Baender v. Barnett

• Decision Date: 28 February 1921
• Docket Number: No. 614,614
• Citation: 41 S.Ct. 271,65 L.Ed. 597,255 U.S. 224
• Parties: BAENDER v. BARNETT, Sheriff
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

255 U.S. 224

41 S.Ct. 271

65 L.Ed. 597

BAENDER

v BARNETT, Sheriff.

No. 614.

Argued Jan. 11, 1921.

Decided Feb. 28, 1921.

Mr. Levi Cooke, of Washington D. C., for appellant.

Mr. Assistant Attorney General Stewart, for appellee.

Mr. Justice VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is an appeal from an order denying a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner was indicted under section 169 of the Criminal Code (Comp. St. § 10339), which declares that 'whoever, without lawful authority, shall have in his possession' any die in the likeness or similitude of a die designated for making genuine coin of the United States shall be punished, etc. The indictment charged that he 'willfully, knowingly,' and without lawful authority had in his possession certain dies of that description. He entered a plea of guilty and was sentenced to pay a fine and suffer a year's imprison ment. He made an explanatory statement to the effect that the dies were in some junk he had purchased, and that he did not know at the time of their presence nor of their coming into his possession; but, so far as appears, the statement was made without his being under oath and with the purpose only of inviting a lenient sentence.

Originally the statute contained the qualifying words 'with intent to fraudulently or unlawfully use the same' (chapter 127, § 1, 26 Stat. 742), but they were eliminated when it was incorporated into the Criminal Code (35 Stat. 1088, 1120, c. 321, § 169).

The petitioner makes two contentions, One is that the statute is repugnant to the due process of law clause of the Fifth Amendment, in that it makes criminal a having in possession which is neither willing nor conscious. The District Court, in denying the petition, held otherwise, saying that the statute, rightly construed, means 'a willing and conscious possession,' and the court added:

'Such is the possession intended by the indictment, and such is the possession, the petitioner having pleaded guilty to the indictment, that he must be held to have had. Otherwise he was not guilty. He might have pleaded not guilty, and upon trial shown that he did not know the dies were in his possession.'

We think the court was right. The statute is not intended to include and make criminal a possession which is not conscious and willing. While its words are general they are to be taken in a reasonable sense, and not in one which works manifest injustice or infringes constitutional safeguards. In so holding we but give effect to a cardinal rule of construction recognized in repeated decisions of this and other courts. A citation of three will illustrate our view. In Margate Pier Co. v. Hannam, 3 B. & Ald. 266, 270, Abbott, C. J., quoting from Lord Coke, said:

'Acts of Parliament are to be so construed, as no man that is innocent, or free from injury or wrong, be by a literal construction punished or endamaged.'

In United States v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 482, 486 (19 L. Ed. 278), this court said:

'All laws should receive a sensible construction. General terms should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence. It will always, therefore, be presumed that the Legislature intended exceptions to its language, which would avoid results of this character. The reason of the law in such cases should prevail over its letter. The common sense of man approves the judgment mentioned by...