Baday v. Kings Cnty.
| Decision Date | 18 October 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1:20-cv-00644-ADA-SKO |
| Parties | KARLA BADAY, Plaintiff, v. KINGS COUNTY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
On May 6, 2020, Plaintiff filed a complaint asserting six causes of action against two groups of defendants: (1) Kings County and certain county officials (hereinafter “County Defendants”), and (2) Adventist Health Hanford and Georganne Greene, a nurse who works at Adventist Health (hereinafter “Health Defendants”). (ECF No. 1.) On July 20, 2020, County Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the claims against them. (ECF No. 14.) Health Defendants filed their own amended motion to dismiss on August 4, 2020. (ECF No. 17.) After filing an opposition to County Defendants' motion, Plaintiff sought leave to amend the complaint to address the pleading deficiencies regarding County Defendants, which the Magistrate Judge granted. (ECF No. 22.) Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint (FAC) on September 3, 2020, and County Defendants withdrew their motion to dismiss. (ECF Nos. 23, 25.)
On September 9, 2020, Plaintiff filed an opposition to Health Defendants' motion. (ECF No. 26.) Health Defendants replied on September 17, 2020. (ECF No. 29.) Plaintiff then filed the Second Amended Complaint (SAC) on February 17, 2021 in order to address certain deficiencies regarding the claims against County Defendants. (ECF No. 39.) On February 18, 2021, pursuant to stipulation of the parties, the Magistrate Judge dismissed Defendant Daniel Brown, a physician at Adventist Health, from the proceedings. (ECF No. 41.) County Defendants proceeded to file an answer on March 23, 2021. (ECF No. 33.)
Plaintiff's SAC states the following claims against Health Defendants. A claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against both Adventist Health and Ms. Greene (Claim 1); aMonell claim under section 1983 against Adventist Health only (Claim 2); a claim for supervisory liability under section 1983 against Adventist Health only (Claim 3); a claim for negligence under California state law against both Adventist Health and Ms. Greene (Claim 4); a claim under California Government Code section 815.2 against Adventist Health only (Claim 5); and a claim under California Civil Code section 52.1 against both Adventist Health and Ms. Greene (Claim 6).
The procedural history of this case presents an unusual situation. Plaintiff's SAC superseded both the initial complaint and FAC, and the Court, therefore, treats the earlier complaints as if they do not exist. See Ramirez v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, 806 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2015). The filing of an amended complaint would ordinarily moot a previously filed motion to dismiss, like the one at issue in this case. LeBarron v. Interstate Group, LLC, No. 2:19-CV-1739 JCM (DJA), 2020 WL 2615900, at *3 (D. Nev. May 22, 2020). When the amended complaint is substantially identical to the original, however, a court can rule on the motion to dismiss with reference to the amended complaint. Id. “It would be futile to dismiss [a defendant's] motion without prejudice, only to have [the defendant] refile another motion to dismiss with effectively the same arguments.” MMG Ins. Co. v. Podiatry Ins. Co. of America, 263 F.Supp.3d 327, 331 (D. Me. 2017).
Here, Health Defendants filed their motion to dismiss after the FAC, but before the SAC. In her request to the court to permit the filing of the SAC, Plaintiff noted that the amendments to the FAC clarified only the allegations against County Defendants for deficient policies and procedures. (ECF No. 36 at 2.) The SAC also added Deputy District Attorney Anna Marie Samardich Tyner as a Defendant. (Id.) The allegations pertaining to Health Defendants are, therefore, substantially identical to those in the FAC. Additionally, the parties filed a Joint Status Report on September 9, 2022, in which they assert that the pending motion to dismiss is fully briefed and still at issue. (ECF No. 59 at 3.) Based on this, the Court will proceed in addressing Health Defendants' motion to dismiss with reference to the Second Amended Complaint.
The claims in this matter arise from Plaintiff's wrongful conviction in 2002 for sexually abusing her girlfriend's three minor children. At the time of the abuse allegations, Plaintiff and her girlfriend, Maria Medina, had been together for two years and jointly cared for Ms. Medina's children, including then seven-year-old Karina, six-year-old Graciela, and three-year-old Fabian. (ECF No. 39 at ¶ 20.) On February 8, 2002, Karina and Graciela told Ms. Medina that Plaintiff had inappropriately touched them and Fabian six days before, while Ms. Medina was at the store. (Id. at ¶ 22.) That same day, Ms. Medina brought her children to the Kings County Sheriff's Office, where they described the alleged abuse to a deputy. (Id. at ¶ 24.) The following day, Ms. Medina took her children to Adventist Health Hanford for an interview with the Sexual Assault Response Team (SART). (Id. at ¶ 27.) Kings County had contracted with Adventist Health to provide forensic examination, analysis, and testimony regarding alleged sexual abuse. (Id. at ¶ 14.) Georgeanne Green, the assigned SART nurse, decided not to conduct a physical examination, after determining that the children were too agitated. (Id.)
About a month later, Ms. Medina's children returned to the hospital for a physical examination with Ms. Greene. (Id. at ¶ 28.) The Deputy District Attorney assigned to the case reviewed, approved, and ratified this visit. (Id.) During the examinations, Ms. Greene documented several physical abnormalities in each of the children. (Id. at ¶¶ 30, 31.) According to Plaintiff, Ms. Greene's findings did not provide evidence of physical abuse or prior injury. (Id.) Ms. Greene also asked each child to describe the alleged abuse. (Id. at ¶ 29.) Contravening established procedures for this type of investigation, Ms. Greene failed to interview the children in their primary language. (Id. at ¶ 40.) She also conducted the interview without the assistance of a trained forensic interviewer. (Id.) Even though Ms. Greene videotaped the interviews and examinations, she did not provide the videotape to Plaintiff or her attorneys until years after Plaintiff's conviction. (Id. at ¶ 41.)
Less than two months after Ms. Greene's examinations, the Kings County District Attorney filed an information charging Plaintiff with three counts of lewd and lascivious acts on a child under fourteen, two counts of forcible sexual penetration, and three counts of terrorist threats. (Id. at ¶ 32.) The District Attorney's case against Plaintiff hinged almost entirely on Ms. Greene's medical opinions and the testimony of Karina and Graciela. (Id. at ¶ 35.) Ms. Greene testified to the content of the children's prior statements. (Id. at ¶¶ 37-39.) She also testified about the physical examinations she performed, asserting that the injuries to Graciela and Fabian were consistent with their descriptions of sexual abuse. (Id.) After a two-day trial, the jury convicted Plaintiff of all eight counts, and the judge sentenced her to forty-five years to life. (Id. at ¶ 44.) Fifteen years later, Plaintiff filed a writ of habeas corpus, asserting that she had suffered a wrongful conviction. (Id. at ¶ 45.) The Kings County District Attorney stipulated to the reversal of Plaintiff's convictions on the basis of newly discovered evidence, and a trial court reversed Plaintiff's sexual abuse convictions. (Id.) Plaintiff eventually pled guilty to three counts of false imprisonment and received credit for time served. (Id.)
The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. N. StarInt'lv. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983). “Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A claim for relief must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Though Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff is required to allege “enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” BellAtl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In determining whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the court accepts as true the allegations in the complaint and construes the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). It is inappropriate to assume that the plaintiff “can prove facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
To begin, the Court must address two features of Plaintiff's section 1983 allegations. First, Plaintiff names Adventist Health as a defendant under the first two claims of relief (1) liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and...
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