Baden v. Staples

• Decision Date: 24 October 1978
• Citation: 410 N.Y.S.2d 808,45 N.Y.2d 889,383 N.E.2d 110
• Parties: , 383 N.E.2d 110 Robert BADEN et al., Respondents, v. Scott STAPLES et al., Appellants.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 808

410 N.Y.S.2d 808

45 N.Y.2d 889, 383 N.E.2d 110

Robert BADEN et al., Respondents, v. Scott STAPLES et al., Appellants.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Oct. 24, 1978.

Thomas R. Newman, Mark L. Rosen and Susan A. Shafer, New York City, for appellants.

Herman Schmertz and Jerome I. Katz, New York City, for respondents.

OPINION OF THE COURT

PER CURIAM.

The issue is whether Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99, 216 N.E.2d 312 should be overruled. The issue is not new for the court; it has been raised with frequency in the 12 years since the Seider case was first decided (see Donawitz v. Danek, 42 N.Y.2d 138, 397 N.Y.S.2d 592, 366 N.E.2d 253; Neuman v. Dunham, 39 N.Y.2d 999, 387 N.Y.S.2d 240, 355 N.E.2d 294; Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633, 234 N.E.2d 669, mot. for rearg. den. 21 N.Y.2d 990, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914, 238 N.E.2d 319). Considerations of Stare decisis and institutional stability, absent compelling grounds to the contrary, require that this challenge, like the others, be rejected.

In this negligence action, plaintiffs seek recovery for personal injuries arising out of a collision between the automobile in which they were riding and one owned by defendant Dean Staples and driven by defendant Scott Staples. Defendants are residents of New Hampshire, where the accident took place. Plaintiffs, although the driver plaintiff Robert Baden had exhibited a Florida operator's license at the time of the accident, are apparently residents of New York.

Personal jurisdiction over defendants is not available in New York. Plaintiffs instead seek to obtain jurisdiction by attaching the insurance obligation owed defendants by their liability insurance carrier, St. Paul Insurance Company, a corporation doing business in New York. This procedure was, of course, first sanctioned in Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 112, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99, 100, 216 N.E.2d 312, 313, Supra. Plaintiffs' motion for attachment was therefore granted by Special Term, and the Appellate Division affirmed. Defendants appeal.

Defendants argue principally that, in light of Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed.2d 683, the Seider attachment procedure is unconstitutional. They argue that since the Seider holding was premised on Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 25 S.Ct. 625, 49 L.Ed. 1023, Seider must fall with Harris, which was overruled by the Shaffer case.

In Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 310, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633, 636, 234 N.E.2d 669, 671, Supra, in which the rationale for the Seider rule was more fully developed, this court cited the Harris case as support for the constitutionality of the procedure. But the court, through Chief Judge Fuld, recognized and indeed foresaw the emergence of more flexible jurisdictional principles for constitutional purposes (Id., p. 311, 287 N.Y.S.2d p. 637, 234 N.E.2d p. 671). The opinion in the Shaffer case parallels this analysis; certainly the Supreme Court has not repudiated it (see Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, esp. pp. 207-212, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed.2d 683, Supra ; see, also, Silberman, Commentaries on Shaffer v. Heitner, End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 33, 96-97). The Seider rule therefore satisfies the jurisdictional standards set forth in the Shaffer case.

Indeed, two appellate courts have written thoughtful opinions holding that the Seider doctrine survives the constitutional principles expressed in the Shaffer case (O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 2 Cir., 579 F.2d 194, 197-202 (Friendly, J.); Alford v. McGaw, 61 A.D.2d 504, 506-509, 402 N.Y.S.2d 499, 501-503, app. dsmd. 45 N.Y.2d 776). The gist of the analysis is that the primary risks and burdens of defending a Seider -type action rest on the insurer, who does business in New York, and over whom even personal jurisdiction may, of course, be obtained. The burdens on the nonresident insured, although existent, are not sufficient to prevent, constitutionally, the New York courts from adjudicating a dispute principally between a New York plaintiff and an insurance company doing business in New York.

Remaining is the basic policy question: should the much-criticized Seider case be overruled? The merits of the rule are still in dispute (compare, e. g., Donawitz v. Danek, 42 N.Y.2d 138, 147-151, 397 N.Y.S.2d 592, 598-601, 366 N.E.2d 253, 258-262 (concurring opn.), Supra, with Id., pp. 151-153, 397 N.Y.S.2d pp. 601-602, 366 P.2d pp. 261-263 (dissenting opn.)). Whatever the deficiencies in its logical foundation, application of the rule does not appear to have worked extensive injustice during its 12-year history. As has been noted, should injustice there be, the Legislature is free to change the rule (see Donawitz v. Danek, supra, 42 N.Y.2d 142, and 149-150, 397 N.Y.S.2d 594, and 599-600, 366 N.E.2d 255 and 260-261 (concurring opn.); Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 312, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633, 638, 234 N.E.2d 669, 672, Supra ).

"Distinctions in the application and withholding of Stare decisis require a nice delicacy and judicial self-restraint. At the root of the techniques must be a humbling assumption, often true, that no particular court as it is then constituted possesses a wisdom surpassing that of its predecessors. Without this assumption there is jurisprudential anarchy" (People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 488, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419, 425, 348 N.E.2d 894, 901).

The Seider rule well illustrates the principle. It provoked sharp disagreement at its inception; it is still the subject of controversy. The balance of those in support and in opposition to the rule may have shifted, as it may shift again. Yet, if such shifts are...