Bacon v. City of Richmond, Virginia

• Citation: 475 F.3d 633
• Decision Date: 23 January 2007
• Docket Number: No. 06-1347.,No. 06-1594.,06-1347.,06-1594.
• Parties: Christopher BACON; D.B., the infant who sues by and through his mother and next friend Vicki Beatty; Vicki Beatty; Citizens for Full Access in Richmond, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. CITY OF RICHMOND, VIRGINIA; L. Douglas Wilder, Jr., in his official capacity as Mayor of Richmond, Virginia; City Council of Richmond, Virginia, Defendants-Appellants, School Board of the City of Richmond, Virginia, Defendant-Amicus Curiae. Virginia Municipal League; Local Government Attorneys of Virginia, Incorporated, Amici Supporting Appellants, Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy, Commonwealth of Virginia; Paralyzed Veterans of America, Amici Supporting Appellees. Christopher Bacon; D.B., the infant who sues by and through his mother and next friend Vicki Beatty; Vicki Beatty; Citizens for Full Access in Richmond, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. City of Richmond, Virginia; L. Douglas Wilder, Jr., in his official capacity as Mayor of Richmond, Virginia; City Council of Richmond, Virginia, Defendants-Appellees, School Board of the City of Richmond, Virginia, Defendant-Amicus Curiae. Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy, Commonwealth of Virginia; Paralyzed Veterans of America, Amici Supporting Appellants, Virginia Municipal League; Local Government Attorneys of Virginia, Incorporated, Amici Supporting Appellees.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)

475 F.3d 633

Christopher BACON; D.B., the infant who sues by and through his mother and next friend Vicki Beatty; Vicki Beatty; Citizens for Full Access in Richmond, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. CITY OF RICHMOND, VIRGINIA; L. Douglas Wilder, Jr., in his official capacity as Mayor of Richmond, Virginia; City Council of Richmond, Virginia, Defendants-Appellants, School Board of the City of Richmond, Virginia, Defendant-Amicus Curiae.

Virginia Municipal League; Local Government Attorneys of Virginia, Incorporated, Amici Supporting Appellants,

Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy, Commonwealth of Virginia; Paralyzed Veterans of America, Amici Supporting Appellees.

Christopher Bacon; D.B., the infant who sues by and through his mother and next friend Vicki Beatty; Vicki Beatty; Citizens for Full Access in Richmond, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. City of Richmond, Virginia; L. Douglas Wilder, Jr., in his official capacity as Mayor of Richmond, Virginia; City Council of Richmond, Virginia, Defendants-Appellees, School Board of the City of Richmond, Virginia, Defendant-Amicus Curiae.

Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy, Commonwealth of Virginia; Paralyzed Veterans of America, Amici Supporting Appellants,

Virginia Municipal League; Local Government Attorneys of Virginia, Incorporated, Amici Supporting Appellees.

No. 06-1347.

No. 06-1594.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued November 29, 2006.

Decided January 23, 2007.

ARGUED: David J. Freedman, Assistant City Attorney, City Attorney's Office for the City of Richmond, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellants/Cross-Appellees. Joseph J. Mueller, Wilmer, Cutler, Pickering, Hale & Dorr, L.L.P., Boston, Massachusetts, for Appellees/Cross-Appellants. ON BRIEF: Beverly Agee Burton, Senior Assistant City Attorney, City Attorney's Office for the City of Richmond,

Richmond, Virginia, for Appellants/Cross-Appellees. David D. Hopper, Cook, Heyward, Lee, Hopper & Feehan, P.C., Richmond, Virginia; Cynthia D. Vreeland, Wilmer, Cutler, Pickering, Hale & Dorr, L.L.P., Boston, Massachusetts; Christopher Davies, Wilmer, Cutler, Pickering, Hale & Dorr, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for Appellees/Cross-Appellants. William D. Bayliss, Edward J. Dillon, Williams Mullen, P.C., Richmond, Virginia, for Amicus Curiae School Board of the City of Richmond, Virginia. William S. Mailander, Michael P. Horan, Paralyzed Veterans of America, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae Paralyzed Veterans of America. Julie C. Kegley, Steven M. Traubert, Commonwealth of Virginia, Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy, Richmond, Virginia, for Amicus Curiae The Commonwealth of Virginia, Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy. L. Lee Byrd, Sharon E. Pandak, Jeffrey H. Geiger, Sands, Anderson, Marks & Miller, P.C., for Amici Curiae Virginia Municipal League and Local Government Attorneys of Virginia, Inc.

Before WILKINSON and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and JOSEPH R. GOODWIN, United States District Judge for the Southern District of West Virginia, sitting by designation.

Reversed by published opinion. Judge WILKINSON wrote the opinion, in which Judge DUNCAN and Judge GOODWIN joined.

OPINION

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge.

