Baden Bank of St. Louis v. Trapp
| Decision Date | 06 June 1944 |
| Docket Number | 26611 |
| Citation | 180 S.W.2d 755 |
| Parties | THE BADEN BANK OF ST. LOUIS, a Corporation, (Plaintiff) Respondent, v. IRENE R. TRAPP, IVA REAVES, and BONNY MAY REAVES, Defendants, IRENE R. TRAPP and IVA REAVES, (Defendants) Appellants |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Circuit Court, St. Louis County. Hon. Raymond E LaDriere, Judge.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
W. E. Bennick
This is an interpleader suit which was brought by The Baden Bank of St. Louis for the purpose of having an adjudication of conflicting claims as between two of its depositors on the one hand, and a garnishing creditor on the other, with respect to the ownership of certain money on deposit in the bank.
The defendant depositors are Irene R. Trapp and Iva Reaves, while the defendant garnishing creditor is Bonny May Reaves. Irene R. Trapp is the daughter of Iva Reaves, while Bonny May Reaves is or was the daughter-in-law of Iva Reaves, being the divorced wife of the latter's son, Donald Reaves.
The controversy between the rival claimants grows out of the contention of Bonny May Reaves that the money on deposit in the names of Irene R. Trapp and Iva Reaves is actually the property of her divorced husband, Donald Reaves, so as to be subject to garnishment in the hands of the bank in aid of an execution issued upon the, divorce decree which had required Donald Reaves to make certain payments for the support of the two minor children of himself and Bonny May Reaves.
The two depositors, Irene R. Trapp and Iva Reaves, filed separate demurrers to the bank's petition upon the principal ground that it failed to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action for interpleader. Defendant Bonny May Reaves, so far as the record discloses, did not contest the sufficiency of the petition. The court thereafter overruled the demurrers, and rendered judgment sustaining the petition and requiring the defendants to interplead. Following the entry of such judgment, defendants Irene R. Trapp and Iva Reaves have prosecuted their appeal to this court, where they stand upon the single point, that from the facts appearing on the face of the petition, the bank is not entitled to maintain the suit.
A suit in interpleader is an equitable remedy, which, generally speaking, may be resorted to where two or more persons severally claim the same debt, duty, or thing from the complainant under different titles or in different interests, and the complainant, claiming no title or interest for himself, and not knowing to which of the claimants he should render the debt or duty or deliver the property, is either molested by an action brought against him, or else is in fear that he may suffer injury from the conflicting claims advanced against him unless the claimants are all brought into court and required to interplead their several claims so that the court, with all the claimants before it, may adjudicate their respective claims and determine which of them has the right to be awarded the matter or thing in controversy. W. A. Ross Const. Co. v. Chiles, 344 Mo. 1084, 130 S.W.2d 524; Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Sheehan, Mo.App., 100 S.W.2d 57.
However, it is not enough to sustain a suit in interpleader that the complainant merely show that rival claims are being made to the fund or thing in his possession, but instead he must show that the contentions of the respective claimants are of such a nature as to create a reasonable doubt regarding which of them is in the right. If it appears that one of them has a valid right, and that the claims of the others are clearly without merit, so that the complainant may be discharged from all liability by making payment to the one who has the valid right, then obviously the basis for interpleader will not exist, and the petition setting forth such facts will fail to state a cause of action. Meredith v. Meredith, 235 Mo.App. 1010, 148 S.W.2d 611; United Railways Co. v. O'Connor, 153 Mo.App. 128, 132 S.W. 262. And of course, even though the facts may be such as to give rise to the right of interpleader, the complainant is nevertheless not entitled to maintain an independent suit in interpleader where there is a proceeding pending against him in which he may have complete relief with full protection to himself by asking that all the claimants be made parties to the end that their respective claims may be adjudicated.
In the case at bar, the petition recited that on June 18, 1943, Irene R. Trapp and Iva Reaves were depositors in the bank, the former having a checking account of $ 255.10 and a savings account of $ 112.50, and the latter a checking account of $ 1,735.87.
It was then recited that on that day, that is, on June 18, 1943, the bank received notice by letter and by an affidavit by an attorney for Bonny May Reeves that the said Bonny May Reaves was the owner and holder of a judgment against Donald Reaves in the sum of $ 1,743 with interest and costs, and that whatever funds were on deposit in the names of Irene R. Trapp and Iva Reaves were in reality the funds of Donald Reaves.
It was then alleged that on June 19, 1943, the bank was summoned as garnishee under an execution issued in favor of Bonny May Reaves against Donald Reaves, the effect of which was to attach all money or evidences of debt which the bank had in its possession belonging to Donald Reaves.
Following the allegation respecting the institution of the garnishment proceeding, the petition then recited that on June 23, 1943, the bank received written notice by registered mail from Iva Reaves that the funds on deposit in her name were her sole property, and were to be paid to her under threat of an action for damages against the bank in the event of its failure to honor her demand. It was further alleged that on the same day the bank received written notice by registered mail from Irene R. Trapp in which she stated that there had been two deposits of $ 100 each to the credit of her account, which money was to be used by her to make payments every two weeks to Bonny May Reaves in satisfaction of the judgment against Donald Reaves for the support of the two minor children; that certain checks had been drawn against her account to pay Bonny May Reaves on account of such judgment; but that a portion of the account belonged to herself and her husband, and was to be paid over to her by the bank under threat of an action for damages in the event of its refusal to honor her demand.
The bank then alleged its disinterest in the controversy and its willingness to pay over the amount of $ 1,743 claimed by Bonny May Reaves to whomsoever of the rival claimants was entitled to the money, but being in doubt as to which of the claimants should receive the fund, it prayed, among other things, that it be discharged from any and all liability upon the payment of the total of the deposits into court; that defendants be required to interplead among themselves, and be permanently enjoined from instituting or prosecuting any suit or proceeding against the bank for the money on deposit; and that pending the final determination of the suit, Bonny May Reaves be enjoined from proceeding further with the garnishment proceeding wherein the bank had been summoned as garnishee.
The issues presented on this appeal involve the question, not only of whether the petition, on its face, shows a proper case for interpleader, but also of whether, if the bank has a case for interpleader, its cause of action is one to be maintained by an independent suit in equity as it has sought to do, or instead is one to be asserted and tried out as an incident of the garnishment proceeding which is already pending against it. A bill in equity is necessarily demurrable unless it shows the complainant to be entitled to the aid of a court of equity; and where the bill shows on its face that the complainant has a complete and adequate remedy at law which will afford him full relief, it states no cause of action for equitable cognizance, and a timely demurrer should be sustained. Martin v. Greene, 10 Mo. 652.
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