Bacon v. State
| Decision Date | 14 July 1952 |
| Docket Number | No. 17881,17881 |
| Citation | 71 S.E.2d 615,209 Ga. 261 |
| Parties | BACON v. STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
On a prosecution for a particular crime, evidence which in any manner shows or tends to show that the accused has committed another crime wholly distinct, independent, and separate from that for which he is on trial, even though it be a crime of the same sort, is irrelevant and inadmissible, unless there be shown some logical connection between the two from which it can be said that proof of the one tends to establish the other.
This case is here on certiorari from the Court of Appeals, and involves the question of whether the State is permitted to introduce in evidence previous convictions of similar offenses against one who is on trial charged with crime. In the instant case the defendant was on trial charged with the offense of burglary, alleged in the indictment to have been committed on December 21, 1950. The trial court admitted in evidence, over the objection of counsel for the defendant that it was permitting the State to place the defendant's character in issue when the defendant had not done so, three accusations from the City Court of Savannah, charging attempt to commit burglary with verdicts of guilty thereon, dated respectively November 24, 1950, December 29, 1950, and March 15, 1951, and three accusations for the crime of burglary, in Chatham Superior Court, with pleas of guilty thereon, dated April 13, 1946. The Court of Appeals, by a divided bench, affirmed the ruling of the trial court, Bacon v. State, 85 Ga.App. 630, 70 S.E.2d 54, holding that this evidence was admissible, under an exception to the general rule, for the purpose of showing intent to steal on the part of the defendant, and it is this portion of the opinion that is assigned as error by the present petition for certiorari.
Joseph B. Cramer, Savannah, for plaintiff in error.
Andrew J. Ryan, Jr., Sol. Gen., Savannah, for defendant in error.
HAWKINS, Justice (after stating the foregoing facts.)
It is a fundamental principle in our system of jurisprudence, intended to protect the individual who is charged with crime, and to insure him of a fair and impartial trial before an unbiased jury, that the general character of the defendant and his conduct in other transactions is irrelevant unless the defendant chooses to put his character in issue. Code, §§ 38-201, 38-202; Green v. State, 172 Ga. 635, 158 S.E. 285; Hunter v. State, 188 Ga. 215, 3 S.E.2d 729. It is universally recognized--and by the Court of Appeals in this case--that 'The general rule is that, on a prosecution for a particular crime, evidence which in any manner shows, or tends to show, that the accused has committed another crime wholly independent from that for which he is on trial, even though it be a crime of the same sort, is irrelevant and inadmissible'. (Italics ours.) Williams v. State, 152 Ga. 498, 521, 110 S.E. 286, 296; Cawthon v. State, 119 Ga. 395, 46 S.E. 897; Frank v. State, 141 Ga. 243, 80 S.E. 1016.
In Cox v. State, 165 Ga. 145, 139 S.E. 861, the general rule is stated as follows: 'When one is on trial charged with the commission of a crime, proof of a distinct, independent, and separate offense is never admissible, unless there is some logical connection between the two, from which it can be said that proof of the one tends to establish the other' (italics ours); and this decision then points out certain exceptions to the general rule, among them being when the extraneous crime tends to prove malice, intent, motive, or the like, if such an element enters into the offense charged. It is under this exception to the general rule that the Court of Appeals has held that the six other convictions of the defendant of the crimes of attempt to commit burglary and burglary were admissible for the purpose of showing an intent to steal on the part of the defendant on the occasion under investigation, since the intent to steal is an essential element of the crime of burglary. For a statement of various exceptions to the general rule and an exhaustive citation of authorities bearing thereon see the dissenting opinion of Judge Townsend in Hodges v. State, 85 Ga.App. 617, 622, 70 S.E.2d 48.
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Williams v. State
...connection between the two from which it can be said that proof of the one tends to establish Page 89 the other." Bacon v. State, 209 Ga. 261, 71 S.E.2d 615 (1952). The reasons for excluding evidence of other crimes are well known. "Courts that follow the common-law tradition almost unanimo......
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Ailstock v. State, 61822
...and his conduct in other transactions is irrelevant unless the defendant chooses to put his character in issue." Bacon v. State, 209 Ga. 261, 262, 71 S.E.2d 615 (1952). "Whenever the defendant puts his good character in issue as a fact, the State has the privilege of disproving this fact, .......
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Smith v. State
...Judge, concur. 1. OCGA § 24-1-2. 2. OCGA § 24-2-2. 3. (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Bacon v. State, 209 Ga. 261, 262, 71 S.E.2d 615 (1952); see Stephens v. State, 261 Ga. 467, 469(6), 405 S.E.2d 483 (1991). 4. (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis in orig......
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Belt v. State
...the carefully constructed procedure was expressed much earlier, as pointed out with reference to prior authority in Bacon v. State, 209 Ga. 261, 262, 71 S.E.2d 615 (1952). The Supreme Court stated succinctly in Bacon: "It is a fundamental principle in our system of jurisprudence, intended t......
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Evidence - Marc T. Treadwell
...S.E.2d at 443-44. 17. . Id. 18. . Id. at 209, 538 S.E.2d at 445. 19. . Id. 20. . Id. 21. . Id. 22. . Id. at 212, 538 S.E.2d at 447. 23. . 209 Ga. 261, 71 S.E.2d 615 (1952). 24. . Davis v. State, 244 Ga. App. 708, 712, 536 S.E.2d 596, 600 (2000) (quoting Bacon v. State, 209 Ga. 261, 262, 71 ......