In this case we are asked to decide whether a city may be required to fund a federal court order mandating the system-wide retrofitting of city schools, under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-34 (2000), without any determination that the city discriminated against or otherwise excluded plaintiffs from its services and activities. Recognizing the fundamental precept that remedies may be imposed only upon a party judged liable for some harm, we reverse the judgment of the district court. To impose a funding obligation on the city in the absence of any underlying finding of liability would disrespect the long-standing structure of local government and impair the Commonwealth's ability to structure its state institutions and run its schools.

I.

This case arises out of a settlement agreement in which the Richmond City School Board agreed to retrofit fifty-six of its sixty school buildings and to make approximately $23 million in capital improvements over five years. Plaintiffs, primarily disabled school children and their families, seek equal access to Richmond school buildings and to the services, programs, and activities conducted therein. They sued the Richmond City School Board as well as the City of Richmond, the Richmond City Council, and the Mayor of Richmond under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-34 (2000), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000), and the Virginians with Disabilities Act, Va.Code Ann. § 51.5-1 et seq. (2005). Plaintiffs alleged that fifty-six of Richmond's sixty public schools violated the ADA's structural accessibility guidelines and requested system-wide injunctive relief.

The schools at issue here were constructed prior to 1992, the year that the ADA became effective. In 1992, the School Board commissioned an architectural study to evaluate structural compliance with the ADA. This study revealed accessibility barriers and recommended a series of retrofitting projects designed to bring pre-1992 buildings into compliance with Title II. The school system made various improvements to Richmond Public School buildings but did not fully implement the 1992 study.

In 2004, the School Board commissioned Trice Architects to conduct a second ADA compliance study. In its January 2005 report, Trice Architects identified a variety of barriers to access, including a lack of wheelchair ramps, elevators, handrails, and wheelchair-accessible bathrooms. After receiving the study, the School Board formed an ADA Subcommittee that developed a three-year remediation plan and called for ADA-related capital improvements beginning in the 2005-06 school year.

On May 31, 2005, the City Council adopted its 2006 capital improvements budget. That budget allocated $2 million in capital improvement funds to the Richmond Public Schools for fiscal year 2006 and $21.6 million over the next five years. Plaintiffs filed suit on June 14, 2005. They argued that the budget provided almost no funding to correct the school's disability accommodation deficiencies. For its part, the City contended that the School Board failed to bring the ADA noncompliance to its attention in a timely fashion and also that the School Board had surplus capital funds sufficient to fund the first year of ADA remediation.

After the district court denied defendants' motions to dismiss plaintiffs' ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, Bacon v. City of Richmond, 386 F.Supp.2d 700, 706-08 (E.D.Va.2005), the School Board settled with plaintiffs. The School Board first conceded that the Richmond Public Schools did not comply with federal and state disability laws. It then agreed with plaintiffs that the appropriate remedy was to "bring the Richmond Public Schools into compliance with the Disability Laws" by executing the remediation plan proposed by the ADA Subcommittee within five years. The School Board also agreed to pay $45,000 in attorneys' fees and costs and to "use its best efforts to obtain the funding necessary to fully implement [the Settlement] Agreement." The Settlement Agreement, however, provided that the School Board's obligations were "contingent on" the School Board "receiving funding from the City of Richmond."

The City and plaintiffs then filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The City contended that, because Virginia law vests the School Board with exclusive control over City schools, it was not responsible for the ADA violations. Plaintiffs maintained that since the City provided capital funding to the Richmond schools it was critical to the Settlement Agreement and thus a necessary party. The district court agreed with plaintiffs. It granted summary judgment in their favor and ordered the City to "ensure that the Richmond City Public Schools become ADA-compliant" within five years. Bacon v. City of Richmond, 419 F.Supp.2d 849, 855 (E.D.Va.2006) [hereinafter Bacon II]. In this connection, the district court imposed upon the City a funding obligation, directing the City to make "a reasonable, good faith appropriation to the School Board in the normal course of the budget process, sufficient to enable ADA compliance within the specified time frame." Id. The district court denied plaintiffs' subsequent petition for attorneys' fees. Both parties now appeal.

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo resolving all doubts and inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Rodriguez v. Smithfield Packing Co., 338 F.3d 348, 354 (4th Cir.2003). When faced with cross-motions for summary judgment, we consider "each motion separately on its own merits to determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law." Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th Cir.2003) (internal quotations omitted). Although decisions relating to injunctive relief are normally reviewed for abuse of discretion, the court's review is de novo where the disputed issue is a question of law. Va. Carolina Tools, Inc. v. Int'l Tool Supply, Inc., 984 F.2d 113, 116 (4th Cir.1993) (quoting Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 757, 106 S.Ct. 2169, 90 L.Ed.2d 779 (1986)).

II.

Our legal system is built on the foundational principle that remedies are a means of redressing wrongs. As the Supreme Court has long made clear, a remedy must be tailored to a violation. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1, 16, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971). "As with any equity case, the nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy." Id. Remedies, in other words, do not exist in the abstract; rather, they flow from and are the consequence of some wrong. At its most basic, this principle limits the reach of judicial decrees to parties found liable for a...