Badgley v. Doggett, No. 56410-2-I (Wash. App. 7/31/2006), 56410-2-I
| Decision Date | 31 July 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 56410-2-I,56410-2-I |
| Parties | KENNETH C. BADGLEY, Respondent, v. JOHN EARL DOGGETT, Appellant. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Superior Court of King County. Docket No: 04-2-39761-8. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 06/10/2005. Judge signing: Hon. Mary I Yu.
Counsel for Appellant(s), John Stocks, Van Siclen Stocks & Finkins, 721 45th St NE, Auburn, WA 98002-1303.
Counsel for Respondent(s), David Lawrence Force, Carlson McMahon & Sealby PLLC, 37 S Wenatchee Ave Ste F, PO Box 2965, Wenatchee, WA 98807-2965.
Patrick G. McMahon, Attorney at Law, 37 S Wenatchee Ave Ste F, PO Box 2965, Wenatchee, WA 98807-2965.
After John Doggett successfully defended the malicious prosecution action Wenatchee Police Chief Kenneth Badgley filed against him under RCW 4.24.350, he moved for attorney fees under RCW 4.84.250, which mandates attorney fees for the prevailing party in an action for damages where the amount pleaded is $10,000 or less. The trial court denied Doggett's request, ruling that the amount Badgley pleaded included his attorney fees and was thus over $10,000. Doggett appeals, arguing attorney fees requested under RCW 4.24.350(2) are not an element of damages.
The plain language of RCW 4.24.350(2) establishes that the legislature intended attorney fees be recovered as costs rather than as damages. So Badgley's `amount pleaded' is limited to the $1,000 in liquidated damages allowed under RCW 4.24.350(2). Under RCW 4.84.250, Doggett is thus entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees. We reverse and remand for an award of reasonable attorney fees.
On December 17, 2004, Wenatchee Police Chief Kenneth C. Badgley filed a summons and complaint against John E. Doggett, alleging malicious prosecution under RCW 4.24.350.1 Badgley sought $1,000.00 in liquidated damages, reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred defending against Doggett's allegedly unfounded lawsuit, and reasonable attorney fees and costs for bringing the malicious prosecution claim. After both parties moved for summary judgment, the trial court granted Doggett's motion and dismissed the case.
Doggett then moved for entry of judgment against Badgley and requested attorney fees and costs under RCW 4.84.250. RCW 4.84.250 provides that in any action for damages where the amount pleaded by the prevailing party as hereinafter defined, exclusive of costs, is {ten thousand} dollars or less, there shall be taxed and allowed to the prevailing party as a part of the costs of the action a reasonable amount to be fixed by the court as attorneys' fees. . . .2
The trial court denied Doggett's motion, ruling that the damages Badgley sought included the reasonable attorney fees he requested for defending against Doggett's initial action. Because Badgley did not plead a specific amount of attorney fees, the court ruled his claim could have exceeded $10,000, so RCW 4.84.250 did not apply and Doggett was not entitled to attorney fees.
I. Attorney Fees Under RCW 4.24.350(2)
We must determine whether attorney fees sought in a malicious prosecution action under RCW 4.24.350(2) are an element of `damages' for purposes of determining the amount pleaded under RCW 4.84.250. If they are, Badgley pleaded over $10,000 and Doggett cannot recover attorney fees under RCW 4.84.250. If not, RCW 4.84.250 applies and mandates an award of attorney fees to Doggett as the prevailing party.3 We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo.4 Where statutory language is "plain, free from ambiguity and devoid of uncertainty, there is no room for construction because the legislative intention derives solely from the language of the statute."5 In undertaking a plain language analysis, this court takes care to avoid "unlikely, absurd or strained" results.6 We interpret a statute to give effect to every word and phrase.7 Only when legislative intent is not clear from the statutory language may we "resort to extrinsic aids, such as legislative history."8 This court interprets statutory provisions together with related provisions to maintain the integrity of the respective statutes and reads statutes addressing the same subject as complementary rather than conflicting.9
Doggett argues the attorney fees Badgley requested in his malicious prosecution lawsuit are costs rather than an element of damages and the trial court erred by including them in Badgley's `amount pleaded' under RCW 4.84.250. He contends the plain language of both RCW 4.84.250 and RCW 4.24.350(2) support this conclusion. Badgley argues that attorney fees in a malicious prosecution action are recoverable as an element of damages rather than as costs, so he pleaded well over $10,000 in damages in the complaint.
