") filed this suit against Defendants and the School Board alleging violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131-12134 (the "ADA"); § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (the "RA"); and the Virginians with Disabilities Act of 1985, Va.Code § 51.5 et seq. (the "VDA"). Each of the Plaintiffs are either disabled or has a disabled child, and is a member of C-FAIR, an organization comprised of citizens of Richmond who are concerned with the rights of persons with disabilities. Plaintiffs have filed this suit seeking redress for the alleged shortfalls of the school system's handicap accessibility.

According to the Complaint, these shortfalls were identified in surveys required by the ADA to identify accessibility improvements dictated by Title II, conducted in both 1992 and 2005. The 1992 survey revealed that none of the City's fifty-seven schools fully complied with the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, nor the VDA. The 2005 study indicated that none of the previously identified schools from the 1992 survey, that are in current use, have been brought into full compliance. Of the sixty school facilities surveyed in 2005, fifty-six did not appear to comply with these accessibility standards. The surveys did not include an evaluation of school playgrounds and athletic facilities, which Plaintiffs contend are also non-compliant. Allegedly only four schools met all ADA, RA, and VDA standards.

Plaintiff Bacon is a father of two daughters who attend Richmond Community High School ("RCHS") and Albert Hill Middle School. He lost both of his legs during the Vietnam War, and depends on a wheelchair for mobility. His daughters' schools are alleged to have inadequate handicap accessibility, leaving Bacon unable to attend school events. RCHS has four stories, yet no elevator. Therefore, Bacon contends that he is not able to enter the second or third levels, or the basement. According to the Complaint, on two occasions, Bacon has left his wheelchair behind, and hopped up and down the stairs using his arms in order to meet with teachers. Further, Bacon states that he has had difficulty picking his children up from school because the handicapped accessible door is locked after-school, while the non-handicapped accessible door is left unlocked. Bacon is therefore forced to wait for someone to enter or exit the building.

Plaintiffs Vicki Beatty and her son, D.B., have also allegedly been adversely effected by deficient handicap accommodation. D.B. would ordinarily attend William Fox Elementary School ("Fox Elementary") with his brother, which is located five blocks away from his home. Instead, he is bused to John B. Cary Elementary School ("Cary Elementary"), which is located outside of his school zone and is alleged to be only partially handicapped accessible. As a result of being bused to a school out of his neighborhood, D.B. is routinely late for class. He also alleges that he has had difficulty making friends with children in his neighborhood since he does not attend the same school. Further, he states that he has not been able to attend functions held at other schools in the City of Richmond, like his brother's theater performance, because of their lack of handicap accommodations. His mother, Beatty, also claims to have faced difficulty participating in the Fox Elementary's PTA because she has not been able to find a babysitter for D.B., and has difficulty transporting him into the school because there are no handicap ramps.

To address the shortfalls identified in the 2005 survey, the School Board allegedly established an ADA Subcommittee to develop a plan of action for remedying the identified deficiencies. In March 2005, the ADA Subcommittee presented the School Board with a three year plan to bring the schools into compliance. The School Board adopted the plan and incorporated it into its Capital Improvement Plan proposed for the City's next budget. The Complaint maintains that the Mayor and City Council, however, rejected the Capital Improvement Plan Budget. According to Plaintiffs, the Mayor and City Council approved a budget with almost no funding to correct the school's handicap accommodation deficiencies. This lawsuit followed, seeking a permanent injunction to require the schools to make the necessary changes to accommodate the needs of the disabled.

II. Analysis
A. Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1)
1. Standing of Plaintiffs Beatty and C-FAIR

The threshold issue is whether Plaintiffs have standing to prosecute the claims asserted. The City Defendants challenge the standing of Plaintiffs Beatty and C-FAIR, arguing that Beatty cannot raise an independent claim because she is not disabled, and C-FAIR cannot bring suit in its representational capacity. The School Board further questions Plaintiffs' ability to claim injury as to all handicap inaccessible schools in the City of Richmond and argue instead, that the injuries claimed should be limited to the four schools that Plaintiffs are attending or in which there is a direct impact. These contentions require the Court to determine whether it has jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1).1

The doctrine of standing derives from Article III of the Constitution, which precludes federal courts from issuing advisory opinions, and instead, limits their jurisdiction to actual cases and controversies. The essence of our inquiry into standing focuses on whether Plaintiffs are proper parties to initiate suit. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818, 117 S.Ct. 2312, 2317, 138 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997). To establish standing, Plaintiffs must demonstrate: (1) an injury-in-fact that is concrete and particularized; (2) that the injury was caused by the conduct complained of; and (3) that such injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992).

The City Defendants maintain that Beatty and CFAIR are not disabled, and therefore, do not have standing. The Court is of the opinion that Beatty is a proper plaintiff. She has standing to bring a claim in both an independent and representational capacity under the ADA. "A public entity shall not exclude or otherwise deny equal services, programs, or activities to an individual or entity because of the known disability of an individual with whom the individual or entity is known to have a relationship or association." 28 C.F.R. 35.130(g). She has standing in her representational capacity under the RA and VDA in that she is suing as her minor child's next friend. See Rule 17; see also Va Code Ann. § 8.01-8.

C-FAIR has standing in its representational capacity with respect to the claims asserted under the ADA and the RA. The ADA grants relief to entities as well as individuals. Addiction Specialists, Inc. v. The Township of Hampton, 411 F.3d 399, 405 (3rd Cir.2005). And the enforcement provision of the ADA and RA do not limit relief to "qualified individuals with disabilities." Innovative Health Sys., Inc. v. City of White Plains, 117 F.3d 37, 47 (2nd Cir.1997).

Here, C-FAIR has associational standing to sue on behalf of its interested members in that (1) its members, such as Bacon, Beatty and D.B., have standing to sue in their individual capacities; (2) the interests at stake are germane to the group's purpose of securing equal opportunity for persons with disabilities to participate in all areas of public life in the City of Richmond; and (3) neither the claims made nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the suit. See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 2441, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977); See also White Tail Park, Inc. v. Stroube, 413 F.3d 451, 458 (4th Cir.2005). Thus, C-FAIR may represent the interests of its effected members under Count One and Two of the Complaint.

C-FAIR, however, does not have standing to present a claim under the VDA. Under Virginia law, persons or entities only acquire standing to sue in a representational capacity by asserting the rights of another when specifically authorized by statute. Carnes v. Board of Supervisors of Chesterfield County, 252 Va. 377, 383, 478 S.E.2d 295 (1996). Since the VDA Act does not provide for associational representation, C-FAIR, therefore, lacks...

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