Badway v. United States

Decision Date20 October 1966
Docket NumberNo. 6707.,6707.
Citation367 F.2d 22
PartiesJoseph A. BADWAY, Defendant, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Harold H. Winsten, Providence, R. I., for appellant.

Mark S. Rothman, Atty. Dept. of Justice, with whom Mitchell Rogovin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Meyer Rothwacks and Joseph Kovner, Attys., Dept. of Justice, and Frederick W. Faerber, Jr., U. S. Atty., were on brief, for appellee.

Before ALDRICH, Chief Judge, and McENTEE and COFFIN, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

McENTEE, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from the judgment of the district court in an action to foreclose two federal tax liens. The essential facts are as follows. On July 18, 1952, the defendants, Joseph G. Roukous, his wife Ilia and his sister, Mary DiLullo, all of Providence, Rhode Island, borrowed $15,000 from the defendant Haddad, a resident of Wareham, Massachusetts, and gave him their promissory note for that amount. The note was secured by a mortgage on real estate located in the Town of Johnston, Rhode Island.1 Shortly thereafter Haddad became involved in serious tax trouble,2 and as a consequence notices of federal tax liens were filed against him. These notices were filed on January 20 and March 9, 1953, in the office of the Town Clerk of Wareham, Massachusetts, where Haddad still resided. Some four years later but while the government's tax claims against him were still pending, Haddad transferred this note and mortgage to the defendant Badway, a relative of his, who resided in Rhode Island.3 At that time the balance on the note was $10,800. Thereafter, when the note matured, the United States and Badway both demanded payment of this balance, but since neither could produce the note in satisfaction of payment, the defendants Roukous and DiLullo refused to pay either of them.

The United States now brings this proceeding to foreclose its tax liens on Haddad's interest in the indebtedness of the defendants Roukous and DiLullo on the note.4 During the pendency of this action Haddad's tax liabilities were reduced to judgment in the United States District Court in Massachusetts.5

At the trial Badway contended (1) that the tax liens are invalid in that they were not filed in Johnston, Rhode Island, where the mortgaged real estate was located, and (2) that he, not Haddad, owns the indebtedness in question by reason of the above stated transfer for which he says he paid Haddad a present valuable consideration.6

The district court found that the transfer of the note and mortgage by Haddad to Badway was fraudulent and without present consideration; that the United States had valid federal tax liens on the indebtedness of the defendants Roukous and DiLullo to the defendant Haddad which are superior to the claim of the defendant Badway and is entitled to foreclose its federal tax liens on this indebtedness.7 Shortly thereafter, judgment was entered upon the court's findings. From this judgment the defendant Badway appeals.

On appeal this defendant's principal contentions are that the trial court erred in not finding that the tax liens were invalid; that it also erred in finding that the transfer of the note and mortgage to him was fraudulent and without present consideration and finally that this proceeding is untimely and is otherwise barred by the previous Massachusetts action against Haddad.8

We do not agree that the trial court erred in upholding the validity of the tax liens. The jeopardy assessments, together with the required notices and demands for payment, all appear to have been timely and legally made. In addition, we think the liens were legally perfected by the filing of the lien notices in the office of the Town Clerk in Wareham, Massachusetts. Badway contends that these liens are invalid because the lien notices were not filed in Johnston, Rhode Island. The short answer to this contention is that here the government is proceeding against the delinquent taxpayer's interest in the indebtedness of the defendants Roukous and DiLullo as evidenced by their unpaid note. Haddad's interest in this indebtedness is intangible personal property, the situs of which is the domicile of its owner. Baldwin v. State of Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 50 S.Ct. 436, 74 L.Ed. 1056 (1930). It is undisputed that during this period Haddad resided in Wareham and in recording the tax lien notices there the United States satisfied the requirements of the Internal Revenue Code and complied with the provisions of the Massachusetts statute in perfecting the liens.9 It seems apparent, therefore, that the government had valid tax liens against the promissory note of the defendants, Roukous and DiLullo, and that these liens attached to the note...

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22 cases
  • O'Rourke v. Jason Inc., Civil Action No. 94-30167-MAP.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts
    • September 10, 1997
    ...While Defendant bore the burden of pleading the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense, see Fed. R.Civ.P. 8(c), Badway v. United States, 367 F.2d 22, 25 (1st Cir.1966), he did not necessarily bear the burden of proof as well. The burden of pleading "operates independently of the b......
  • Rivera-Puig v. Garcia-Rosario
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)
    • November 4, 1992
    ...just as well, as they are affirmative defenses that are waived unless raised in the answer. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c); Badway v. United States, 367 F.2d 22, 25 (1st Cir.1966). Appellants failed to raise these defenses in their answer.Moreover, even if appellants had properly raised these defens......
  • Tang v. Appellate Division of NY Supreme Ct., First Dept.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit)
    • October 19, 1973
    ...res judicata as a defense amounts to a waiver of that defense, and it cannot be raised on appeal for the first time. Badway v. United States, 367 F.2d 22, 25 (1st Cir. 1966). The same is true for collateral estoppel. Cf. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corp. v. Szarabajka, 330 F. Supp. 1......
  • Nixon v. U.S., 92-5021
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia)
    • November 17, 1992
    ...Seventh and Ninth Circuits have declined to exercise such authority under the circumstances presented to them. See Badway v. United States, 367 F.2d 22, 25 (1st Cir.1966); Kane v. Heckler, 776 F.2d 1130, 1132 (3d Cir.1985); Crowe v. Cherokee Wonderland, Inc., 379 F.2d 51, 54 (4th Cir.1967);......
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