The `amount pleaded' under RCW 4.84.250 includes only the plaintiff's basic claim for damages.10 There is no dispute Badgley's attorney fees, even if they are limited to the fees he incurred defending against Doggett's initial action, total over $10,000. Badgley brought his malicious prosecution action under RCW 4.24.350(2):
In any action, claim, or counterclaim brought by a judicial officer, prosecuting authority, or law enforcement officer for malicious prosecution arising out of the performance or purported performance of the public duty of such officer, an arrest or seizure of property need not be an element of the claim, nor do special damages need to be proved. A judicial officer, prosecuting authority, or law enforcement officer prevailing in such an action may be allowed an amount up to one thousand dollars as liquidated damages, together with a reasonable attorneys' fee, and other costs of suit. A government entity which has provided legal services to the prevailing judicial officer, prosecuting authority, or law enforcement officer has reimbursement rights to any award for reasonable attorneys' fees and other costs, but shall have no such rights to any liquidated damages allowed.11
The `together with a reasonable attorneys' fee, and other costs of suit' language indicates the legislature considers attorney fees a cost of the suit rather than an element of damages.12 The next sentence confirms this, stating that a government entity providing legal services to a prevailing officer `has reimbursement rights to any award for reasonable attorneys' fees and other costs, but shall have no such rights to any liquidated damages allowed.'13 Even if it were not clear that the legislature considers attorney fees a cost of suit, the statutory language prevents them from being considered an element of damages. Black's Law Dictionary defines `liquidated damages' as an 14 Where a statute provides for liquidated damages, the sum fixed is the only measure of damages recoverable under the statute, and there can be no additional recovery for special damages.15 RCW 4.24.350(2) limits damages to $1,000, but it also provides for recovery of reasonable attorney fees along with `other costs of suit.'16 The very fact that a law enforcement officer can recover attorney fees in addition to liquidated damages means those fees are not damages under the statute.
Badgley relies on Washington case law recognizing attorney fees as an element of damages when they arise from a malicious prosecution lawsuit. In Washington, attorney fees are considered costs of litigation,17 but there are "certain circumstances" where a party may recover attorney fees as an element of damages.18 In Rorvig v. Douglas, the Washington Supreme Court held that, in malicious prosecution actions, `it has long been the rule that damages include the attorney fees for the underlying action made necessary by the defendant's wrongful act.'19 But neither Rorvig nor any other case has addressed whether, in the context of RCW 4.24.350(2), attorney fees are considered an element of damages or costs. Washington common law does not change the fact the legislature in RCW 4.24.350(2) limits damages to $1,000 and allows a separate recovery of attorney fees as costs. Not only does the statute authorize an attorney fees award in addition to liquidated damages, indicating the fees are allowed as part of the cost of litigation,20 it specifically treats attorney fees as distinct from damages. The legislature intended that a prevailing party recover attorney fees as costs rather than as an element of damages under RCW 4.24.350(2).
Badgley argues that even if attorney fees are recoverable as costs rather than damages under RCW 4.24.350(2), allowing Doggett to recover attorney fees under RCW 4.84.250 creates an absurd result that is contrary to the policies underlying RCW 4.24.350(2). He contends the legislature did not intend to expose law enforcement officers to liability for attorney fees under RCW 4.84.250 by limiting liquidated damages to $1,000. In enacting RCW 4.24.350(2), the legislature found that a growing number of unfounded lawsuits, claims, and liens are filed against law enforcement officers, prosecuting authorities, and judges, and against their property, having the purpose and effect of deterring those officers in the exercise of their discretion and inhibiting the performance of their public duties.
The legislature also finds that the cost of defending against such unfounded suits, claims and liens is severely burdensome to such officers, and also to the state and the various cities and counties of the state. The purpose of section 2 of this 1984 act is to provide a remedy to those public officers and to the public.21
`{O}ur Legislature has attempted to discourage lawsuits by enacting RCW 4.24.350, which...
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